GHSA-6GXP-VF4Q-CCGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-07 06:31 – Updated: 2026-11-07 06:31The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-120560"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-07T04:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler \u2014 registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` \u2014 performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site\u0027s media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` \u2014 such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files \u2014 cannot be targeted through this path.",
"id": "GHSA-6gxp-vf4q-ccgc",
"modified": "2026-11-07T06:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-11-07T06:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1090"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1094"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3784667/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4962c61-9059-4fb9-9ddf-5e6aa1d2675a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.