Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-59155 (GCVE-0-2026-59155)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-10 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 17:56

Title

Nezha Monitoring: DDNS and Notification credential exposure via unredacted list API

Summary

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. Prior to 2.2.5, the GET /api/v1/ddns and GET /api/v1/notification endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials, including Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack, Discord, and Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values, without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin or PAT with nezha:ddns:read or nezha:notification:read scope can receive stored credentials through the listDDNS and listNotification handlers in a single API response. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.5.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-13 17:56 UTC

CWE

CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/commit/39d398066…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/releases/tag/v2.2.5	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
nezhahq	nezha	Affected: < 2.2.5

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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}

EUVD-2026-336096

European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISA

Reserved

2026-10-02 07:51

Assigner

ENISA

Alias of

a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities. This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own: they belong to that CVE.

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "assigner": "ENISA",
  "date_reserved": "2026-10-02T07:51:35.320505+00:00",
  "id": "EUVD-2026-336096"
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-59155

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-10 22:16 - Updated: 2026-07-13 19:49

Severity

6.9 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/commit/39d398066d8c644fe452f74704e34ada6c7ab61e
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/releases/tag/v2.2.5
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "nezha",
          "vendor": "nezhahq",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.2.5"
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    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59155",
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      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WW5P-J6CJ-6MQQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:55 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:55

Summary

Nezha Dashboard: DDNS and Notification credential exposure via unredacted list API

Details

Summary

The GET /api/v1/ddns and GET /api/v1/notification endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values — without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin who calls these endpoints receives every stored credential in the system in a single API response. A compromised admin session or leaked PAT with nezha:ddns:read or nezha:notification:read scope exposes all third-party integration secrets.

Details

The listDDNS and listNotification handlers follow an identical pattern: they call the corresponding singleton GetSortedList(), copier.Copy the full in-memory structs into a response slice, and return them via listHandler with zero field stripping.

DDNS — cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:25–33:

func listDDNS(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.DDNSProfile, error) {
    var ddnsProfiles []*model.DDNSProfile
    list := singleton.DDNSShared.GetSortedList()
    if err := copier.Copy(&ddnsProfiles, &list); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return ddnsProfiles, nil
}

The DDNSProfile struct (model/ddns.go:20–36) serializes AccessSecret with json:"access_secret,omitempty" — non-empty Cloudflare tokens and TencentCloud SecretKeys are returned in cleartext. The WebhookURL and WebhookHeaders fields may also contain embedded secrets.

Notification — cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:25–33:

func listNotification(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.Notification, error) {
    slist := singleton.NotificationShared.GetSortedList()
    var notifications []*model.Notification
    if err := copier.Copy(&notifications, &slist); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return notifications, nil
}

The Notification struct (model/notification.go:34–44) serializes URL, RequestHeader, and RequestBody — all of which commonly contain embedded bot tokens (Slack, Discord, Telegram), API keys in Authorization headers, and webhook secrets.

Route and authorization (cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:155, 171):

auth.GET("/notification", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeNotificationRead), listHandler(listNotification))
auth.GET("/ddns", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeDDNSRead), listHandler(listDDNS))

Both routes are behind authMw (JWT or PAT) and the corresponding read scope. The listHandler → filter chain uses HasPermission (model/common.go:63–82) which grants admins access to ALL profiles and restricts members to their own. No separate response struct or field masking exists anywhere in the codebase — confirmed by exhaustive search for DDNSResponse, DDNSView, NotificationResponse, NotificationView, or any JSON middleware that strips sensitive fields.

The codebase already demonstrates awareness of this pattern: serverConfigSensitiveScope() in cmd/dashboard/controller/api_token_scope.go:117 was introduced to restrict client_secret exposure via GET /server/config/:id, tightening the scope from ScopeServerRead to ScopeServerWrite. No equivalent protection exists for the DDNS or Notification list endpoints.

Tested at commit 3d74cd94 (master, post v2.2.3). The vulnerable pattern has existed since the DDNS and notification list endpoints were introduced.

PoC

Deploy nezha with at least one admin user. Configure a DDNS profile with a Cloudflare API token (AccessSecret) and a Notification webhook pointing to a Slack incoming webhook URL (https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx...).
Authenticate as the admin user. Call:

```bash # DDNS credentials exposed curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer " \ https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \ | jq '.data[].access_secret'

# Notification webhook secrets exposed curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer " \ https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification \ | jq '.data[].url' ```

Observe the full Cloudflare API token, Slack webhook URL with embedded token, and any RequestHeader values (e.g., Authorization: Bearer ...) returned in cleartext.
Alternatively, create a PAT with nezha:ddns:read scope:

bash curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer nzp_<pat_secret>" \ https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \ | jq '.data[].access_secret'

If the PAT creator is an admin, all DDNS secrets are returned in a single response.

Negative control: A member (non-admin) calling the same endpoints only sees their own profiles due to the HasPermission filter (model/common.go:63–82). However, an admin sees ALL profiles with ALL secrets. The security boundary crossed is the credential confidentiality boundary — a read-only listing endpoint should not return write-capable credentials.

Impact

An attacker who compromises an admin session or obtains a PAT with the appropriate read scope can exfiltrate all third-party API credentials stored in the dashboard — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram bot tokens, and any secrets embedded in webhook URLs or Authorization headers. These credentials can then be used to:

Modify DNS records for any domain managed via Cloudflare/TencentCloud DDNS profiles
Send messages as the Slack/Discord/Telegram bot to any configured channel
Access any other API the compromised credentials grant access to

The attack requires high privileges (admin JWT or PAT with appropriate scope), but the impact is amplified because a single API call exposes ALL stored credentials across ALL DDNS profiles and ALL notification webhooks, with no field-level access control separating metadata from secrets.

Suggested remediation: Introduce separate response structs (e.g., DDNSProfileResponse, NotificationResponse) that omit sensitive fields (AccessSecret, WebhookHeaders, URL, RequestHeader) from list/read endpoints, or use json:"-" tags on sensitive fields and provide them only through a dedicated credential-retrieval endpoint with stricter authorization (analogous to the existing serverConfigSensitiveScope() pattern).

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:55:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `GET /api/v1/ddns` and `GET /api/v1/notification` endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials \u2014 Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values \u2014 without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin who calls these endpoints receives every stored credential in the system in a single API response. A compromised admin session or leaked PAT with `nezha:ddns:read` or `nezha:notification:read` scope exposes all third-party integration secrets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `listDDNS` and `listNotification` handlers follow an identical pattern: they call the corresponding singleton `GetSortedList()`, `copier.Copy` the full in-memory structs into a response slice, and return them via `listHandler` with zero field stripping.\n\n**DDNS \u2014 `cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:25\u201333`:**\n\n```go\nfunc listDDNS(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.DDNSProfile, error) {\n    var ddnsProfiles []*model.DDNSProfile\n    list := singleton.DDNSShared.GetSortedList()\n    if err := copier.Copy(\u0026ddnsProfiles, \u0026list); err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    return ddnsProfiles, nil\n}\n```\n\nThe `DDNSProfile` struct (`model/ddns.go:20\u201336`) serializes `AccessSecret` with `json:\"access_secret,omitempty\"` \u2014 non-empty Cloudflare tokens and TencentCloud SecretKeys are returned in cleartext. The `WebhookURL` and `WebhookHeaders` fields may also contain embedded secrets.\n\n**Notification \u2014 `cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:25\u201333`:**\n\n```go\nfunc listNotification(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.Notification, error) {\n    slist := singleton.NotificationShared.GetSortedList()\n    var notifications []*model.Notification\n    if err := copier.Copy(\u0026notifications, \u0026slist); err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    return notifications, nil\n}\n```\n\nThe `Notification` struct (`model/notification.go:34\u201344`) serializes `URL`, `RequestHeader`, and `RequestBody` \u2014 all of which commonly contain embedded bot tokens (Slack, Discord, Telegram), API keys in Authorization headers, and webhook secrets.\n\n**Route and authorization (`cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:155, 171`):**\n\n```go\nauth.GET(\"/notification\", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeNotificationRead), listHandler(listNotification))\nauth.GET(\"/ddns\", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeDDNSRead), listHandler(listDDNS))\n```\n\nBoth routes are behind `authMw` (JWT or PAT) and the corresponding read scope. The `listHandler` \u2192 `filter` chain uses `HasPermission` (`model/common.go:63\u201382`) which grants admins access to ALL profiles and restricts members to their own. No separate response struct or field masking exists anywhere in the codebase \u2014 confirmed by exhaustive search for `DDNSResponse`, `DDNSView`, `NotificationResponse`, `NotificationView`, or any JSON middleware that strips sensitive fields.\n\nThe codebase already demonstrates awareness of this pattern: `serverConfigSensitiveScope()` in `cmd/dashboard/controller/api_token_scope.go:117` was introduced to restrict `client_secret` exposure via `GET /server/config/:id`, tightening the scope from `ScopeServerRead` to `ScopeServerWrite`. No equivalent protection exists for the DDNS or Notification list endpoints.\n\n**Tested at commit `3d74cd94` (master, post v2.2.3).** The vulnerable pattern has existed since the DDNS and notification list endpoints were introduced.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Deploy nezha with at least one admin user. Configure a DDNS profile with a Cloudflare API token (AccessSecret) and a Notification webhook pointing to a Slack incoming webhook URL (`https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx...`).\n\n2. Authenticate as the admin user. Call:\n\n   ```bash\n   # DDNS credentials exposed\n   curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cadmin_jwt\u003e\" \\\n     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \\\n     | jq \u0027.data[].access_secret\u0027\n\n   # Notification webhook secrets exposed\n   curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cadmin_jwt\u003e\" \\\n     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification \\\n     | jq \u0027.data[].url\u0027\n   ```\n\n3. Observe the full Cloudflare API token, Slack webhook URL with embedded token, and any `RequestHeader` values (e.g., `Authorization: Bearer ...`) returned in cleartext.\n\n4. Alternatively, create a PAT with `nezha:ddns:read` scope:\n\n   ```bash\n   curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer nzp_\u003cpat_secret\u003e\" \\\n     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \\\n     | jq \u0027.data[].access_secret\u0027\n   ```\n\n   If the PAT creator is an admin, all DDNS secrets are returned in a single response.\n\n5. **Negative control:** A member (non-admin) calling the same endpoints only sees their own profiles due to the `HasPermission` filter (`model/common.go:63\u201382`). However, an admin sees ALL profiles with ALL secrets. The security boundary crossed is the credential confidentiality boundary \u2014 a read-only listing endpoint should not return write-capable credentials.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who compromises an admin session or obtains a PAT with the appropriate read scope can exfiltrate all third-party API credentials stored in the dashboard \u2014 Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram bot tokens, and any secrets embedded in webhook URLs or Authorization headers. These credentials can then be used to:\n\n- Modify DNS records for any domain managed via Cloudflare/TencentCloud DDNS profiles\n- Send messages as the Slack/Discord/Telegram bot to any configured channel\n- Access any other API the compromised credentials grant access to\n\nThe attack requires high privileges (admin JWT or PAT with appropriate scope), but the impact is amplified because a single API call exposes ALL stored credentials across ALL DDNS profiles and ALL notification webhooks, with no field-level access control separating metadata from secrets.\n\n**Suggested remediation:** Introduce separate response structs (e.g., `DDNSProfileResponse`, `NotificationResponse`) that omit sensitive fields (`AccessSecret`, `WebhookHeaders`, `URL`, `RequestHeader`) from list/read endpoints, or use `json:\"-\"` tags on sensitive fields and provide them only through a dedicated credential-retrieval endpoint with stricter authorization (analogous to the existing `serverConfigSensitiveScope()` pattern).",
  "id": "GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T23:55:26Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T23:55:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nezha Dashboard: DDNS and Notification credential exposure via unredacted list API"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

CVE-2026-59155 (GCVE-0-2026-59155)

EUVD-2026-336096

FKIE_CVE-2026-59155

GHSA-WW5P-J6CJ-6MQQ

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