Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-54017 (GCVE-0-2026-54017)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-18 21:09 – Updated: 2026-06-22 14:17

Title

Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal

Summary

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services. This is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here: first, raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report); and second, a bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`). The attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation. Version 0.9.6 fixes the issue.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-22 14:14 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
open-webui	open-webui	Affected: < 0.9.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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EUVD-2026-328883

European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISA

Reserved

2026-10-02 07:48

Assigner

ENISA

Alias of

a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities. This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own: they belong to that CVE.

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "assigner": "ENISA",
  "date_reserved": "2026-10-02T07:48:33.372912+00:00",
  "id": "EUVD-2026-328883"
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-54017

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-18 22:16 - Updated: 2026-06-24 19:04

Severity

7.7 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv	Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv	Mitigation, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	openwebui	open_webui	*

JSON

To clipboard

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GHSA-R2WG-2MCR-66RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 17:55 – Updated: 2026-07-15 21:51

Summary

Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal

Details

Summary

The terminal-server reverse proxy in backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py does not fully confine the user-controlled path segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft path values containing encoded ../ traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.

This is a separate code path from the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:

Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).
A bypass of the subsequently-added _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation using double-encoded dots (%252e%252e).

The attacker-controlled input is the request path, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.

Affected code

The proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:

# routers/terminals.py
@router.api_route('/{server_id}/{path:path}', methods=PROXY_METHODS)
async def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    ...
    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)
    if safe_path is None:
        return JSONResponse({'error': 'Invalid path'}, status_code=400)
    target_url = f'{base_url}/{safe_path}'
    policy_id = connection.get('policy_id')
    if policy_id:
        target_url = f'{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}'

Access requires has_connection_access(user, connection, ...), i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.

Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)

The path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (target_url = f"{base_url}/{path}"), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets
# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets

This vector is closed at HEAD: _sanitize_proxy_path now URL-decodes once, runs posixpath.normpath, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with .. (unquote('..%2F..%2F') -> '../../' -> normpath -> '../..' -> rejected).

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`

_sanitize_proxy_path decodes the path only once before the .. check, so a double-encoded payload survives:

def _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -> str | None:
    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only
    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
    cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
    if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
        return None
    ...

unquote('%252e%252e/secret') yields %2e%2e/secret (not ..), which normpath leaves unchanged and which does not start with .., so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards {base_url}/%2e%2e/secret, and the upstream terminal server decodes %2e%2e into .. and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file
# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file
# upstream decodes -> ../../sensitive-file

The policy_id form ({base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.

Impact

An authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).

Fix

Decode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:

decoded = path
for _ in range(8):
    once = unquote(decoded)
    if once == decoded:
        break
    decoded = once
normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
    return None

This rejects %2e%2e, %252e%252e, %25252e%25252e, ..%2f..%2f, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as %20) intact.

Credits

Tulgaaaaaaaa — original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).
sermikr0 — double-encoded (%252e%252e) bypass of the _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T17:55:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-18T22:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.\n\nThis is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:\n\n1. Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).\n2. A bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`).\n\nThe attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.\n\n### Affected code\n\nThe proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:\n\n```python\n# routers/terminals.py\n@router.api_route(\u0027/{server_id}/{path:path}\u0027, methods=PROXY_METHODS)\nasync def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n    ...\n    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)\n    if safe_path is None:\n        return JSONResponse({\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Invalid path\u0027}, status_code=400)\n    target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/{safe_path}\u0027\n    policy_id = connection.get(\u0027policy_id\u0027)\n    if policy_id:\n        target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}\u0027\n```\n\nAccess requires `has_connection_access(user, connection, ...)`, i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.\n\n### Vector 1 \u2014 single-encoded traversal (original)\n\nThe path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (`target_url = f\"{base_url}/{path}\"`), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets\n# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets\n```\n\nThis vector is closed at HEAD: `_sanitize_proxy_path` now URL-decodes once, runs `posixpath.normpath`, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with `..` (`unquote(\u0027..%2F..%2F\u0027) -\u003e \u0027../../\u0027 -\u003e normpath -\u003e \u0027../..\u0027` -\u003e rejected).\n\n### Vector 2 \u2014 double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`\n\n`_sanitize_proxy_path` decodes the path only once before the `..` check, so a double-encoded payload survives:\n\n```python\ndef _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -\u003e str | None:\n    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only\n    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\n    cleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\n    if cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n        return None\n    ...\n```\n\n`unquote(\u0027%252e%252e/secret\u0027)` yields `%2e%2e/secret` (not `..`), which `normpath` leaves unchanged and which does not start with `..`, so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards `{base_url}/%2e%2e/secret`, and the upstream terminal server decodes `%2e%2e` into `..` and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file\n# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file\n# upstream decodes -\u003e ../../sensitive-file\n```\n\nThe `policy_id` form (`{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).\n\n### Fix\n\nDecode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:\n\n```python\ndecoded = path\nfor _ in range(8):\n    once = unquote(decoded)\n    if once == decoded:\n        break\n    decoded = once\nnormalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\ncleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\nif cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n    return None\n```\n\nThis rejects `%2e%2e`, `%252e%252e`, `%25252e%25252e`, `..%2f..%2f`, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as `%20`) intact.\n\n### Credits\n\n- **Tulgaaaaaaaa** \u2014 original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).\n- **sermikr0** \u2014 double-encoded (`%252e%252e`) bypass of the `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T21:51:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T17:55:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54017"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2751.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal"
}

PYSEC-2026-2751

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:46 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05

Details

Summary

This is a separate code path from the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:

Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).
A bypass of the subsequently-added _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation using double-encoded dots (%252e%252e).

The attacker-controlled input is the request path, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.

Affected code

The proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:

# routers/terminals.py
@router.api_route('/{server_id}/{path:path}', methods=PROXY_METHODS)
async def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    ...
    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)
    if safe_path is None:
        return JSONResponse({'error': 'Invalid path'}, status_code=400)
    target_url = f'{base_url}/{safe_path}'
    policy_id = connection.get('policy_id')
    if policy_id:
        target_url = f'{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}'

Access requires has_connection_access(user, connection, ...), i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.

Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)

The path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (target_url = f"{base_url}/{path}"), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets
# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`

_sanitize_proxy_path decodes the path only once before the .. check, so a double-encoded payload survives:

def _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -> str | None:
    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only
    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
    cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
    if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
        return None
    ...

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file
# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file
# upstream decodes -> ../../sensitive-file

The policy_id form ({base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.

Impact

Fix

Decode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:

decoded = path
for _ in range(8):
    once = unquote(decoded)
    if once == decoded:
        break
    decoded = once
normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
    return None

This rejects %2e%2e, %252e%252e, %25252e%25252e, ..%2f..%2f, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as %20) intact.

Credits

Tulgaaaaaaaa — original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).
sermikr0 — double-encoded (%252e%252e) bypass of the _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
open-webui	pkg:pypi/open-webui

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.124",
        "0.1.125",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.2.3",
        "0.2.4",
        "0.2.5",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.3.10",
        "0.3.12",
        "0.3.13",
        "0.3.14",
        "0.3.15",
        "0.3.16",
        "0.3.17",
        "0.3.17.dev2",
        "0.3.17.dev3",
        "0.3.17.dev4",
        "0.3.17.dev5",
        "0.3.18",
        "0.3.19",
        "0.3.2",
        "0.3.20",
        "0.3.21",
        "0.3.22",
        "0.3.23",
        "0.3.24",
        "0.3.25",
        "0.3.26",
        "0.3.27",
        "0.3.27.dev1",
        "0.3.27.dev2",
        "0.3.27.dev3",
        "0.3.28",
        "0.3.29",
        "0.3.3",
        "0.3.30",
        "0.3.30.dev1",
        "0.3.30.dev2",
        "0.3.31",
        "0.3.31.dev1",
        "0.3.32",
        "0.3.33",
        "0.3.33.dev1",
        "0.3.34",
        "0.3.35",
        "0.3.4",
        "0.3.5",
        "0.3.6",
        "0.3.7",
        "0.3.8",
        "0.3.9",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.0.dev1",
        "0.4.0.dev2",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4",
        "0.4.5",
        "0.4.6",
        "0.4.6.dev1",
        "0.4.7",
        "0.4.8",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.0.dev1",
        "0.5.0.dev2",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.5.10",
        "0.5.11",
        "0.5.12",
        "0.5.13",
        "0.5.14",
        "0.5.15",
        "0.5.16",
        "0.5.17",
        "0.5.18",
        "0.5.19",
        "0.5.2",
        "0.5.20",
        "0.5.3",
        "0.5.3.dev1",
        "0.5.4",
        "0.5.5",
        "0.5.6",
        "0.5.7",
        "0.5.8",
        "0.5.9",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.10",
        "0.6.11",
        "0.6.12",
        "0.6.13",
        "0.6.14",
        "0.6.15",
        "0.6.16",
        "0.6.18",
        "0.6.19",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.6.20",
        "0.6.21",
        "0.6.22",
        "0.6.23",
        "0.6.24",
        "0.6.25",
        "0.6.26",
        "0.6.26.dev1",
        "0.6.27",
        "0.6.28",
        "0.6.29",
        "0.6.3",
        "0.6.30",
        "0.6.31",
        "0.6.32",
        "0.6.33",
        "0.6.34",
        "0.6.35",
        "0.6.36",
        "0.6.37",
        "0.6.38",
        "0.6.39",
        "0.6.4",
        "0.6.40",
        "0.6.41",
        "0.6.42",
        "0.6.43",
        "0.6.5",
        "0.6.6",
        "0.6.6.dev1",
        "0.6.7",
        "0.6.8",
        "0.6.9",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.8.10",
        "0.8.11",
        "0.8.12",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.8.3",
        "0.8.4",
        "0.8.5",
        "0.8.6",
        "0.8.7",
        "0.8.8",
        "0.8.9",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.2",
        "0.9.3",
        "0.9.4",
        "0.9.5"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54017",
    "GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.\n\nThis is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:\n\n1. Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).\n2. A bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`).\n\nThe attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.\n\n### Affected code\n\nThe proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:\n\n```python\n# routers/terminals.py\n@router.api_route(\u0027/{server_id}/{path:path}\u0027, methods=PROXY_METHODS)\nasync def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n    ...\n    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)\n    if safe_path is None:\n        return JSONResponse({\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Invalid path\u0027}, status_code=400)\n    target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/{safe_path}\u0027\n    policy_id = connection.get(\u0027policy_id\u0027)\n    if policy_id:\n        target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}\u0027\n```\n\nAccess requires `has_connection_access(user, connection, ...)`, i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.\n\n### Vector 1 \u2014 single-encoded traversal (original)\n\nThe path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (`target_url = f\"{base_url}/{path}\"`), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets\n# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets\n```\n\nThis vector is closed at HEAD: `_sanitize_proxy_path` now URL-decodes once, runs `posixpath.normpath`, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with `..` (`unquote(\u0027..%2F..%2F\u0027) -\u003e \u0027../../\u0027 -\u003e normpath -\u003e \u0027../..\u0027` -\u003e rejected).\n\n### Vector 2 \u2014 double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`\n\n`_sanitize_proxy_path` decodes the path only once before the `..` check, so a double-encoded payload survives:\n\n```python\ndef _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -\u003e str | None:\n    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only\n    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\n    cleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\n    if cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n        return None\n    ...\n```\n\n`unquote(\u0027%252e%252e/secret\u0027)` yields `%2e%2e/secret` (not `..`), which `normpath` leaves unchanged and which does not start with `..`, so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards `{base_url}/%2e%2e/secret`, and the upstream terminal server decodes `%2e%2e` into `..` and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file\n# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file\n# upstream decodes -\u003e ../../sensitive-file\n```\n\nThe `policy_id` form (`{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).\n\n### Fix\n\nDecode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:\n\n```python\ndecoded = path\nfor _ in range(8):\n    once = unquote(decoded)\n    if once == decoded:\n        break\n    decoded = once\nnormalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\ncleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\nif cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n    return None\n```\n\nThis rejects `%2e%2e`, `%252e%252e`, `%25252e%25252e`, `..%2f..%2f`, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as `%20`) intact.\n\n### Credits\n\n- **Tulgaaaaaaaa** \u2014 original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).\n- **sermikr0** \u2014 double-encoded (`%252e%252e`) bypass of the `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2751",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:14.387214Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:46:19.727130Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54017"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-54017 (GCVE-0-2026-54017)

EUVD-2026-328883

FKIE_CVE-2026-54017

GHSA-R2WG-2MCR-66RV

Summary

Affected code

Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of _sanitize_proxy_path

Impact

Fix

Credits

PYSEC-2026-2751

Summary

Affected code

Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of _sanitize_proxy_path

Impact

Fix

Credits

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`