CVE-2026-76847 (GCVE-0-2026-76847)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-24 13:12 – Updated: 2026-08-26 16:15
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
act 0.2.81 through 0.2.89 Missing Authorization in the Artifacts V4 Backend
Summary
act starts an HTTP Artifacts V4 backend whenever a workflow uses actions/upload-artifact@v4 or actions/download-artifact@v4. The control-plane RPCs of that backend, including CreateArtifact, GetSignedArtifactURL, ListArtifacts, FinalizeArtifact and DeleteArtifact, accept a caller-supplied workflow_run_backend_id and never check that it belongs to the requester: validateRunIDV4 in pkg/artifacts/artifacts_v4.go parses the value and returns it with the comparison against the requesting task's run ID left commented out. The signed URLs the backend issues are authenticated by an HMAC whose key is hardcoded to the four bytes 0xba 0xdb 0xee 0xf0, identical in every build, computed over a concatenation of endpoint, expiry, artifact name and task ID with no length prefix or delimiter, so signatures are both forgeable and ambiguous between differing artifact name and task ID pairs. The --artifact-server-addr flag defaults to the host's outbound address rather than loopback, leaving the backend reachable from the surrounding network. Any client that can reach it may read, overwrite or delete the artifacts of a concurrently running job with no credentials, exposing build outputs such as secrets and deployment credentials and permitting their replacement before the owning job consumes them.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-26 15:56 UTC
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/nektos/act | product |
| https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.89/pkg/ar… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.89/cmd/root.go | technical-description |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/act-through-… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-08-18 00:00
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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