CVE-2026-46395 (GCVE-0-2026-46395)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-05 18:27 – Updated: 2026-06-05 19:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
HAX CMS Vulnerable to Private Key Disclosure via Broken HMAC Implementation
Summary
HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. Prior to version 26.0.0, the `hmacBase64()` function in the HAXcms Node.js backend contains two critical cryptographic implementation errors that together allow any unauthenticated attacker to extract the system’s private signing key and forge arbitrary admin-level JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) allowing them to get full admin access with a single HTTP request. First, the function passes the literal string "0" as the HMAC signing key instead of the key parameter, making every HAXcms instance compute identical HMACs for the same input. Then, after computing the HMAC, the function concatenates the real key parameter which is "this.privateKey + this.salt", the system’s master signing secret is directly onto the output. The combined buffer is base64-encoded and returned as the token. Every base64url token produced has the same structure: 32 bytes HMAC keyed with "0" and N bytes of `privateKey+salt`. An attacker base64-decodes any token, discards the first 32 bytes, and reads the private key directly. The `/system/api/connectionSettings` endpoint is unauthenticated and returns multiple tokens generated by this function. A single GET request to this endpoint exposes the private key. The PHP backend implements this function correctly with the actual key and returns only the hash. The PHP version produces 44-character tokens whereas the broken Node.js version produces 139+ character tokens. Version 26.0.0 fixes the issue.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-05 19:41 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| haxtheweb | haxcms-nodejs |
Affected:
< 26.0.0
|
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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