CVE-2026-97200 (GCVE-0-2026-97200)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 13:49 – Updated: 2026-10-26 15:35
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.
hackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-26 14:54 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
6 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0 | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-97200.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-97200 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/980 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/dc41b79… | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/493e8bf… | patch |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-10-25 00:00
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"title": "Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney",
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBuild a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStart a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers \u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 200 OK\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eContent-Encoding: gzip\u003c/code\u003e, a \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length\u003c/code\u003e matching the stream, \u003ccode\u003eConnection: close\u003c/code\u003e, and the stream as body.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFrom a node running a vulnerable hackney, call \u003ccode\u003ehackney:request(get, Url, [], \u0026lt;\u0026lt;\u0026gt;\u0026gt;, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body])\u003c/code\u003e against that listener.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without \u003ccode\u003eauto_decompress\u003c/code\u003e, drives the node out of memory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "* Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\n* Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers HTTP/1.1 200 OK with Content-Encoding: gzip, a Content-Length matching the stream, Connection: close, and the stream as body.\n* From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call hackney:request(get, Url, [], \u003c\u003c\u003e\u003e, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body]) against that listener.\n* Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without auto_decompress, drives the node out of memory."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Unbounded accumulation.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney:request/5\u003c/code\u003e with a body, and \u003ccode\u003ehackney:body/1\u003c/code\u003e after \u003ccode\u003estart_response/1\u003c/code\u003e, read the response in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_conn.erl\u003c/code\u003e through \u003ccode\u003eread_full_body/2\u003c/code\u003e, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. One-step decompression.\u003c/strong\u003e With \u003ccode\u003e{auto_decompress, true}\u003c/code\u003e hackney sends \u003ccode\u003eAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\u003c/code\u003e. Once the body is complete, \u003ccode\u003emaybe_decompress_body/2\u003c/code\u003e dispatches on \u003ccode\u003eContent-Encoding\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003edecompress_gzip/1\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003ezlib:gunzip/1\u003c/code\u003e) or \u003ccode\u003edecompress_deflate/1\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003ezlib:inflate/2\u003c/code\u003e). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "**1. Unbounded accumulation.** `hackney:request/5` with a body, and `hackney:body/1` after `start_response/1`, read the response in `src/hackney_conn.erl` through `read_full_body/2`, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\n\n**2. One-step decompression.** With `{auto_decompress, true}` hackney sends `Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate`. Once the body is complete, `maybe_decompress_body/2` dispatches on `Content-Encoding` to `decompress_gzip/1` (`zlib:gunzip/1`) or `decompress_deflate/1` (`zlib:inflate/2`). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4."
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"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
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"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"ssvcV203": [
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"options": [
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{
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{
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-26T14:54:57.385457Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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},
"published": "2026-10-26T14:16:42.180",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-97200.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/493e8bf83a391548e5101792276ab3fc428fa76c"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/dc41b79339ca0c41e16d3f2dd17172bc2de855d6"
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{
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
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{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-97200"
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],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
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{
"lang": "en",
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],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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}
},
"suse_vex": {
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"current_release_date": "2026-10-27T18:09:41Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-97200",
"id": "CVE-2026-97200",
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-27T18:09:41Z",
"product_status:known_affected": "20",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-97200",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/2026/cve-2026-97200.json",
"version": "2"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
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{
"metrics": [
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{
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},
{
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}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
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],
"packageName": "hackney",
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],
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{
"name": "hackney_conn:read_full_body/2"
},
{
"name": "hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2"
},
{
"name": "hackney_conn:decompress_gzip/1"
},
{
"name": "hackney_conn:decompress_deflate/1"
},
{
"name": "hackney:request/5"
},
{
"name": "hackney:body/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.9.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.0.0-beta.1",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
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],
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],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_conn:read_full_body/2"
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{
"name": "hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2"
},
{
"name": "hackney_conn:decompress_gzip/1"
},
{
"name": "hackney_conn:decompress_deflate/1"
},
{
"name": "hackney:request/5"
},
{
"name": "hackney:body/1"
}
],
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"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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{
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}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Martin Karrer"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Quinn Wilton"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Quinn Wilton"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Martin Karrer"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Benoit Chesneau"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T09:42:31.000Z",
"datePublic": "2026-10-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
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"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in \u003ccode\u003ehackney_conn\u003c/code\u003e in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. \u003ccode\u003ehackney:request/5\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003ehackney:body/1\u003c/code\u003e return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003ehackney_conn:read_full_body/2\u003c/code\u003e and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With \u003ccode\u003e{auto_decompress, true}\u003c/code\u003e the buffered body is then inflated in one step with \u003ccode\u003ezlib:gunzip/1\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ezlib:inflate/2\u003c/code\u003e, which return the whole output at once.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in `hackney_conn` in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. `hackney:request/5` and `hackney:body/1` return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\n`hackney_conn:read_full_body/2` and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With `{auto_decompress, true}` the buffered body is then inflated in one step with `zlib:gunzip/1` or `zlib:inflate/2`, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\nhackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
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"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory."
}
],
"value": "A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
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"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-409",
"description": "CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:49:40.392Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "hackney 4.9.0 release notes",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-97200",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-97200.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-97200",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-97200"
},
{
"name": "Cap buffered response bodies with max_body_size and bound decompression (benoitc/hackney#980)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/980"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit dc41b79 in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/dc41b79339ca0c41e16d3f2dd17172bc2de855d6"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 493e8bf in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/493e8bf83a391548e5101792276ab3fc428fa76c"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eLeave \u003ccode\u003eauto_decompress\u003c/code\u003e disabled (the default). Without it \u003ccode\u003ehackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2\u003c/code\u003e never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Leave `auto_decompress` disabled (the default). Without it `hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2` never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround."
}
],
"value": "Leave auto_decompress disabled (the default). Without it hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2 never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround."
}
],
"x_proofOfConcept": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBuild a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStart a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers \u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 200 OK\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eContent-Encoding: gzip\u003c/code\u003e, a \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length\u003c/code\u003e matching the stream, \u003ccode\u003eConnection: close\u003c/code\u003e, and the stream as body.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFrom a node running a vulnerable hackney, call \u003ccode\u003ehackney:request(get, Url, [], \u0026lt;\u0026lt;\u0026gt;\u0026gt;, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body])\u003c/code\u003e against that listener.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without \u003ccode\u003eauto_decompress\u003c/code\u003e, drives the node out of memory.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\n2. Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` with `Content-Encoding: gzip`, a `Content-Length` matching the stream, `Connection: close`, and the stream as body.\n3. From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call `hackney:request(get, Url, [], \u003c\u003c\u003e\u003e, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body])` against that listener.\n4. Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without `auto_decompress`, drives the node out of memory."
}
],
"value": "* Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\n* Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers HTTP/1.1 200 OK with Content-Encoding: gzip, a Content-Length matching the stream, Connection: close, and the stream as body.\n* From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call hackney:request(get, Url, [], \u003c\u003c\u003e\u003e, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body]) against that listener.\n* Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without auto_decompress, drives the node out of memory."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Unbounded accumulation.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney:request/5\u003c/code\u003e with a body, and \u003ccode\u003ehackney:body/1\u003c/code\u003e after \u003ccode\u003estart_response/1\u003c/code\u003e, read the response in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_conn.erl\u003c/code\u003e through \u003ccode\u003eread_full_body/2\u003c/code\u003e, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. One-step decompression.\u003c/strong\u003e With \u003ccode\u003e{auto_decompress, true}\u003c/code\u003e hackney sends \u003ccode\u003eAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\u003c/code\u003e. Once the body is complete, \u003ccode\u003emaybe_decompress_body/2\u003c/code\u003e dispatches on \u003ccode\u003eContent-Encoding\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003edecompress_gzip/1\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003ezlib:gunzip/1\u003c/code\u003e) or \u003ccode\u003edecompress_deflate/1\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003ezlib:inflate/2\u003c/code\u003e). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. Unbounded accumulation.** `hackney:request/5` with a body, and `hackney:body/1` after `start_response/1`, read the response in `src/hackney_conn.erl` through `read_full_body/2`, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\n\n**2. One-step decompression.** With `{auto_decompress, true}` hackney sends `Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate`. Once the body is complete, `maybe_decompress_body/2` dispatches on `Content-Encoding` to `decompress_gzip/1` (`zlib:gunzip/1`) or `decompress_deflate/1` (`zlib:inflate/2`). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4."
}
],
"value": "1. Unbounded accumulation. hackney:request/5 with a body, and hackney:body/1 after start_response/1, read the response in src/hackney_conn.erl through read_full_body/2, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\n\n2. One-step decompression. With {auto_decompress, true} hackney sends Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate. Once the body is complete, maybe_decompress_body/2 dispatches on Content-Encoding to decompress_gzip/1 (zlib:gunzip/1) or decompress_deflate/1 (zlib:inflate/2). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-97200",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:49:40.392Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-26T05:15:01.465Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:50.487Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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