GHSA-9QW7-J9XW-FV9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 19:53 – Updated: 2026-11-09 19:53Summary
git.checkout writes working-tree files through a directory symlink without checking the leading path, so a malicious repository can write outside the intended working directory. The defect is in isomorphic-git's checkout logic itself and is therefore independent of the fs provider. The impact depends on the configured filesystem; worst case is arbitrary file write on the host, e.g. injecting an attacker key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys → remote login / code execution.
Details
A single git tree can't hold a name as both a symlink and a directory, so the attack uses two states:
Commit N: config (mode 120000, symlink → ../.ssh)
Commit N+1: config/ (mode 040000, tree)
authorized_keys (mode 100644, attacker public key)
Checking out commit N writes config as a directory symlink. Checking out commit N+1 sees config/authorized_keys as a new path: isomorphic-git mkdirs the parent (config, already a symlink → EEXIST, ignored) then writeFiles the file, which the OS resolves through the symlink to outside the working directory. A file-level symlink swap is caught (the 120000→100644 mode change triggers an rm), but the directory-level variant is not — the payload is always a new child path, a plain create, so the parent symlink is never removed.
The symlink target is attacker-chosen. Besides ~/.ssh, pointing it at the repo's own control directory — hooks → .git/hooks then hooks/pre-commit, or x → .git then overwriting .git/config (core.hooksPath / alias / core.fsmonitor) — yields RCE on the next native git command without depending on ~/.ssh existing, since .git/ is always present in a fresh clone.
Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git refuses to do this: has_symlink_leading_path() (symlinks.c) checks each leading path component during checkout and will not follow a symlink — the hardening behind CVE-2021-21300 and CVE-2024-32002. isomorphic-git has no equivalent check.
PoC
https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av1-symlink-hook-rce — open in a Codespace; it builds the malicious repo, serves it locally, and runs a victim. Output on Linux:
[AV-1] Directory symlink on disk: …/config → ../.ssh (→ /home/node/.ssh)
[AV-1] *** SSH KEY INJECTION CONFIRMED ***
Trigger: minimal realistic path is clone (commit N) + a later pull (commit N+1) — ordinary sync of an already-trusted repo. It also collapses to a single clone when the consuming app reads or writes into the cloned tree, or when a symlink already exists on disk.
Impact
isomorphic-git is filesystem-agnostic, so exploitability and blast radius depend on the active fs provider — specifically whether it creates a symlink and follows it on a later write:
- Node
fson Linux/macOS (servers, CI, CLIs, Electron/desktop tooling — the common server-side use): real OS symlinks → the write lands anywhere the process can reach → arbitrary file write on the host → RCE (the PoC above). Highest impact. - Node
fson Windows:fs.symlinktypically requires privilege and throwsEPERM, so the symlink-plant step usually fails — not exploitable by default. (A property of the OS/provider, not of isomorphic-git.) - In-memory / browser providers (memfs, ZenFS, lightning-fs, custom
fs): there is no host filesystem to escape to, so the worst case is writing outside the intended clone directory but within that virtual filesystem — i.e. corrupting other repos/app data the same provider holds. Bounded by the sandbox, and only if the provider implements symlink creation + following.
The CVSS above reflects the worst-case (Node fs on a POSIX host). Browser/in-memory-only deployments are lower severity (sandboxed integrity impact).
Suggested fix
Before each working-tree write, lstat every leading path component and refuse to traverse a
symlink (mirrors git's has_symlink_leading_path()); optionally honor core.symlinks=false.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.38.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "isomorphic-git"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.38.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63395"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T19:53:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T20:18:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`git.checkout` writes working-tree files through a directory **symlink** without checking the leading path, so a malicious repository can write **outside the intended working directory**. The defect is in isomorphic-git\u0027s checkout logic itself and is therefore **independent of the `fs` provider**. The *impact* depends on the configured filesystem; worst case is arbitrary file write on the host, e.g. injecting an attacker key into `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` \u2192 remote login / code execution.\n\n### Details\nA single git tree can\u0027t hold a name as both a symlink and a directory, so the attack uses two states:\n\n```\nCommit N: config (mode 120000, symlink \u2192 ../.ssh)\nCommit N+1: config/ (mode 040000, tree)\n authorized_keys (mode 100644, attacker public key)\n```\n\nChecking out commit N writes `config` as a directory symlink. Checking out commit N+1 sees `config/authorized_keys` as a new path: isomorphic-git `mkdir`s the parent (`config`, already a symlink \u2192 `EEXIST`, ignored) then `writeFile`s the file, which the OS resolves through the symlink to outside the working directory. A *file*-level symlink swap is caught (the `120000`\u2192`100644` mode change triggers an `rm`), but the **directory**-level variant is not \u2014 the payload is always a new child path, a plain `create`, so the parent symlink is never removed.\n\nThe symlink target is attacker-chosen. Besides `~/.ssh`, pointing it at the repo\u0027s own control directory \u2014 `hooks \u2192 .git/hooks` then `hooks/pre-commit`, or `x \u2192 .git` then overwriting `.git/config` (`core.hooksPath` / alias / `core.fsmonitor`) \u2014 yields RCE on the next native `git` command **without** depending on `~/.ssh` existing, since `.git/` is always present in a fresh clone.\n\n#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)\ngit refuses to do this: `has_symlink_leading_path()` (symlinks.c) checks each leading path component during checkout and will not follow a symlink \u2014 the hardening behind CVE-2021-21300 and CVE-2024-32002. isomorphic-git has no equivalent check.\n\n### PoC\n`https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av1-symlink-hook-rce` \u2014 open in a Codespace; it builds the malicious repo, serves it locally, and runs a victim. Output on Linux:\n\n```\n[AV-1] Directory symlink on disk: \u2026/config \u2192 ../.ssh (\u2192 /home/node/.ssh)\n[AV-1] *** SSH KEY INJECTION CONFIRMED ***\n```\n\n**Trigger:** minimal realistic path is `clone` (commit N) + a later `pull` (commit N+1) \u2014 ordinary sync of an already-trusted repo. It also collapses to a single `clone` when the consuming app reads or writes into the cloned tree, or when a symlink already exists on disk.\n\n\n### Impact\n\nisomorphic-git is filesystem-agnostic, so exploitability and blast radius depend on the active `fs` provider \u2014 specifically whether it creates a symlink and follows it on a later write:\n\n- **Node `fs` on Linux/macOS** (servers, CI, CLIs, Electron/desktop tooling \u2014 the common server-side use): real OS symlinks \u2192 the write lands anywhere the process can reach \u2192 **arbitrary file write on the host \u2192 RCE** (the PoC above). Highest impact.\n- **Node `fs` on Windows:** `fs.symlink` typically requires privilege and throws `EPERM`, so the symlink-plant step usually fails \u2014 not exploitable by default. (A property of the OS/provider, not of isomorphic-git.)\n- **In-memory / browser providers** (memfs, ZenFS, lightning-fs, custom `fs`): there is no host filesystem to escape to, so the worst case is writing **outside the intended clone directory but within that virtual filesystem** \u2014 i.e. corrupting other repos/app data the same provider holds. Bounded by the sandbox, and only if the provider implements symlink creation + following.\n\nThe CVSS above reflects the worst-case (Node `fs` on a POSIX host). Browser/in-memory-only deployments are lower severity (sandboxed integrity impact).\n\n### Suggested fix\nBefore each working-tree write, `lstat` every leading path component and refuse to traverse a\nsymlink (mirrors git\u0027s `has_symlink_leading_path()`); optionally honor `core.symlinks=false`.",
"id": "GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c",
"modified": "2026-11-09T19:53:44Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T19:53:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/security/advisories/GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63395"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/pull/2370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/commit/823843d1cd19182df79bc907c767f5bcecb39a0b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git/releases/tag/v1.38.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "isomorphic-git: Arbitrary file write outside of working tree via directory symlink during checkout (potential RCE)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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