CVE-2026-16664 (GCVE-0-2026-16664)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 00:23 – Updated: 2026-11-13 21:59
VLAI
Title
Unchecked serial-recovery image index causes out-of-bounds slot-table read in MCUboot Zephyr port
Summary
MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num 2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER 2 entries, so any img_num >= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read. The path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image >= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices). flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the "no image given" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num >= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth. This vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
mcu-tools mcuboot Affected: 2.0.0 , ≤ * (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "mcuboot",
          "product": "mcuboot",
          "programFiles": [
            "boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c",
            "boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "__flash_area_ids_for_slot"
            },
            {
              "name": "bs_upload"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "mcu-tools",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "MCUboot\u0027s Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num  2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER  2 entries, so any img_num \u003e= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read.\n\nThe path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image \u003e= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices).\n\nflash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the \"no image given\" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num \u003e= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth.\nThis vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below."
        }
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T21:59:26.710Z",
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/183a05f256bdbbac86edcb048958da59018f814e"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix commit b35d623fc44b",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/b35d623fc44b873cbb244a4fb0930f259ff45eb8"
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      ],
      "title": "Unchecked serial-recovery image index causes out-of-bounds slot-table read in MCUboot Zephyr port",
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    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-16664",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-13T00:23:05.652Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-22T19:47:54.908Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T21:59:26.710Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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                "programFiles": [
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            "value": "MCUboot\u0027s Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num  2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER  2 entries, so any img_num \u003e= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read.\n\nThe path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image \u003e= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices).\n\nflash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the \"no image given\" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num \u003e= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth.\nThis vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-16664",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-13T22:17:25.017",
        "metrics": {
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}



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