GHSA-8CGQ-X343-P74C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:22 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:22
VLAI
Summary
mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch
Details

Impact

write_attachments() called _safe_attachment_filename() and write_sample() inside its loop with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment after the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that catches only MailParserError.

That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496.

Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:

  • NUL smuggled through RFC 2231 — filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin decodes to a NUL in the filename during parsing and raised ValueError out of the name check;
  • overlong basename — a filename longer than NAME_MAX (e.g. 300 characters) raised OSError: File name too long from open(), after creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
  • undecodable payload — a body that is not valid base64 raised binascii.Error (a ValueError subclass) from the decode performed inside the open() block.
import tempfile, mailparser

raw = ("Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\r\n\r\nxx\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\r\n\r\nyy\r\n"
       "--b--\r\n")

mp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)     # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None
mp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())
# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written
# 4.6.3         -> logs "Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\x00.bin'";
#                  good.bin is written

parse() itself was never affected — it catches the ValueError — so only the write path was unguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename sanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).

Patches

Fixed in 4.6.3. write_attachments() now logs and skips a single unusable attachment instead of aborting the batch:

  • an invalid filename is caught and skipped;
  • overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than reaching open();
  • the base64 decode moved before open(), so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching MIME::Base64 on 2008 cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;
  • MailParserPathError is deliberately not caught by the per-attachment handler: a containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise MailParserPathError instead of ValueError so the broader catch cannot swallow them.

Deduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker (write_sample() sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off, collapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem instead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now milliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse Invoice.pdf and invoice.pdf.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call write_attachments() on untrusted mail; iterate parser.attachments yourself and write each attachment inside its own try/except Exception, skipping the ones whose safe_filename is None.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mail-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-129301"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:22:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T18:17:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop\nwith no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment\n**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that\ncatches only `MailParserError`.\n\nThat is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part\nfirst and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that\na downstream scanner or sandbox reads \u2014 while it still reaches the recipient\u0027s mail client\nintact. The tool\u0027s output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same\nfailure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in\n[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).\n\nThree shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:\n\n- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** \u2014 `filename*=us-ascii\u0027\u0027evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the\n  filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;\n- **overlong basename** \u2014 a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised\n  `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;\n- **undecodable payload** \u2014 a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a\n  `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, mailparser\n\nraw = (\"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n       \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n       \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii\u0027\u0027evil%00.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nxx\\r\\n\"\n       \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n       \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nyy\\r\\n\"\n       \"--b--\\r\\n\")\n\nmp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)     # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None\nmp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())\n# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -\u003e ValueError, and good.bin is never written\n# 4.6.3         -\u003e logs \"Skipped attachment with invalid filename: \u0027evil\\x00.bin\u0027\";\n#                  good.bin is written\n```\n\n`parse()` itself was never affected \u2014 it catches the `ValueError` \u2014 so only the write path was\nunguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename\nsanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.3**. `write_attachments()` now logs and skips a single unusable attachment\ninstead of aborting the batch:\n\n- an invalid filename is caught and skipped;\n- overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than\n  reaching `open()`;\n- the base64 decode moved *before* `open()`, so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now\n  repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching `MIME::Base64` on 2008\n  cases) \u2014 rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from\n  the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;\n- `MailParserPathError` is deliberately **not** caught by the per-attachment handler: a\n  containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise\n  `MailParserPathError` instead of `ValueError` so the broader catch cannot swallow them.\n\nDeduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker\n(`write_sample()` sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off,\ncollapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem\ninstead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before \u2014 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now\nmilliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse `Invoice.pdf` and\n`invoice.pdf`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call `write_attachments()` on untrusted mail;\niterate `parser.attachments` yourself and write each attachment inside its own\n`try`/`except Exception`, skipping the ones whose `safe_filename` is `None`.",
  "id": "GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T22:22:13Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T22:22:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/11b894a0b8b3f11055a99caff118206138d1daba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/e1d9fe6778045d6e2c44406bc8822e3464c1097f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch"
}



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