GHSA-CW2G-2VWQ-88W6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 20:13 – Updated: 2026-11-09 20:13Summary
isomorphic-git's tree parser (src/models/GitTree.js) validates each entry name only against the path separators / and \. It does not reject the standalone reserved name .., so a malicious repository can, on a single clone/checkout, write files outside the working
directory (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed fs provider.
Details
The guard is:
// src/models/GitTree.js
if (path.includes('\\') || path.includes('/')) {
throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)
}
The standalone string .. passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting .. trees yields ../escaped.txt, ../../escaped.txt, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout mkdir(workdir/..) hits EEXIST (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, /etc, /tmp, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.
Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git rejects this via verify_path(): git read-tree fails with error: invalid path '../escaped.txt' and git fsck flags warning … hasDotdot: contains '..'. (git's verify_path also rejects . and .git, the latter flagged by fsck as hasDotgit — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can't be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.
PoC
https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal — open in a Codespace; a single git.clone() from the bundled server writes escaped.txt one directory above the clone target (DEPTH=N escapes N levels):
[AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED ***
[AV-2] File written outside workdir: …/escaped.txt
Impact
A path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files.
Any application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM'd) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (Linux, macOS, or Windows — no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub's fsck rejects trees containing ...
Suggested fix
In the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to . or ... For full verify_path parity it should also reject .git (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal .git entry is not independently exploitable via
clone/checkout in current isomorphic-git — the checkout walk skips a .git tree entry (a sibling file is written but the .git entry is not), so rejecting .git is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.38.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "isomorphic-git"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.38.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T20:18:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nisomorphic-git\u0027s tree parser (`src/models/GitTree.js`) validates each entry name only against the path separators `/` and `\\`. It does not reject the standalone reserved name `..`, so a malicious repository can, on a single `clone`/`checkout`, **write files outside the working\ndirectory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed `fs` provider.\n\n### Details\nThe guard is:\n\n```js\n// src/models/GitTree.js\nif (path.includes(\u0027\\\\\u0027) || path.includes(\u0027/\u0027)) {\n throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)\n}\n```\n\nThe standalone string `..` passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting `..` trees yields `../escaped.txt`, `../../escaped.txt`, \u2026 with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout `mkdir(workdir/..)` hits `EEXIST` (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, `/etc`, `/tmp`, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.\n\n#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)\ngit rejects this via `verify_path()`: `git read-tree` fails with `error: invalid path \u0027../escaped.txt\u0027` and `git fsck` flags `warning \u2026 hasDotdot: contains \u0027..\u0027`. (git\u0027s `verify_path` also rejects `.` and `.git`, the latter flagged by fsck as `hasDotgit` \u2014 see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can\u0027t be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.\n\n\n### PoC\n`https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal` \u2014 open in a Codespace; a single `git.clone()` from the bundled server writes `escaped.txt` one directory above the clone target (`DEPTH=N` escapes N levels):\n\n```\n[AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED ***\n[AV-2] File written outside workdir: \u2026/escaped.txt\n```\n\n### Impact\nA path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files.\n\nAny application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM\u0027d) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (**Linux, macOS, or Windows** \u2014 no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub\u0027s fsck rejects trees containing `..`.\n\n### Suggested fix\nIn the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to `.` or `..`. For full `verify_path` parity it should **also** reject `.git` (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal `.git` entry is *not* independently exploitable via\n`clone`/`checkout` in current isomorphic-git \u2014 the checkout walk skips a `.git` tree entry (a sibling file is written but the `.git` entry is not), so rejecting `.git` is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.",
"id": "GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6",
"modified": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T20:13:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/security/advisories/GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/pull/2370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/commit/823843d1cd19182df79bc907c767f5bcecb39a0b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/releases/tag/v1.38.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a \"..\" tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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