RUSTSEC-2026-0385
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-23 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-23 08:19 – Source websiteSummary
The ctutils::Choice type has mask generation functions for each unsigned
integer size (u8, u16, u32, u64, u128). These are const fn and
therefore can't reuse the asm!-backed mask generation in the cmov crate
that's otherwise used to ensure constant-time.
In releases prior to v0.4.4, the generated code from these functions could include a branch on commonly used platforms. This has been corrected in this release and now verified on several platforms using BINSEC.
Additionally, u128 comparison operations provided via ctutils::Choice and
intended to work in constant-time were generating branches on 32-bit targets.
This has been resolved via a special case implementation of these functions
for such targets.
Impact
Branch instructions on secret values can potentially leak such values via covert channels. This can enable attackers to potentially recover such secrets.
Resolution
This has been resolved by calling Choice::to_u8() when generating the mask,
which in turn uses black_box as an optimization barrier. Verification that
this resulted in the desired change in the generated assembly across a variety
of target CPU architectures was performed by BINSEC, which now runs
automatically in CI using cargo checkct.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "ctutils",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/ctutils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.4"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `ctutils::Choice` type has mask generation functions for each unsigned\ninteger size (`u8`, `u16`, `u32`, `u64`, `u128`). These are `const fn` and\ntherefore can\u0027t reuse the `asm!`-backed mask generation in the `cmov` crate\nthat\u0027s otherwise used to ensure constant-time.\n\nIn releases prior to v0.4.4, the generated code from these functions could\ninclude a branch on commonly used platforms. This has been corrected in this\nrelease and now verified on several platforms using BINSEC.\n\nAdditionally, `u128` comparison operations provided via `ctutils::Choice` and\nintended to work in constant-time were generating branches on 32-bit targets.\nThis has been resolved via a special case implementation of these functions\nfor such targets.\n\n## Impact\n\nBranch instructions on secret values can potentially leak such values via\ncovert channels. This can enable attackers to potentially recover such secrets.\n\n## Resolution\n\nThis has been resolved by calling `Choice::to_u8()` when generating the mask,\nwhich in turn uses `black_box` as an optimization barrier. Verification that\nthis resulted in the desired change in the generated assembly across a variety\nof target CPU architectures was performed by BINSEC, which now runs\nautomatically in CI using `cargo checkct`.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0385",
"modified": "2026-10-23T08:19:48Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/ctutils"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0385.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/utils/pull/1569"
}
],
"related": [
"RUSTSEC-2026-0003"
],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Non-constant-time mask generation and `u128` comparisons"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.