GHSA-56X6-Q882-MF27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 21:18 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:18Summary
Remark42 applied chi's middleware.RealIP globally, trusting True-Client-IP / X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For headers without verifying the request came from a trusted proxy. The per-IP rate limiters key on the overwritten r.RemoteAddr, so any client can bypass every per-IP rate limiter by rotating spoofed IP headers. The same spoofed IP also drives other per-IP controls (stored comment IP, anonymous identity derivation, and --votes-ip vote de-duplication). This affects deployments reachable directly from the internet (Remark42's built-in HTTP, static TLS, and ACME modes are all documented and supported), as well as any proxied deployment where the proxy forwards an attacker-controlled recognised header.
Details
The router applies middleware.RealIP globally, ahead of the per-route limiters, without any check that the server is behind a trusted proxy (in v1.16.1, backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:207).
The rateLimiter function (v1.16.1, backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:769-779) builds a tollbooth limiter with IPLookup{Name: "RemoteAddr"}, which reads r.RemoteAddr. Since chi's middleware.RealIP (v1.16.1, backend/vendor/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware/realip.go:42-55) unconditionally overwrites r.RemoteAddr from True-Client-IP > X-Real-IP > first X-Forwarded-For (accepting any syntactically valid IP), any client can set its apparent IP to an arbitrary value.
This bypasses every per-IP rate limiter that runs after RealIP: /auth (2/s), avatars (100/s), the image proxy (10/s), open / protected / admin route groups (10/s), root routes (50/s), and /web/* (20/s). Comment and vote creation go through the update limiter, whose server default is UPDATE_LIMIT=0.5/s (burst 1), not 10/s. The global 1,000 concurrent-request throttle still applies, so this is a per-IP-limit bypass rather than truly unlimited throughput. chi's own documentation warns that middleware.RealIP should be used only behind a trusted proxy.
PoC
# Deploy Remark42 reachable directly from the internet (built-in HTTP / TLS / ACME, no proxy that overwrites the headers).
# Comment creation is limited to UPDATE_LIMIT (default 0.5/s, burst 1) per IP.
# Rotate X-Real-IP across many requests; each distinct value gets its own token bucket.
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
-H "X-Real-IP: 192.0.2.$i" \
-X POST 'https://remark42.example.com/api/v1/comment?site=site1' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer YOUR_JWT' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"text":"spam","locator":{"site":"site1","url":"https://example.com/post"}}'
done | sort | uniq -c
# With rotating headers the responses stay 201; without them, requests beyond the burst return 429.
Impact
By rotating the spoofed client IP an attacker bypasses the per-IP token buckets on all rate-limited endpoints and defeats other per-IP controls, enabling: (a) spam comment creation beyond the configured per-IP limit, (b) confirmation-email / notification flooding to supplied addresses, (c) high-volume outbound image fetching and resource consumption via the image proxy (its transport still blocks private/reserved destinations and DNS rebinding, so this is amplification, not new SSRF reach), (d) authentication-endpoint abuse, (e) where --votes-ip is enabled, defeating per-IP vote de-duplication (ballot stuffing), and (f) minting fresh anonymous identities and poisoning the stored comment IP and request logs, since the anonymous user ID is derived from name + RemoteAddr. The global concurrency ceiling and per-request timeouts remain, so availability impact is limited.
Resolution
Mitigation support was added in v1.16.2 (umputun/remark42#2116, follow-up in #2118). Upgrading alone does not remediate the issue: --trusted-proxy must be configured.
The fix adds --trusted-proxy / TRUSTED_PROXY. When set, the forwarding headers (X-Real-IP, then CF-Connecting-IP, then the leftmost public X-Forwarded-For) are honoured only when the direct TCP peer falls inside a trusted-proxy network; for a request from any other peer those headers are dropped and the real socket IP is used. When it is unset, the previous trust-all behaviour is preserved for backward compatibility and a startup warning is logged, so an un-configured v1.16.2 remains exploitable. True-Client-IP is no longer recognised. TRUSTED_PROXY takes a comma-separated list; on the command line, repeat --trusted-proxy per entry.
Required configuration:
- Reachable directly from the internet: set a value that no real client matches so the forwarding headers are always ignored, e.g. --trusted-proxy=127.0.0.1/32 (only when Remark42 is not actually reached over loopback).
- Behind a reverse proxy: point --trusted-proxy at the proxy's network only, block direct access to Remark42, and make the proxy overwrite X-Real-IP with the real client and discard client-supplied forwarding headers. A proxy that merely appends to X-Forwarded-For, or that forwards a client-supplied X-Real-IP, still lets the client choose the reported IP. Note that the shipped nginx manual sets X-Real-IP but does not strip a client True-Client-IP.
- Before v1.16.2: strip True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-For at the edge and set a known-safe client-IP header.
See the Trusted proxies and client IP docs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/umputun/remark42/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/umputun/remark42"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77463"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348",
"CWE-807"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T21:18:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T21:18:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nRemark42 applied chi\u0027s `middleware.RealIP` globally, trusting `True-Client-IP` / `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` headers without verifying the request came from a trusted proxy. The per-IP rate limiters key on the overwritten `r.RemoteAddr`, so any client can bypass every per-IP rate limiter by rotating spoofed IP headers. The same spoofed IP also drives other per-IP controls (stored comment IP, anonymous identity derivation, and `--votes-ip` vote de-duplication). This affects deployments reachable directly from the internet (Remark42\u0027s built-in HTTP, static TLS, and ACME modes are all documented and supported), as well as any proxied deployment where the proxy forwards an attacker-controlled recognised header.\n\n### Details\nThe router applies `middleware.RealIP` globally, ahead of the per-route limiters, without any check that the server is behind a trusted proxy (in v1.16.1, `backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:207`).\n\nThe `rateLimiter` function (v1.16.1, `backend/app/rest/api/rest.go:769-779`) builds a tollbooth limiter with `IPLookup{Name: \"RemoteAddr\"}`, which reads `r.RemoteAddr`. Since chi\u0027s `middleware.RealIP` (v1.16.1, `backend/vendor/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware/realip.go:42-55`) unconditionally overwrites `r.RemoteAddr` from `True-Client-IP \u003e X-Real-IP \u003e first X-Forwarded-For` (accepting any syntactically valid IP), any client can set its apparent IP to an arbitrary value.\n\nThis bypasses every per-IP rate limiter that runs after `RealIP`: `/auth` (2/s), avatars (100/s), the image proxy (10/s), open / protected / admin route groups (10/s), root routes (50/s), and `/web/*` (20/s). Comment and vote creation go through the update limiter, whose server default is `UPDATE_LIMIT=0.5`/s (burst 1), not 10/s. The global 1,000 concurrent-request throttle still applies, so this is a per-IP-limit bypass rather than truly unlimited throughput. chi\u0027s own documentation warns that `middleware.RealIP` should be used only behind a trusted proxy.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# Deploy Remark42 reachable directly from the internet (built-in HTTP / TLS / ACME, no proxy that overwrites the headers).\n# Comment creation is limited to UPDATE_LIMIT (default 0.5/s, burst 1) per IP.\n\n# Rotate X-Real-IP across many requests; each distinct value gets its own token bucket.\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n curl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 \\\n -H \"X-Real-IP: 192.0.2.$i\" \\\n -X POST \u0027https://remark42.example.com/api/v1/comment?site=site1\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer YOUR_JWT\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"text\":\"spam\",\"locator\":{\"site\":\"site1\",\"url\":\"https://example.com/post\"}}\u0027\ndone | sort | uniq -c\n# With rotating headers the responses stay 201; without them, requests beyond the burst return 429.\n```\n\n### Impact\nBy rotating the spoofed client IP an attacker bypasses the per-IP token buckets on all rate-limited endpoints and defeats other per-IP controls, enabling: (a) spam comment creation beyond the configured per-IP limit, (b) confirmation-email / notification flooding to supplied addresses, (c) high-volume outbound image fetching and resource consumption via the image proxy (its transport still blocks private/reserved destinations and DNS rebinding, so this is amplification, not new SSRF reach), (d) authentication-endpoint abuse, (e) where `--votes-ip` is enabled, defeating per-IP vote de-duplication (ballot stuffing), and (f) minting fresh anonymous identities and poisoning the stored comment IP and request logs, since the anonymous user ID is derived from `name + RemoteAddr`. The global concurrency ceiling and per-request timeouts remain, so availability impact is limited.\n\n### Resolution\nMitigation support was added in v1.16.2 (umputun/remark42#2116, follow-up in #2118). **Upgrading alone does not remediate the issue: `--trusted-proxy` must be configured.**\n\nThe fix adds `--trusted-proxy` / `TRUSTED_PROXY`. When set, the forwarding headers (`X-Real-IP`, then `CF-Connecting-IP`, then the leftmost public `X-Forwarded-For`) are honoured only when the direct TCP peer falls inside a trusted-proxy network; for a request from any other peer those headers are dropped and the real socket IP is used. When it is **unset**, the previous trust-all behaviour is preserved for backward compatibility and a startup warning is logged, so an un-configured v1.16.2 remains exploitable. `True-Client-IP` is no longer recognised. `TRUSTED_PROXY` takes a comma-separated list; on the command line, repeat `--trusted-proxy` per entry.\n\n**Required configuration:**\n- **Reachable directly from the internet:** set a value that no real client matches so the forwarding headers are always ignored, e.g. `--trusted-proxy=127.0.0.1/32` (only when Remark42 is not actually reached over loopback).\n- **Behind a reverse proxy:** point `--trusted-proxy` at the proxy\u0027s network only, block direct access to Remark42, and make the proxy **overwrite** `X-Real-IP` with the real client and discard client-supplied forwarding headers. A proxy that merely appends to `X-Forwarded-For`, or that forwards a client-supplied `X-Real-IP`, still lets the client choose the reported IP. Note that the shipped nginx manual sets `X-Real-IP` but does not strip a client `True-Client-IP`.\n- **Before v1.16.2:** strip `True-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, and `X-Forwarded-For` at the edge and set a known-safe client-IP header.\n\nSee the [Trusted proxies and client IP docs](https://remark42.com/docs/configuration/parameters/#trusted-proxies-and-client-ip).",
"id": "GHSA-56x6-q882-mf27",
"modified": "2026-11-09T21:18:29Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T21:18:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/security/advisories/GHSA-56x6-q882-mf27"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/pull/2116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/pull/2118"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/commit/b1502801facd7782a1c70fd51f8ad5c2eb650d39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/commit/e62b3c830d81659cf5d2687b0c8261da7d42fdab"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umputun/remark42/releases/tag/backend/v1.16.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://remark42.com/docs/configuration/parameters/#trusted-proxies-and-client-ip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Remark42: Rate limit bypass via unconditional trust of X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers in direct-internet deployment"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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