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      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0003 — Non-constant-time code generation on ARM32 targets</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0003</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: cmov&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the `cmov` crate has a special backend for `aarch64` which uses special
CSEL instructions, on 32-bit ARM it uses a portable pure Rust fallback
implementation. This implementation uses a combination of bitwise arithmetic
and `core::hint::black_box` to attempt to coerce constant-time code generation
out of the optimizer, but the implementation in v0.4.3 and earlier failed to
do this on 32-bit ARM targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Branch instructions inserted by the LLVM optimizer on 32-bit targets can be
leveraged using various microarchitectural sidechannels like cache timing
attacks to learn secret information that `cmov` is designed to protect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following assembly was emitted when using `Cmov::cmovnz`, a function which
implements a conditional move when a provided value is non-zero:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```asm
    bne  .LBB0_2
    mvns r3, r3
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This includes a branch instruction `bne`: Branch if Not Equal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following code reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
#![no_std]
use cmov::Cmov;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[inline(never)]
pub fn test_ct_cmov(a: &amp;amp;mut u8, b: u8, c: u8) {
    a.cmovnz(&amp;amp;b, c);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resolution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cmov` v0.4.4 includes a portable `black_box`-based tactical mitigation for the
issue which coerced the compiler into producing the expected codegen, and
additionally v0.4.5 added an `asm!` reimplementation of the problematic mask
generation function for ARM32 targets which should guarantee that particular
function never contains a branch on such targets.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: cmov&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the `cmov` crate has a special backend for `aarch64` which uses special
CSEL instructions, on 32-bit ARM it uses a portable pure Rust fallback
implementation. This implementation uses a combination of bitwise arithmetic
and `core::hint::black_box` to attempt to coerce constant-time code generation
out of the optimizer, but the implementation in v0.4.3 and earlier failed to
do this on 32-bit ARM targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Branch instructions inserted by the LLVM optimizer on 32-bit targets can be
leveraged using various microarchitectural sidechannels like cache timing
attacks to learn secret information that `cmov` is designed to protect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following assembly was emitted when using `Cmov::cmovnz`, a function which
implements a conditional move when a provided value is non-zero:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```asm
    bne  .LBB0_2
    mvns r3, r3
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This includes a branch instruction `bne`: Branch if Not Equal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following code reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
#![no_std]
use cmov::Cmov;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[inline(never)]
pub fn test_ct_cmov(a: &amp;amp;mut u8, b: u8, c: u8) {
    a.cmovnz(&amp;amp;b, c);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resolution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cmov` v0.4.4 includes a portable `black_box`-based tactical mitigation for the
issue which coerced the compiler into producing the expected codegen, and
additionally v0.4.5 added an `asm!` reimplementation of the problematic mask
generation function for ARM32 targets which should guarantee that particular
function never contains a branch on such targets.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0003</guid>
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