GHSA-86HP-PWWM-2J34

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-18 12:31
VLAI
Details

MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) contains an authorization bypass in the SharingGroup model's captureSGExisting method. The authorization check used a logical AND condition that effectively exempted users with the sync permission (perm_sync) from the membership verification. Specifically, the original condition 'if (!checkIfAuthorised(...) && !perm_sync) return false' meant that any user holding the sync role would pass the check regardless of whether they were actually a member of the target sharing group.

A sync user who knows or can discover the UUID of a non-local sharing group could exploit this flaw through the /sharing_groups/add endpoint or by embedding a SharingGroup object in pushed sync data. The attacker could rewrite the sharing group record to add their own organisation as a member or insert an all_orgs server entry for their MISP instance, thereby gaining read access to all events contained in that group. This exposes threat intelligence data that was intended to be restricted to the group's legitimate members.

The vulnerability requires an authenticated account with the sync role and knowledge of a valid sharing group UUID. No user interaction is required. The impact is unauthorized disclosure of shared threat intelligence events and limited integrity modification of the sharing group record.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-132069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T11:17:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) contains an authorization bypass in the SharingGroup model\u0027s captureSGExisting method. The authorization check used a logical AND condition that effectively exempted users with the sync permission (perm_sync) from the membership verification. Specifically, the original condition \u0027if (!checkIfAuthorised(...) \u0026\u0026 !perm_sync) return false\u0027 meant that any user holding the sync role would pass the check regardless of whether they were actually a member of the target sharing group.\n\nA sync user who knows or can discover the UUID of a non-local sharing group could exploit this flaw through the /sharing_groups/add endpoint or by embedding a SharingGroup object in pushed sync data. The attacker could rewrite the sharing group record to add their own organisation as a member or insert an all_orgs server entry for their MISP instance, thereby gaining read access to all events contained in that group. This exposes threat intelligence data that was intended to be restricted to the group\u0027s legitimate members.\n\nThe vulnerability requires an authenticated account with the sync role and knowledge of a valid sharing group UUID. No user interaction is required. The impact is unauthorized disclosure of shared threat intelligence events and limited integrity modification of the sharing group record.",
  "id": "GHSA-86hp-pwwm-2j34",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T12:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-11-18T12:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-132069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58b38a20f7231a569b896432f6cedcd7bf31a4b4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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