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EUVD-2026-406780
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISA{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-11-16T10:08:46.264703+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-406780"
}
CVE-2026-129703 (GCVE-0-2026-129703)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-16 08:36 – Updated: 2026-11-16 14:55| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerabi… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| vulnerability-lookup | vulnerability-lookup |
Affected:
unspecified
cpe:2.3:a:vulnerability-lookup:vulnerability-lookup:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
4 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-16 08:23 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/3605d5b65d340343cc4b612d40d454afed84302b.patch
36e0430891b6… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
3605d5b65d34
|
fix: [security] A feed key or an API key no longer opens a | 36e0430891b6… |
Fix summary
The authentication decorators for feed-key and API-key requests no longer call Flask-Login's login_user(), which was writing the authenticated user into the session cookie and creating a full web session. Instead, the user object is now stored on Flask's request-scoped g._login_user attribute, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads first. This authenticates only the current request without setting any session cookie, preventing a limited-scope token from being elevated to a persistent, all-pages session that bypasses password and two-factor authentication.
Patch summary
In website/decorators.py (auth_feedkey_func) and website/web/api/v1/common.py (auth_func), the import of login_user from flask_login is removed and replaced with an import of g from flask. The call login_user(user) (or login_user(user, remember=False)) is replaced with g._login_user = user. A new test file tests/test_token_auth_no_session.py is added with four test cases verifying that: (1) a feed-key request returns 200 but sets no session cookie, (2) an API-key request returns 200 but sets no session cookie, (3) a subsequent unauthenticated request to /user/profile is redirected (302), and (4) a 403 response from an API-key request also sets no session cookie.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The feed key is in a URL and the API key is in a header; both are accessible over the network. AC:L: A single HTTP request with the token is sufficient; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: No manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:N: No prior authentication is required; the token itself is the credential, and it is not protected by any additional gate. UI:N: No user interaction is needed. VC/VI/VA:N: The vulnerable component (the authentication layer) is not itself compromised in terms of its own data, integrity, or availability. SC:H: The attacker gains full read access to the user's account data, including the API key and profile information. SI:H: The attacker can modify the user's account settings, and for administrator accounts, can perform arbitrary administrative actions via /admin. SA:N: No availability impact on the user's account or the application is demonstrated by the evidence.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-287 The authentication mechanism improperly elevated a limited-scope credential (feed key or API key intended for single-request authentication) into a full web session via login_user(), bypassing password and two-factor authentication. The authentication check succeeded but the session establishment was incorrect for the credential type.
- CWE-613 The commit message explicitly references CWE-613 as a related concern: sessions created before the fix remain valid until they expire and are not bound to the original credential. While the primary fix addresses the session creation, the lack of credential binding in existing sessions is a secondary weakness acknowledged by the developers.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-63 The feed key and API key are trusted credentials for specific, limited-scope access (feed delivery, API calls). The vulnerable implementation incorrectly leveraged that trust to establish a full web session, extending the credential's authority beyond its intended scope. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a limited credential being used to gain broader access than intended. Uncertainty: no CAPEC precisely describes 'token authentication creating an unintended persistent session'; CAPEC-63 is the best available match for trust-scope escalation.
Assumptions to verify
- The application is assumed to be a self-hosted or publicly accessible web service; the patch does not specify deployment topology.
- No specific version numbers are available from the patch; the affected version range is unspecified.
- The CVSS sub-component impact (SC:H, SI:H) assumes the worst case where the authenticated account has administrative privileges, granting access to /admin. For non-admin accounts, the impact is limited to the user's own account data.
- The CAPEC-63 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC precisely describes a limited-scope token being elevated to a full session via an improper login_user() call.
- The commit message notes that pre-existing sessions created before the fix remain valid until expiration and are not bound to the credential (CWE-613); this is acknowledged as a separate issue not addressed by this patch.
- The 'Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5' credit is included as a tool credit based on the explicit commit message; it is unclear whether this represents meaningful remediation contribution or automated assistance.
- The patch does not indicate whether the application requires TLS or any other transport-level protection; CVSS assumes standard network access.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | high | 7 |
- 2026-11-15 16:36 UTC Report received maintainer Vulnerability report received by e-mail from the reporter.
- 2026-11-16 07:40 UTC Validated maintainer Report reproduced: a feed key or an API key opens a full web session, which also bypasses two-factor authentication.
- 2026-11-16 07:56 UTC Fix developed maintainer Corrective change authored (3605d5b6): a feed key or an API key no longer opens a web session. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/3605d5b65d340343cc4b612d40d454afed84302b
- 2026-11-16 08:06 UTC Fix available maintainer Fix pushed to the public main branch. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/3605d5b65d340343cc4b612d40d454afed84302b
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.