RUSTSEC-2026-0501 (GHSA-CWXV-4866-5GQ2)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-12 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source websiteKeyShares::from_backup_format (the Shamir backup share reader, public since
0.2.0, the crate's first release) accepted a share whose x coordinate is 0,
and KeyShares::recover_private_key interpolates the shares at x = 0 to
recover the key. At an x of 0 the interpolation answers that share's y value
alone, so an attacker who supplies one share in that form — with the share's
integrity tag ground to match the honest set's — chooses the recovered key
outright. The non-canonical zero x = p works the same way, and a repeated x
past the threshold window also passed.
An application that recovers a Shamir backup from shares it did not produce — a custodian's medium, a share pasted by hand, a set restored from another writer — could be handed the attacker's key as the recovered one. A set the crate's own writer produces never carries such a share; the door is the reader.
0.8.7 refuses such a set before interpolating (the 0.9 line's next prerelease
carries the same refusal). Where upgrading is not possible, before recovering
split each share on . into four fields, base58-decode the x field, and
refuse the set if it decodes to zero (the one-character field 1, or a value
at or above the field prime) or if two shares carry the same x.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::shamir::KeyShares::from_backup_format",
"bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::shamir::KeyShares::recover_private_key"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "bsv-rs",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.7"
},
{
"introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-cwxv-4866-5gq2"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`KeyShares::from_backup_format` (the Shamir backup share reader, public since\n0.2.0, the crate\u0027s first release) accepted a share whose x coordinate is 0,\nand `KeyShares::recover_private_key` interpolates the shares at x = 0 to\nrecover the key. At an x of 0 the interpolation answers that share\u0027s y value\nalone, so an attacker who supplies one share in that form \u2014 with the share\u0027s\nintegrity tag ground to match the honest set\u0027s \u2014 chooses the recovered key\noutright. The non-canonical zero x = p works the same way, and a repeated x\npast the threshold window also passed.\n\nAn application that recovers a Shamir backup from shares it did not produce \u2014\na custodian\u0027s medium, a share pasted by hand, a set restored from another\nwriter \u2014 could be handed the attacker\u0027s key as the recovered one. A set the\ncrate\u0027s own writer produces never carries such a share; the door is the\nreader.\n\n0.8.7 refuses such a set before interpolating (the 0.9 line\u0027s next prerelease\ncarries the same refusal). Where upgrading is not possible, before recovering\nsplit each share on `.` into four fields, base58-decode the x field, and\nrefuse the set if it decodes to zero (the one-character field `1`, or a value\nat or above the field prime) or if two shares carry the same x.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0501",
"modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0501.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.7/CHANGELOG.md"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/issues/854"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Shamir backup recovery accepts a share at x = 0, so a supplied share can substitute the recovered private key"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.