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EUVD-2026-392291
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-10-31 00:22
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-10-31T00:22:25.937178+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-392291"
}
CVE-2026-115700 (GCVE-0-2026-115700)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 13:49 – Updated: 2026-11-02 21:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney
Summary
Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.
The IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.
This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-02 21:09 UTC
Assigner
References
6 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0 | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115700 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a… | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a… | patch |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-10-25 00:00
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"dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T10:12:09.000Z",
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"value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"description": "CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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},
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"descriptions": [
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"cweId": "CWE-918",
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"title": "SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. The gate.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_url:normalize/2\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_url.erl\u003c/code\u003e percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises \u003ccode\u003einvalid_url_host\u003c/code\u003e when \u003ccode\u003einet_parse:address/1\u003c/code\u003e accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. What the connect path accepts.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_happy:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e removes a surrounding \u003ccode\u003e[...]\u003c/code\u003e pair before calling \u003ccode\u003einet:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by \u003ccode\u003einet_parse:address/1\u003c/code\u003e, so \u003ccode\u003e[::ffff:127.0.0.1]\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1.\u003c/code\u003e pass the gate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Result.\u003c/strong\u003e A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as \u003ccode\u003e%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D\u003c/code\u003e, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on \u003ccode\u003euri_string:parse/1\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003einet:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a \u003ccode\u003eLocation\u003c/code\u003e target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in \u003ccode\u003eip_candidate/1\u003c/code\u003e before the gate.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "**1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n**2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate.\n\n**3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate."
}
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"value": "1. The gate. hackney_url:normalize/2 in src/hackney_url.erl percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises invalid_url_host when inet_parse:address/1 accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n2. What the connect path accepts. hackney_happy:parse_address/1 removes a surrounding [...] pair before calling inet:parse_address/1, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by inet_parse:address/1, so [::ffff:127.0.0.1] and 127.0.0.1. pass the gate.\n\n3. Result. A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in ip_candidate/1 before the gate."
}
]
}
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-115700",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-25T17:30:02.231Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T21:10:51.594Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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