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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-103858",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-01T15:00:37.761849Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T15:00:57.587Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "modules": [
            "PostsController (discussion/thread posting)"
          ],
          "product": "MISP",
          "programFiles": [
            "app/Controller/PostsController.php"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
          "vendor": "MISP",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.5.48",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unspecified",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Bastien Bossiroy and C\u00e9lien Desteucq of NCIA"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "iglocska"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context)"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP contains an incomplete authorization check in the discussion posting functionality. When a user submits a post to a thread or replies to an existing post, the application only verified whether the target thread was restricted to a single organization (org-only distribution). It did not enforce the full thread access control list, including sharing-group membership and event-level visibility.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs a result, an authenticated user who is outside the relevant sharing group or who does not have visibility on the associated event could:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Read the thread title and the content of the quoted post\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Submit a new post into the discussion thread\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis constitutes both an information disclosure (reading restricted thread and post content) and an integrity issue (injecting content into a thread the user is not authorized to participate in).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAffected: \u0026lt;2.5.48\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "MISP contains an incomplete authorization check in the discussion posting functionality. When a user submits a post to a thread or replies to an existing post, the application only verified whether the target thread was restricted to a single organization (org-only distribution). It did not enforce the full thread access control list, including sharing-group membership and event-level visibility.\n\nAs a result, an authenticated user who is outside the relevant sharing group or who does not have visibility on the associated event could:\n\n- Read the thread title and the content of the quoted post\n\n- Submit a new post into the discussion thread\n\nThis constitutes both an information disclosure (reading restricted thread and post content) and an integrity issue (injecting content into a thread the user is not authorized to participate in).\n\nAffected: \u003c2.5.48"
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-10",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-10 Parameter Tampering"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        },
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          "format": "SSVC",
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            "content": {
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              "role": "Supplier",
              "timestamp": "2026-10-01T11:16:47Z",
              "version": "2.0.3"
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      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T11:31:32.840Z",
        "orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "shortName": "CIRCL"
      },
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          "name": "Security patch",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix replaces the limited org-only distribution check with a call to the thread\u0027s full authorization method (checkIfAuthorised), which enforces the complete access control list including sharing groups and event-level visibility. The thread is only read after successful authorization, preventing disclosure of the title and content to unauthorized users. An additional null-check on the post\u0027s thread_id was added to prevent referencing posts without a valid thread association.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The fix replaces the limited org-only distribution check with a call to the thread\u0027s full authorization method (checkIfAuthorised), which enforces the complete access control list including sharing groups and event-level visibility. The thread is only read after successful authorization, preventing disclosure of the title and content to unauthorized users. An additional null-check on the post\u0027s thread_id was added to prevent referencing posts without a valid thread association."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Incomplete Thread Authorization Allows Unauthorized Read and Post Access to Discussions",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
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              "ai_annotations": [
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                  "ai_level": "generated",
                  "description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
                  "gna_source": 1,
                  "models": [
                    {
                      "gna_source": 1,
                      "identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "name": "qwen3.8:27b",
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                    }
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                  "review_status": "full",
                  "scope": "record",
                  "tags": [
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              ]
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            "bcp-05-x-02": {
              "x_patch2vuln": {
                "assumptions": [
                  "The exact affected version range is uncertain; the tag boundary v2.5.48 with 42 commits after the fix suggests the fix landed around or before v2.5.48, but the precise first-affected and first-fixed versions are not stated in the patch.",
                  "The checkIfAuthorised() method is assumed to enforce the full thread ACL including sharing groups and event visibility, based on the commit message description; the method\u0027s implementation is not included in the patch.",
                  "CAPEC-10 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available CAPEC mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers \u0027incomplete authorization check on a direct object reference\u0027 was identified in the catalog.",
                  "The CVSS assumes the attacker already possesses a valid MISP account (PR:L); unauthenticated access is not indicated by the patch.",
                  "The AI co-author (Claude Opus 5.5) is credited as a tool rather than a person, per the Co-Authored-By line."
                ],
                "capecRationale": [
                  {
                    "capecId": "CAPEC-10",
                    "rationale": "The attacker manipulates the target_id parameter (thread_id or post_id) in the posts/add request to reference a thread or post they do not have full access to. The incomplete server-side authorization check then permits the operation. CAPEC-10 is the closest available pattern for exploiting a server\u0027s failure to properly validate the authorization context of a user-supplied resource identifier. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically named \u0027Insecure Direct Object Reference\u0027 or \u0027Broken Access Control via Incomplete ACL\u0027 exists in the CAPEC catalog, so Parameter Tampering is the best available match."
                  }
                ],
                "commit": "79fbd4c7580adc0518581351c3d8c3d5b3ac7c97",
                "confidence": "medium",
                "credits": [
                  {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "type": "reporter",
                    "value": "Bastien Bossiroy and C\u00e9lien Desteucq of NCIA"
                  },
                  {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "type": "remediation developer",
                    "value": "iglocska"
                  },
                  {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "type": "remediation developer",
                    "value": "Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context)"
                  }
                ],
                "cvssRationale": "AV:N: web application accessible over network. AC:L: attacker only needs a valid thread_id or post_id, no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no special attack prerequisites beyond authentication. PR:L: requires an authenticated MISP user account. UI:N: no victim interaction needed; the attacker directly issues the request. VC:L: attacker can read thread titles and quoted post content they should not see. VI:L: attacker can inject posts into unauthorized threads. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no impact on subsequent components. The impact is bounded to the MISP instance\u0027s data and does not compromise the server or other systems.",
                "fixSummary": "The fix replaces the limited org-only distribution check with a call to the thread\u0027s full authorization method (checkIfAuthorised), which enforces the complete access control list including sharing groups and event-level visibility. The thread is only read after successful authorization, preventing disclosure of the title and content to unauthorized users. An additional null-check on the post\u0027s thread_id was added to prevent referencing posts without a valid thread association.",
                "generatedAt": "2026-10-01T11:16:47.016611Z",
                "generator": "patch2vuln.py",
                "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                "modelComparison": {
                  "rankings": [
                    {
                      "agreementScore": 11,
                      "assumptionCount": 5,
                      "confidence": "medium",
                      "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "score": 7
                    }
                  ],
                  "selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
                  "selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
                  "selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
                },
                "patchSha256": "04551eba9b017a1a2ccf05a79c21466f3fd7095a42750bd2704d57b2e3730938",
                "patchSummary": "In PostsController.php add() method: (1) For the \u0027thread\u0027 target case, replaced the inline distribution==0 and org_id comparison with a call to Thread-\u003echeckIfAuthorised() before reading the thread; removed the separate _isSiteAdmin() bypass. (2) For the \u0027post\u0027 target case, added a check that the post has a non-empty thread_id, replaced the same limited distribution/org check with Thread-\u003echeckIfAuthorised(), and reordered the thread read to occur after the authorization check. Net: 8 insertions, 12 deletions in one file.",
                "patchTruncated": false,
                "patches": [
                  {
                    "commit": "79fbd4c7580adc0518581351c3d8c3d5b3ac7c97",
                    "date": "Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:27:08 +0200",
                    "patchSha256": "04551eba9b017a1a2ccf05a79c21466f3fd7095a42750bd2704d57b2e3730938",
                    "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch",
                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch",
                    "subject": "fix: [security] Apply the thread ACL when posting to a"
                  }
                ],
                "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch",
                "ssvc": {
                  "options": [
                    {
                      "Exploitation": "none"
                    },
                    {
                      "Automatable": "yes"
                    },
                    {
                      "Technical Impact": "partial"
                    }
                  ],
                  "role": "Supplier",
                  "timestamp": "2026-10-01T11:16:47Z",
                  "version": "2.0.3"
                },
                "subject": "fix: [security] Apply the thread ACL when posting to a",
                "tagVersionBoundary": {
                  "commits_after_fix": 42,
                  "repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
                  "tag": "v2.5.48",
                  "version": "2.5.48",
                  "version_type": "semver"
                },
                "weaknessRationale": [
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-285",
                    "rationale": "The authorization check was present but incomplete: it only verified org-level distribution (distribution==0) and org_id match, failing to enforce sharing-group membership and event-level ACL. This is a classic case of insufficient authorization logic rather than a completely missing check, making CWE-285 more precise than CWE-862."
                  }
                ]
              }
            },
            "bcp-05-x-03": {
              "x_timeline": {
                "events": [
                  {
                    "description": "Corrective change authored (79fbd4c7580adc0518581351c3d8c3d5b3ac7c97): fix: [security] Apply the thread ACL when posting to a",
                    "id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
                    "references": [
                      "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch"
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                    "timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:27:08Z",
                    "type": "fix-developed"
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            }
          },
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20244"
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
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    "assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-103858",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-01T11:31:32.840Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-01T11:31:31.101Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T15:00:57.587Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-103664",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
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                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-01T15:06:14.886463Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
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        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T15:06:25.374Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "modules": [
            "AttributesController::viewAnalystData",
            "ObjectsController::viewAnalystData",
            "Analyst_data view templates"
          ],
          "product": "MISP",
          "programFiles": [
            "app/Controller/AttributesController.php",
            "app/Controller/ObjectsController.php",
            "app/View/Elements/genericElements/Analyst_data/generic_simple.ctp",
            "app/View/Elements/genericElements/Analyst_data/thread.ctp"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
          "vendor": "MISP",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.5.48",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
        },
        {
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          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "iglocska"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context)"
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      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP contains a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the analyst data notes panel. The seed path parameter, supplied by the user via the URL, was passed directly into inline JavaScript within the rendered HTML response without any sanitization or type enforcement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn attacker who can convince an authenticated MISP user to navigate to a crafted URL (for example, via a phishing link) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the victim\u0027s browser context. This may allow the attacker to read session tokens, manipulate the page, or perform actions on behalf of the victim.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreconditions:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- The victim must be authenticated to MISP and access the analyst data view for an attribute or object.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- The attacker must supply a malicious seed value in the URL path.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eImpact:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the victim\u0027s browser session.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Potential theft of session credentials or sensitive data visible in the page.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Manipulation of the analyst data interface.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAffected: MISP versions prior to the fix (commit 58925dbf0, post v2.5.48).\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "MISP contains a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the analyst data notes panel. The seed path parameter, supplied by the user via the URL, was passed directly into inline JavaScript within the rendered HTML response without any sanitization or type enforcement.\n\nAn attacker who can convince an authenticated MISP user to navigate to a crafted URL (for example, via a phishing link) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the victim\u0027s browser context. This may allow the attacker to read session tokens, manipulate the page, or perform actions on behalf of the victim.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- The victim must be authenticated to MISP and access the analyst data view for an attribute or object.\n\n- The attacker must supply a malicious seed value in the URL path.\n\nImpact:\n\n- Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the victim\u0027s browser session.\n\n- Potential theft of session credentials or sensitive data visible in the page.\n\n- Manipulation of the analyst data interface.\n\nAffected: MISP versions prior to the fix (commit 58925dbf0, post v2.5.48)."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-1",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-1 XSS - Reflected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 4.8,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
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            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
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            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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          "format": "CVSS",
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              "value": "GENERAL"
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          "format": "SSVC",
          "other": {
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              "timestamp": "2026-10-01T08:49:54Z",
              "version": "2.0.3"
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              "value": "GENERAL"
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      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "description": "CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T08:55:51.589Z",
        "orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "shortName": "CIRCL"
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      "references": [
        {
          "name": "Security patch",
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            "patch"
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          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58925dbf0"
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      "solutions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer type on the seed parameter at both the controller layer and the view/template layer. Casting the value to an integer ensures that any non-numeric input (including script payloads) is neutralized before it reaches the inline JavaScript context, eliminating the injection vector.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer type on the seed parameter at both the controller layer and the view/template layer. Casting the value to an integer ensures that any non-numeric input (including script payloads) is neutralized before it reaches the inline JavaScript context, eliminating the injection vector."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via Unsanitized Analyst Data Seed Parameter",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
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              "ai_annotations": [
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            },
            "bcp-05-x-02": {
              "x_patch2vuln": {
                "assumptions": [
                  "MISP requires user authentication to access the analyst data views; PR:L assumes a low-privilege authenticated account is sufficient for the attacker to craft or deliver the malicious URL.",
                  "The exact fixed version number is not stated in the patch; the fix commit is 32 commits after the v2.5.48 tag, so the fixed version is presumed to be a release after 2.5.48.",
                  "The UI:A rating assumes the victim must click a link or navigate to the crafted URL; if the seed could be injected via a different vector requiring no user interaction, UI could be None.",
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                "timestamp": "2026-09-30T14:58:27.715153Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T15:28:06.728Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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          "modules": [
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            "Correlation Graph (default theme)",
            "Correlation Graph (Overmind theme)",
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          ],
          "product": "MISP",
          "programFiles": [
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            "app/Lib/Tools/CorrelationGraphTool.php",
            "app/webroot/js/correlation-graph.js",
            "app/webroot/js/correlation-graphOvermind.js"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
          "vendor": "MISP",
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            {
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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        }
      ],
      "credits": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
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          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "iglocska"
        },
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      ],
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          "lang": "en",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the galaxy icon handling path. The icon field of a galaxy object was persisted without any server-side validation through the galaxy add, edit, and sync/import capture endpoints. The stored value was subsequently concatenated directly into HTML markup by the D3-based correlation graph rendering scripts (both the default and Overmind themes) using the .html() method.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA user holding the perm_galaxy_editor permission, which is granted to the stock User role, could store arbitrary HTML or JavaScript in the icon field. Any other user who opened the correlation graph of an event containing a cluster belonging to that galaxy would have the injected script executed in their browser session.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eImpact:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Arbitrary script execution in the context of the victim\u0027s MISP session\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Potential theft of session credentials, manipulation of displayed data, or initiation of actions on behalf of the victim\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Affects both the default and Overmind UI themes\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAffected versions: \u0026lt;2.5.48\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "MISP contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the galaxy icon handling path. The icon field of a galaxy object was persisted without any server-side validation through the galaxy add, edit, and sync/import capture endpoints. The stored value was subsequently concatenated directly into HTML markup by the D3-based correlation graph rendering scripts (both the default and Overmind themes) using the .html() method.\n\nA user holding the perm_galaxy_editor permission, which is granted to the stock User role, could store arbitrary HTML or JavaScript in the icon field. Any other user who opened the correlation graph of an event containing a cluster belonging to that galaxy would have the injected script executed in their browser session.\n\nImpact:\n\n- Arbitrary script execution in the context of the victim\u0027s MISP session\n\n- Potential theft of session credentials, manipulation of displayed data, or initiation of actions on behalf of the victim\n\n- Affects both the default and Overmind UI themes\n\nAffected versions: \u003c2.5.48"
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
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          "capecId": "CAPEC-1",
          "descriptions": [
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              "value": "CAPEC-1 Cross Site Scripting"
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          ]
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      "metrics": [
        {
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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            "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
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        }
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      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "description": "CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "cweId": "CWE-20",
              "description": "CWE-20 Improper Input Validation",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T14:25:59.230Z",
        "orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "shortName": "CIRCL"
      },
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Unvalidated Galaxy Icon Field in Correlation Graph",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
            "bcp-05-x-01": {
              "ai_annotations": [
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                  "description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
                  "gna_source": 1,
                  "models": [
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                      "gna_source": 1,
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                "assumptions": [
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                  "The perm_galaxy_editor permission is assumed to be granted to the stock User role as stated in the commit message; the exact role-permission mapping was not independently verified from the patch.",
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                  "CVSS UI:A assumes the victim must navigate to the correlation graph view of a specific event; if the graph is auto-loaded on a commonly visited page, UI could be lowered to Passive.",
                  "The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Fable 5.1); it is recorded as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer."
                ],
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                "fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts.",
                "generatedAt": "2026-09-30T14:24:01.890608Z",
                "generator": "patch2vuln.py",
                "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                "modelComparison": {
                  "rankings": [
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                      "agreementScore": 9,
                      "assumptionCount": 5,
                      "confidence": "high",
                      "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "score": 6
                    }
                  ],
                  "selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
                  "selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
                  "selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
                },
                "patchSha256": "382869c811e8df5875a463c4b6275f754f4969445196f08d708cfee926528b0f",
                "patchSummary": "Added a static isValidIconName() method and a regex constant (ICON_NAME_PATTERN) to the Galaxy model, plus a model-level validation rule restricting the icon field to lowercase letters, digits, and dashes. The captureGalaxy() method now blanks out any icon value that fails validation before persistence. CorrelationGraphTool::__createNode() now checks the icon against the validator and substitutes \u0027globe\u0027 for invalid stored values. Both correlation-graph.js and correlation-graphOvermind.js were changed from .html() string concatenation to .attr(\u0027class\u0027, ...) with a regex strip of non-conforming characters. AppController asset query version bumped from 225 to 226. A new PHPUnit test file (GalaxyIconNameTest.php) validates the icon name rule against known-good and known-bad payloads including the originally reported XSS vector.",
                "patchTruncated": false,
                "patches": [
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                    "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd.patch",
                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd.patch",
                    "subject": "fix: [security] Galaxy icons are icon names, and the"
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                "subject": "fix: [security] Galaxy icons are icon names, and the",
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                    "cweId": "CWE-79",
                    "rationale": "The galaxy icon field was stored without validation and later rendered into the DOM via D3 .html(), allowing an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary script in the victim\u0027s browser. This is a textbook stored XSS."
                  },
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-20",
                    "rationale": "The root enabler is the absence of any server-side validation on the icon field at write time (add, edit, capture). The field accepted arbitrary strings including HTML markup, which was the precondition for the XSS."
                  }
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          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20142"
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    "dateReserved": "2026-09-30T14:25:56.802Z",
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{
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP renders the source field of a Galaxy Cluster as a clickable hyperlink whenever the stored value passes PHP\u0027s FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. Because FILTER_VALIDATE_URL accepts the javascript: URI scheme, a user with galaxy editor privileges on the local instance or on a synced instance could store a javascript: URL as the cluster source.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen another user views the affected Galaxy Cluster and clicks the rendered link, the embedded script executes in the victim\u0027s browser context, enabling session hijacking, data exfiltration, or actions performed on behalf of the victim.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreconditions:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Attacker must hold galaxy editor privileges (local or via sync).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Victim must view the affected cluster and click the malicious link.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eImpact:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in the victim\u0027s browser.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Potential session theft, credential harvesting, or unauthorized actions within the MISP application.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAffected: \u0026lt;2.5.48.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme.\u003c/p\u003e"
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          "value": "The fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Stored Cross-Site Scripting via JavaScript URL in Galaxy Cluster Source Field",
      "x_gcve": [
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                "cvssRationale": "AV:N \u2013 MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L \u2013 no race conditions or special environment needed; storing a javascript: URL is straightforward. AT:N \u2013 no manipulation of the attack target required. PR:L \u2013 attacker needs galaxy editor privileges (authenticated, non-admin role). UI:A \u2013 victim must click the malicious link for script execution. VC/VI/VA:N \u2013 the MISP server itself is not directly compromised; impact is on the victim\u0027s browser. SC:H \u2013 attacker can read cookies, session tokens, and manipulate the DOM in the victim\u0027s session. SI:H \u2013 attacker can perform actions on behalf of the victim within MISP. SA:N \u2013 no direct compromise of the application\u0027s security controls or system integrity.",
                "fixSummary": "The fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme.",
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                "patchSummary": "Two view templates are modified. In app/View/GalaxyClusters/view.ctp, the source value is extracted into a local variable and the conditional for rendering an anchor tag now requires both FILTER_VALIDATE_URL and a preg_match against /^https?:\\/\\//i. In app/View/Themed/Overmind/Elements/GalaxyClusters/View/galaxy_clusters_general.ctp, the same preg_match guard is added to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL check. Net effect: only http(s) URLs produce a clickable link; all other values (including javascript:) are rendered as plain escaped text.",
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                    "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch",
                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch",
                    "subject": "fix: [security] Link a galaxy cluster source only when it is"
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          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/92c7ccc43"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
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          "supportingMedia": [
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              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict server-side validation of the preview image field, restricting it to a well-formed base64-encoded PNG data URL, and by replacing the client-side string-concatenation rendering with DOM-based attribute assignment that does not interpret the value as HTML.\u003c/p\u003e"
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        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Unvalidated Event Graph Preview Image",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
            "bcp-05-x-01": {
              "ai_annotations": [
                {
                  "ai_level": "generated",
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                  "models": [
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                      "gna_source": 1,
                      "identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "name": "qwen3.8:27b",
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            "bcp-05-x-02": {
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                "assumptions": [
                  "The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.48 with 43 commits after the fix); the exact fixed release version is not stated in the patch metadata.",
                  "PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least a basic authenticated MISP account to create or modify an event graph entry; the patch does not specify the exact permission level required.",
                  "UI:P assumes the victim triggers the XSS by viewing the event graph preview as part of normal workflow (hovering the plot button), which is a passive interaction rather than an active click on a crafted link.",
                  "The CAPEC-1 mapping is direct and unambiguous given the explicit stored XSS identification in the commit message.",
                  "The Co-Authored-By line referencing Claude Opus 4.8 is treated as a tool credit per the commit metadata; it is not a human contributor."
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                "fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict server-side validation of the preview image field, restricting it to a well-formed base64-encoded PNG data URL, and by replacing the client-side string-concatenation rendering with DOM-based attribute assignment that does not interpret the value as HTML.",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix replaces the bulk-association save call with an explicit two-step process: first, only the TagCollection data is extracted from the request and saved via a plain save() operation that does not write belongsTo siblings; second, tag association rows are persisted individually in a controlled loop. This ensures that any User, Organisation, or other sibling model data present in the request payload is silently discarded and never reaches the database, eliminating the privilege escalation path.\u003c/p\u003e"
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      ],
      "title": "MISP Tag Collection Save Allows Privilege Escalation via Sibling Model Injection",
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      "title": "MISP: Nested Model Alias Key Bypasses Sanitization to Modify Cross-Tenant Rows",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe AIL Framework\u0027s username timeline feature is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS). Usernames imported from chats and crawled forums are stored without character restrictions. When an authenticated analyst views the username timeline, the application renders these stored usernames into the DOM using D3\u0027s html() method in the tooltip. Because the username value (d.obj) is interpolated directly into an HTML string without sanitization, a crafted username containing HTML event handlers (e.g., \u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;) will execute arbitrary JavaScript in the analyst\u0027s browser when the analyst hovers over the corresponding timeline entry. The attack requires the victim to be an authenticated analyst with access to the timeline view and to interact with the malicious timeline entry (hover). Successful exploitation can lead to session hijacking, data exfiltration, or unauthorized actions performed within the analyst\u0027s authenticated session. The vulnerability resides in the client-side JavaScript file var/www/static/js/d3/timeline_basic.js.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix applies the existing sanitize_text() helper to the user-controlled username value (d.obj) immediately before it is interpolated into the D3 tooltip HTML string. This ensures that any HTML or script content embedded in the stored username is neutralized before DOM insertion, preventing script execution while preserving the tooltip\u0027s intended formatting (line breaks and date/time display).\u003c/p\u003e"
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        }
      ],
      "title": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in AIL Framework Username Timeline Tooltip",
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                  "The UI:A (Active) user interaction metric assumes the analyst must deliberately hover over the specific timeline entry to trigger the XSS; passive rendering without hover is not evidenced in the patch.",
                  "The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v7.1, 29 commits after fix); the exact last affected and first fixed version numbers are not explicitly stated in the patch.",
                  "PR:N assumes the attacker does not need an account on the AIL Framework itself, only a presence in a crawled chat or forum source; if the platform requires the attacker to be a registered user to have their username crawled, PR:L might be more appropriate.",
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                  "The sanitize_text() helper is assumed to perform adequate HTML entity encoding or equivalent neutralization; its implementation is not shown in the patch.",
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                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/ail-project/ail-framework/commit/455dd92c4179c53204368d93681ded4b57e31643.patch",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe AIL Framework tag selector component (var/www/static/js/tags.js) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS). A user with the ability to create a custom tag could embed an HTML payload containing JavaScript event handlers (e.g., \u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt; or \u0026lt;svg onload=...\u0026gt;) in the tag name. When another authenticated user opened a page containing the tag selector, the malicious tag name was inserted into the DOM using jQuery\u0027s html property, causing the embedded script to execute in the victim\u0027s browser context.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerable code paths affected both the suggestion/combo-item rendering (_renderComboItems) and the selected-tag rendering logic. In both cases, the display value derived from the tag\u0027s displayField was passed directly to the html property of a jQuery element constructor, which parses and inserts the string as raw HTML rather than as text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreconditions: the attacker must have an authenticated account with permission to create custom tags, and the victim must be an authenticated user who views a page that renders the tag selector with the attacker\u0027s stored tag. The attack is stored (persistent) and does not require the victim to perform any action beyond loading the page.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecurity impact: successful exploitation allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim\u0027s browser within the application\u0027s origin, potentially leading to session hijacking, unauthorized data access, form manipulation, or further client-side attacks.\u003c/p\u003e"
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                  "The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC entry specifically covers stored XSS in a tag-selector UI component, so the general XSS pattern is used.",
                  "The PR:L rating assumes that creating a custom tag requires only a basic authenticated account; if tag creation requires elevated privileges, PR:H would be more appropriate.",
                  "The eval() to JSON.parse() change is treated as a secondary hardening fix within the same patch set; the primary vulnerability addressed is the stored XSS in tag rendering.",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe cisco_firesight_manager_ACL_rule_export module in misp-modules generates a shell script (.sh) that authenticates to and calls the Cisco fireSIGHT Manager API. The module interpolates configuration values (IP address, login, password, domain ID, policy ID) and MISP attribute values (destination IPs, URLs, event info comments) directly into single-quoted shell string assignments without any escaping or sanitization. Because the values are placed inside single-quoted shell strings, any value containing a single-quote character (e.g., a crafted ip-dst or url attribute value submitted to MISP) breaks out of the quoting context, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands into the exported script. A security analyst who subsequently executes the generated .sh file unmodified would run the injected commands with their own privileges, potentially exposing fireSIGHT Manager credentials, modifying ACL rules, or compromising the analyst workstation. Additionally, the module contained a secondary defect where the variable \u0027config\u0027 was only assigned inside a conditional block but referenced unconditionally afterward, causing a NameError (denial of service) when the request payload lacked a \u0027config\u0027 key. The vulnerability requires the attacker to have the ability to submit MISP events or attributes containing a single-quote character and the victim to execute the exported script. No authentication bypass is required beyond standard MISP event-submission privileges.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAll user-controlled and configuration values interpolated into the generated shell script are now passed through Python\u0027s shlex.quote() function, which produces a safely quoted string that cannot be broken out of by embedded shell metacharacters. For the JSON access-rule block that embeds multiple attribute values within a single shell assignment, the JSON content is first assembled as plain text and then the entire assembled string is shlex-quoted once, preventing stray quote characters from corrupting the outer quoting. The \u0027config\u0027 variable is now initialized to an empty dictionary before the conditional assignment, eliminating the NameError.\u003c/p\u003e"
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "misp-modules: Shell Command Injection in MISP cisco_firesight_manager_ACL_rule_export Module via Unescaped Attribute Values",
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                  "PR is set to L assuming the attacker holds a basic MISP user role sufficient to create or modify events and attributes; the patch does not specify exact role requirements.",
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                "patchSummary": "Added \u0027import shlex\u0027 at the top of the module. Replaced direct .format() interpolation of config values (fmc_ip_addr, fmc_login, fmc_pass, domain_id, acpolicy_id) with shlex.quote()-wrapped values. Refactored the BLOCK_JSON_TMPL to separate the JSON content template (BLOCK_JSON_CONTENT_TMPL) from the shell assignment template; the JSON content is formatted first with raw attribute values, then the resulting string is passed through shlex.quote() before being substituted into the shell assignment. Initialized \u0027config = {}\u0027 before the \u0027if \"config\" in request:\u0027 block to prevent NameError.",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe phar stream wrapper is unregistered via stream_wrapper_unregister(\u0027phar\u0027) at the top of both the web and console entry points, before any framework bootstrap or application code executes. Because no MISP component, CakePHP, or runtime library requires the phar wrapper, removing it eliminates the implicit unserialize() sink and the directory-like phar archive behavior without functional impact. This closes the deserialization and code-execution primitive application-wide, independent of whether individual callers validate their path arguments.\u003c/p\u003e"
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          "value": "The phar stream wrapper is unregistered via stream_wrapper_unregister(\u0027phar\u0027) at the top of both the web and console entry points, before any framework bootstrap or application code executes. Because no MISP component, CakePHP, or runtime library requires the phar wrapper, removing it eliminates the implicit unserialize() sink and the directory-like phar archive behavior without functional impact. This closes the deserialization and code-execution primitive application-wide, independent of whether individual callers validate their path arguments."
        }
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          "extensions": {
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                  "PR:L is assumed because MISP is an authenticated threat-intelligence platform; however, the patch does not explicitly state whether the vulnerable code path requires authentication. If the argument-injection vector is reachable unauthenticated, PR should be N.",
                  "AC:H is assumed because crafting a valid phar archive and identifying the correct code path for the filesystem call is non-trivial; the commit describes it as an \u0027argument-injection exploit,\u0027 implying specific conditions must be met.",
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                  "The commit message references \u0027the job-argument guard reverted,\u0027 implying a prior guard existed and was removed, making the phar wrapper the remaining defense. The exact prior guard is not described in this patch.",
                  "The Co-Authored-By line lists \u0027Claude Opus 5 (1M context)\u0027 as a co-author; this is recorded in the metadata as a remediation developer but is an AI assistant, not a human contributor. It is excluded from credits to avoid attributing a CVE credit to a non-human entity."
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                ],
                "cvssRationale": "AV:N: The vulnerability is reachable through the web entry point (app/webroot/index.php), making it network-accessible. AC:H: Exploitation requires crafting a valid phar archive with a malicious serialized payload and identifying a code path where a caller-influenced filesystem argument resolves to that archive; the commit describes this as an \u0027argument-injection exploit,\u0027 implying non-trivial path manipulation. AT:N: No specific attack-target conditions are indicated. PR:L: MISP is a threat-intelligence platform that typically requires authenticated access; the commit references \u0027the web user\u0027 context, suggesting the attacker operates within the application\u0027s privilege boundary. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC/VI/VA:H: Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution as the web user, compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the MISP instance. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence of impact on subsequent or other components beyond the MISP instance itself.",
                "fixSummary": "The phar stream wrapper is unregistered via stream_wrapper_unregister(\u0027phar\u0027) at the top of both the web and console entry points, before any framework bootstrap or application code executes. Because no MISP component, CakePHP, or runtime library requires the phar wrapper, removing it eliminates the implicit unserialize() sink and the directory-like phar archive behavior without functional impact. This closes the deserialization and code-execution primitive application-wide, independent of whether individual callers validate their path arguments.",
                "generatedAt": "2026-09-22T15:01:21.211955Z",
                "generator": "patch2vuln.py",
                "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                "modelComparison": {
                  "rankings": [
                    {
                      "agreementScore": 9,
                      "assumptionCount": 6,
                      "confidence": "medium",
                      "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "score": 4
                    }
                  ],
                  "selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
                  "selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
                  "selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
                },
                "patchSha256": "f4fc3223e6421557e1c03c2182cfaa2b0c17a1a20870c71214708034faf1350f",
                "patchSummary": "Two files are modified. In app/Console/cake.php and app/webroot/index.php, a 14-line block is inserted immediately after the file header comment and before any existing logic. The block checks whether \u0027phar\u0027 is present in stream_get_wrappers() and, if so, calls stream_wrapper_unregister(\u0027phar\u0027). A docblock comment explains the security rationale: the wrapper turns filesystem calls on caller-influenced paths into unserialize() sinks and allows a relocated application root to reach code inside an uploaded file. No other code is changed; the total diff is 28 insertions across the two files.",
                "patchTruncated": false,
                "patches": [
                  {
                    "commit": "08fa755b6363ec0b7194d97ea36800ae8eb8f919",
                    "patchSha256": "f4fc3223e6421557e1c03c2182cfaa2b0c17a1a20870c71214708034faf1350f",
                    "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/08fa755b6.patch",
                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/08fa755b6.patch",
                    "subject": "chg: [internal] Unregister the phar stream wrapper in the"
                  }
                ],
                "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/08fa755b6.patch",
                "subject": "chg: [internal] Unregister the phar stream wrapper in the",
                "tagVersionBoundary": {
                  "commits_after_fix": 42,
                  "repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
                  "tag": "v2.5.47",
                  "version": "2.5.47",
                  "version_type": "semver"
                },
                "weaknessRationale": [
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-502",
                    "rationale": "The phar stream wrapper causes PHP to invoke unserialize() implicitly whenever a filesystem operation resolves to a phar archive. An attacker who can influence the path argument (e.g., via argument injection) can supply a crafted phar file, triggering deserialization of attacker-controlled data and leading to code execution. This is the primary and most specific weakness."
                  },
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-74",
                    "rationale": "The phar stream wrapper is a special element of the PHP runtime that was not neutralized (unregistered) in the MISP entry points. Its presence allows downstream filesystem calls to be subverted into deserialization sinks. This is a secondary, broader characterization of the same issue."
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          },
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20263"
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
    "assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-95806",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-22T15:09:09.738Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-22T15:09:04.977Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T15:54:08.956Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}