CVE-2026-16664 (GCVE-0-2026-16664)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 00:23 – Updated: 2026-11-13 21:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Unchecked serial-recovery image index causes out-of-bounds slot-table read in MCUboot Zephyr port
Summary
MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num 2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER 2 entries, so any img_num >= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read.
The path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image >= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices).
flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the "no image given" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num >= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth.
This vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below.
Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CWE
- CWE-129 - bounds
Assigner
References
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"value": "MCUboot\u0027s Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num 2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER 2 entries, so any img_num \u003e= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read.\n\nThe path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image \u003e= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices).\n\nflash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the \"no image given\" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num \u003e= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth.\nThis vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below."
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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