GHSA-9V7C-Q64Q-VV33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 23:00 – Updated: 2026-10-30 23:00Summary
Since 4.6.0, Nuxt resolves . and .. segments in the request path, including percent-encoded forms such as %2e, before rendering a page. Nitro's routing, Nitro's route rules and server/middleware see the path with those segments still in place. A request for /%2e/admin therefore renders the page at /admin, while server-side checks keyed on /admin do not apply.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can bypass server-side controls that match on the request path of a page route.
server/middleware that checks event.path (or event.node.req.url) is skipped:
export default defineEventHandler((event) => {
if (event.path.startsWith('/admin') && !isAuthenticated(event)) {
throw createError({ statusCode: 401 })
}
})
With this middleware, /admin returns 401, but /%2e/admin, /.%2e/admin and /x/%2e%2e/admin reach the middleware with event.path set to /./admin, /../admin and /x/../admin, and render app/pages/admin.vue along with the data it fetches during server rendering.
Server-side redirect and headers route rules are skipped in the same way, so '/admin/**': { redirect: '/login' } does not redirect /%2e/admin/secret, and per-route security headers such as Content-Security-Policy are not sent.
Not affected:
- API handlers in
server/apiandserver/routes. Nitro's router does not resolve dot segments, so these requests do not reach the handler. appMiddlewareroute rules and middleware declared withdefinePageMeta, which are matched against the resolved route.- Nuxt
3.xand4.0.0to4.5.x, which pass the path to the page router unchanged, so these requests 404.
Browsers resolve dot segments before sending a request, so exploitation requires a client that sends the path as written.
Patches
Fixed in nuxt@4.6.3 and @nuxt/nitro-server@4.6.3. A page request whose path contains . or .. segments now receives a 404 instead of rendering the page the path resolves to, and route-rule keys and lookup paths have their dot segments resolved, including percent-encoded spellings, before they are compared.
Workarounds
Reject dot segments in a server middleware that runs before your other middleware (middleware runs in file name order):
// server/middleware/0.dot-segments.ts
export default defineEventHandler((event) => {
if (/(?:^|\/)\.{1,2}(?:\/|$)/.test(event.path.split('?')[0])) {
throw createError({ statusCode: 404 })
}
})
Checking getRequestURL(event).pathname instead of event.path is not a sufficient workaround: it resolves dot segments, but keeps percent-encoding such as %61 that the page router decodes. Path checks in server middleware should also account for the page router matching paths case-insensitively unless router.options.sensitive is set.
A reverse proxy or CDN that normalises the request path before forwarding it also removes the mismatch.
Credits
Thanks to @vinzabe, @nikhilagrawalsf (Nikhil Agrawal, Mettle Labs), @0xjunwei and @kq5y, who reported this issue independently.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/nitro-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-41",
"CWE-436",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T23:00:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T21:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSince `4.6.0`, Nuxt resolves `.` and `..` segments in the request path, including percent-encoded forms such as `%2e`, before rendering a page. Nitro\u0027s routing, Nitro\u0027s route rules and `server/middleware` see the path with those segments still in place. A request for `/%2e/admin` therefore renders the page at `/admin`, while server-side checks keyed on `/admin` do not apply.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can bypass server-side controls that match on the request path of a page route.\n\n`server/middleware` that checks `event.path` (or `event.node.req.url`) is skipped:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineEventHandler((event) =\u003e {\n if (event.path.startsWith(\u0027/admin\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !isAuthenticated(event)) {\n throw createError({ statusCode: 401 })\n }\n})\n```\n\nWith this middleware, `/admin` returns 401, but `/%2e/admin`, `/.%2e/admin` and `/x/%2e%2e/admin` reach the middleware with `event.path` set to `/./admin`, `/../admin` and `/x/../admin`, and render `app/pages/admin.vue` along with the data it fetches during server rendering.\n\nServer-side `redirect` and `headers` route rules are skipped in the same way, so `\u0027/admin/**\u0027: { redirect: \u0027/login\u0027 }` does not redirect `/%2e/admin/secret`, and per-route security headers such as `Content-Security-Policy` are not sent.\n\nNot affected:\n\n- API handlers in `server/api` and `server/routes`. Nitro\u0027s router does not resolve dot segments, so these requests do not reach the handler.\n- `appMiddleware` route rules and middleware declared with `definePageMeta`, which are matched against the resolved route.\n- Nuxt `3.x` and `4.0.0` to `4.5.x`, which pass the path to the page router unchanged, so these requests 404.\n\nBrowsers resolve dot segments before sending a request, so exploitation requires a client that sends the path as written.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `nuxt@4.6.3` and `@nuxt/nitro-server@4.6.3`. A page request whose path contains `.` or `..` segments now receives a 404 instead of rendering the page the path resolves to, and route-rule keys and lookup paths have their dot segments resolved, including percent-encoded spellings, before they are compared.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nReject dot segments in a server middleware that runs before your other middleware (middleware runs in file name order):\n\n```ts\n// server/middleware/0.dot-segments.ts\nexport default defineEventHandler((event) =\u003e {\n if (/(?:^|\\/)\\.{1,2}(?:\\/|$)/.test(event.path.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0])) {\n throw createError({ statusCode: 404 })\n }\n})\n```\n\nChecking `getRequestURL(event).pathname` instead of `event.path` is not a sufficient workaround: it resolves dot segments, but keeps percent-encoding such as `%61` that the page router decodes. Path checks in server middleware should also account for the page router matching paths case-insensitively unless `router.options.sensitive` is set.\n\nA reverse proxy or CDN that normalises the request path before forwarding it also removes the mismatch.\n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to @vinzabe, @nikhilagrawalsf (Nikhil Agrawal, Mettle Labs), @0xjunwei and @kq5y, who reported this issue independently.",
"id": "GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33",
"modified": "2026-10-30T23:00:53Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T23:00:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/45463f8b58487e387149ebfb704d6a0834b3a450"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v4.6.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nuxt: Dot segments in the request path bypass `server/middleware` path checks and server route rules on page routes"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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