GHSA-MJQ6-R62F-5PQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 21:31 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:31MISP's EventDelegationsController delegateEvent method accepted a user-supplied sharing_group_id parameter without verifying that the requesting user was a member of the referenced sharing group. When a delegation request was submitted with distribution set to 4 (sharing-group distribution), the raw sharing_group_id value was stored directly into the EventDelegation record. The delegation view subsequently rendered the stored sharing group's name back to the requester. Because no authorization check was performed, any authenticated user with delegation permission could enumerate sharing group identifiers (by guessing sequential IDs or other values) and read the names of sharing groups to which their organisation did not belong, including hidden or restricted groups. Hidden, missing, and malformed identifiers were not distinguished in the response, but the successful case still leaked the group name. The vulnerability required an authenticated session with the perm_delegate capability and knowledge of a valid event ID to delegate. The security impact is limited to disclosure of sharing group names (a low-impact confidentiality breach) and does not grant access to the group's contents or modify any data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-132641"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T21:17:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MISP\u0027s EventDelegationsController delegateEvent method accepted a user-supplied sharing_group_id parameter without verifying that the requesting user was a member of the referenced sharing group. When a delegation request was submitted with distribution set to 4 (sharing-group distribution), the raw sharing_group_id value was stored directly into the EventDelegation record. The delegation view subsequently rendered the stored sharing group\u0027s name back to the requester. Because no authorization check was performed, any authenticated user with delegation permission could enumerate sharing group identifiers (by guessing sequential IDs or other values) and read the names of sharing groups to which their organisation did not belong, including hidden or restricted groups. Hidden, missing, and malformed identifiers were not distinguished in the response, but the successful case still leaked the group name. The vulnerability required an authenticated session with the perm_delegate capability and knowledge of a valid event ID to delegate. The security impact is limited to disclosure of sharing group names (a low-impact confidentiality breach) and does not grant access to the group\u0027s contents or modify any data.",
"id": "GHSA-mjq6-r62f-5pqr",
"modified": "2026-11-18T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-132641"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/518ce0fe6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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