GHSA-CW2G-2VWQ-88W6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 20:13 – Updated: 2026-11-09 20:13
VLAI
Summary
isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a ".." tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout
Details

Summary

isomorphic-git's tree parser (src/models/GitTree.js) validates each entry name only against the path separators / and \. It does not reject the standalone reserved name .., so a malicious repository can, on a single clone/checkout, write files outside the working directory (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed fs provider.

Details

The guard is:

// src/models/GitTree.js
if (path.includes('\\') || path.includes('/')) {
  throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)
}

The standalone string .. passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting .. trees yields ../escaped.txt, ../../escaped.txt, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout mkdir(workdir/..) hits EEXIST (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, /etc, /tmp, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.

Canonical git behavior (divergence)

git rejects this via verify_path(): git read-tree fails with error: invalid path '../escaped.txt' and git fsck flags warning … hasDotdot: contains '..'. (git's verify_path also rejects . and .git, the latter flagged by fsck as hasDotgit — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can't be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.

PoC

https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal — open in a Codespace; a single git.clone() from the bundled server writes escaped.txt one directory above the clone target (DEPTH=N escapes N levels):

[AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED ***
[AV-2] File written outside workdir: …/escaped.txt

Impact

A path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files.

Any application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM'd) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (Linux, macOS, or Windows — no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub's fsck rejects trees containing ...

Suggested fix

In the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to . or ... For full verify_path parity it should also reject .git (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal .git entry is not independently exploitable via clone/checkout in current isomorphic-git — the checkout walk skips a .git tree entry (a sibling file is written but the .git entry is not), so rejecting .git is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.38.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "isomorphic-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.38.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63478"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T20:18:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nisomorphic-git\u0027s tree parser (`src/models/GitTree.js`) validates each entry name only against the path separators `/` and `\\`. It does not reject the standalone reserved name `..`, so a malicious repository can, on a single `clone`/`checkout`, **write files outside the working\ndirectory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed `fs` provider.\n\n### Details\nThe guard is:\n\n```js\n// src/models/GitTree.js\nif (path.includes(\u0027\\\\\u0027) || path.includes(\u0027/\u0027)) {\n  throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)\n}\n```\n\nThe standalone string `..` passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting `..` trees yields `../escaped.txt`, `../../escaped.txt`, \u2026 with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout `mkdir(workdir/..)` hits `EEXIST` (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, `/etc`, `/tmp`, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.\n\n#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)\ngit rejects this via `verify_path()`: `git read-tree` fails with `error: invalid path \u0027../escaped.txt\u0027` and `git fsck` flags `warning \u2026 hasDotdot: contains \u0027..\u0027`. (git\u0027s `verify_path` also rejects `.` and `.git`, the latter flagged by fsck as `hasDotgit` \u2014 see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can\u0027t be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.\n\n\n### PoC\n`https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal` \u2014 open in a Codespace; a single `git.clone()` from the bundled server writes `escaped.txt` one directory above the clone target (`DEPTH=N` escapes N levels):\n\n```\n[AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED ***\n[AV-2] File written outside workdir: \u2026/escaped.txt\n```\n\n### Impact\nA path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files.\n\nAny application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM\u0027d) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (**Linux, macOS, or Windows** \u2014 no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub\u0027s fsck rejects trees containing `..`.\n\n### Suggested fix\nIn the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to `.` or `..`. For full `verify_path` parity it should **also** reject `.git` (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal `.git` entry is *not* independently exploitable via\n`clone`/`checkout` in current isomorphic-git \u2014 the checkout walk skips a `.git` tree entry (a sibling file is written but the `.git` entry is not), so rejecting `.git` is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.",
  "id": "GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/security/advisories/GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/pull/2370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/commit/823843d1cd19182df79bc907c767f5bcecb39a0b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/releases/tag/v1.38.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a \"..\" tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…