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EUVD-2026-408494
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISA{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-11-18T11:23:46.640156+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-408494"
}
CVE-2026-132069 (GCVE-0-2026-132069)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 10:31 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:55| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58b38a20f7231… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 10:24 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58b38a20f7231a569b896432f6cedcd7bf31a4b4.patch
310dbcaf2ac2… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
58b38a20f723
|
fix: [security] Sync users can no longer update sharing | 310dbcaf2ac2… |
Fix summary
The fix removes the sync-permission exception from the authorization check in captureSGExisting. The condition is simplified to unconditionally require that the user passes checkIfAuthorised for the target sharing group, regardless of whether the user holds the sync role. This ensures sync users are subject to the same membership verification as all other users before a sharing group can be modified.
Patch summary
In app/Model/SharingGroup.php, the captureSGExisting method's guard clause was changed from 'if (!checkIfAuthorised(...) && !perm_sync) return false' to 'if (!checkIfAuthorised(...)) return false'. The '&& !$user[Role][perm_sync]' clause was removed, eliminating the bypass that allowed sync-role users to skip the membership authorization check. One line changed (1 insertion, 1 deletion).
CVSS rationale
AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - exploitation requires only a valid sync account and a known sharing group UUID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack target manipulation. PR:L - requires an authenticated account with the sync role. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:N/VI:N/VA:N - the MISP system's own operational integrity and availability are not directly compromised. SC:H - the primary impact is unauthorized read access to threat intelligence events belonging to other organisations (subsequent component confidentiality). SI:L - the attacker can modify the sharing group record (add org or all_orgs entry), a limited integrity impact on shared data. SA:N - no security authority impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The authorization check (checkIfAuthorised) was effectively bypassed for users with the sync role due to a flawed logical condition. The membership verification was not enforced for sync users, constituting a missing authorization control for that user class.
- CWE-285 The authorization logic incorrectly combined the membership check with a role-based exemption using a logical AND, resulting in an improper authorization decision that permitted sync users to act outside their granted scope.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker leverages a legitimate role (sync) that was incorrectly coded to bypass the authorization check, gaining access to resources (sharing group events) they are not entitled to. This is a direct authorization bypass. The mapping is confident because the patch explicitly removes a condition that allowed a specific role to skip the authorization check.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions containing the flawed captureSGExisting logic prior to this commit.
- The CVSS SC:H rating assumes that the events in a non-member sharing group contain sensitive threat intelligence data whose disclosure constitutes a high confidentiality impact; if the data is less sensitive, SC could be rated L.
- The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest standard pattern; the specific mechanism is a logic flaw in an authorization condition rather than a classic privilege escalation, but CAPEC-114 (Bypass Authorization) is the best available match.
- The sync role (perm_sync) is assumed to be a standard MISP role for inter-instance synchronization; the exact role configuration is not detailed in the patch.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); this is not included as a credit as it is not a human or organizational entity in the traditional CVE credit sense.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-10-14 12:57 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (58b38a20f7231a569b896432f6cedcd7bf31a4b4): fix: [security] Sync users can no longer update sharing https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58b38a20f7231a569b896432f6cedcd7bf31a4b4.patch
- 2026-11-18 10:24 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58b38a20f7231a569b896432f6cedcd7bf31a4b4.patch
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"title": "MISP Authorization Bypass: Sync Users Can Modify and Read Non-Member Sharing Groups",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.