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    RUSTSEC-2026-0501 (GHSA-CWXV-4866-5GQ2)

    Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-12 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    Shamir backup recovery accepts a share at x = 0, so a supplied share can substitute the recovered private key
    Details

    KeyShares::from_backup_format (the Shamir backup share reader, public since 0.2.0, the crate's first release) accepted a share whose x coordinate is 0, and KeyShares::recover_private_key interpolates the shares at x = 0 to recover the key. At an x of 0 the interpolation answers that share's y value alone, so an attacker who supplies one share in that form — with the share's integrity tag ground to match the honest set's — chooses the recovered key outright. The non-canonical zero x = p works the same way, and a repeated x past the threshold window also passed.

    An application that recovers a Shamir backup from shares it did not produce — a custodian's medium, a share pasted by hand, a set restored from another writer — could be handed the attacker's key as the recovered one. A set the crate's own writer produces never carries such a share; the door is the reader.

    0.8.7 refuses such a set before interpolating (the 0.9 line's next prerelease carries the same refusal). Where upgrading is not possible, before recovering split each share on . into four fields, base58-decode the x field, and refuse the set if it decodes to zero (the one-character field 1, or a value at or above the field prime) or if two shares carry the same x.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "categories": [
              "crypto-failure"
            ],
            "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "informational": null
          },
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "affected_functions": null,
            "affects": {
              "arch": [],
              "functions": [
                "bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::shamir::KeyShares::from_backup_format",
                "bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::shamir::KeyShares::recover_private_key"
              ],
              "os": []
            }
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "crates.io",
            "name": "bsv-rs",
            "purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.8.7"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
                }
              ],
              "type": "SEMVER"
            }
          ],
          "versions": []
        }
      ],
      "aliases": [
        "GHSA-cwxv-4866-5gq2"
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "license": "CC0-1.0"
      },
      "details": "`KeyShares::from_backup_format` (the Shamir backup share reader, public since\n0.2.0, the crate\u0027s first release) accepted a share whose x coordinate is 0,\nand `KeyShares::recover_private_key` interpolates the shares at x = 0 to\nrecover the key. At an x of 0 the interpolation answers that share\u0027s y value\nalone, so an attacker who supplies one share in that form \u2014 with the share\u0027s\nintegrity tag ground to match the honest set\u0027s \u2014 chooses the recovered key\noutright. The non-canonical zero x = p works the same way, and a repeated x\npast the threshold window also passed.\n\nAn application that recovers a Shamir backup from shares it did not produce \u2014\na custodian\u0027s medium, a share pasted by hand, a set restored from another\nwriter \u2014 could be handed the attacker\u0027s key as the recovered one. A set the\ncrate\u0027s own writer produces never carries such a share; the door is the\nreader.\n\n0.8.7 refuses such a set before interpolating (the 0.9 line\u0027s next prerelease\ncarries the same refusal). Where upgrading is not possible, before recovering\nsplit each share on `.` into four fields, base58-decode the x field, and\nrefuse the set if it decodes to zero (the one-character field `1`, or a value\nat or above the field prime) or if two shares carry the same x.",
      "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0501",
      "modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
      "published": "2026-11-12T12:00:00Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0501.html"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.7/CHANGELOG.md"
        },
        {
          "type": "REPORT",
          "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/issues/854"
        }
      ],
      "related": [],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "Shamir backup recovery accepts a share at x = 0, so a supplied share can substitute the recovered private key"
    }