https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T01:58:24.671167+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336096 EUVD-2026-336096 2026-10-06T01:58:24.726566+00:00 EUVD-2026-336096 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59155 fkie_cve-2026-59155 2026-10-06T01:58:24.726610+00:00

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. Prior to 2.2.5, the GET /api/v1/ddns and GET /api/v1/notification endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials, including Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack, Discord, and Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values, without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin or PAT with nezha:ddns:read or nezha:notification:read scope can receive stored credentials through the listDDNS and listNotification handlers in a single API response. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.5.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq — Nezha Dashboard: DDNS and Notification credential exposure via unredacted list API 2026-10-06T01:58:24.726649+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/nezhahq/nezha

### Summary

The `GET /api/v1/ddns` and `GET /api/v1/notification` endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values — without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin who calls these endpoints receives every stored credential in the system in a single API response. A compromised admin session or leaked PAT with `nezha:ddns:read` or `nezha:notification:read` scope exposes all third-party integration secrets.

### Details

The `listDDNS` and `listNotification` handlers follow an identical pattern: they call the corresponding singleton `GetSortedList()`, `copier.Copy` the full in-memory structs into a response slice, and return them via `listHandler` with zero field stripping.

**DDNS — `cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:25–33`:**

```go func listDDNS(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.DDNSProfile, error) { var ddnsProfiles []*model.DDNSProfile list := singleton.DDNSShared.GetSortedList() if err := copier.Copy(&ddnsProfiles, &list); err != nil { return nil, err } return ddnsProfiles, nil } ```

The `DDNSProfile` struct (`model/ddns.go:20–36`) serializes `AccessSecret` with `json:"access_secret,omitempty"` — non-empty Cloudflare tokens and TencentCloud SecretKeys are returned in cleartext. The `WebhookURL` and `WebhookHeaders` fields may also contain embedded secrets.

**N…