CVE-2026-130091 (GCVE-0-2026-130091)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:24 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:19
VLAI
Title
temporal-proxy can be terminated by memory exhaustion when decompressing stored payloads
Summary
A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server's /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 21:19 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Temporal Technologies, Inc. temporal-proxy Affected: 1.2.0 , < 1.2.1 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-130091",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:19:00.476228Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T21:19:07.877Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
          "product": "temporal-proxy",
          "programFiles": [
            "pkg/codec/compressor.go",
            "internal/proxy/compression.go",
            "internal/proxy/codec.go"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "Compressor.Decode"
            },
            {
              "name": "NewCodecs"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
          "vendor": "Temporal Technologies, Inc.",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.2.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eEvery temporal-proxy 1.2.0 deployment is affected; no compression, encryption, or codec server setting is required. The attacker needs write permission in one namespace whose history is read through the proxy.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Every temporal-proxy 1.2.0 deployment is affected; no compression, encryption, or codec server setting is required. The attacker needs write permission in one namespace whose history is read through the proxy."
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Subsequent System Availability metric is None because the upstream Temporal service keeps running and serving clients that do not use the proxy; loss of the proxy\u0027s own service is scored as Vulnerable System Availability.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The Subsequent System Availability metric is None because the upstream Temporal service keeps running and serving clients that do not use the proxy; loss of the proxy\u0027s own service is scored as Vulnerable System Availability."
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eA caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server\u0027s /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server\u0027s /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Termination of the proxy process through memory exhaustion, interrupting service for every namespace and upstream it serves. Restarting the proxy does not restore service while the stored payloads remain. No confidentiality or integrity impact was identified."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-409",
              "description": "CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:24:35.307Z",
        "orgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
        "shortName": "Temporal"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "Inbound codec chain in temporal-proxy 1.2.0, which always includes the decompressor",
          "tags": [
            "product"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/internal/proxy/codec.go#L157-L166"
        },
        {
          "name": "Compressor.Decode in temporal-proxy 1.2.0, which bounds each payload but not the response",
          "tags": [
            "product"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/pkg/codec/compressor.go#L206-L262"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix pull request",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/295"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix commit",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/ea70ede864cdf6aa9591432d0464a6d6f3413260"
        },
        {
          "name": "Backport pull request for the 1.2 release line",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/301"
        },
        {
          "name": "Backport commit on releases/v1.2.x",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/5c5060cc77c8e94a01de1414cc32e55751580381"
        },
        {
          "name": "temporal-proxy 1.2.1",
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.2.1"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to temporal-proxy 1.2.1 or later. Fixed releases limit the bytes decoded for one response to its upstream\u0027s maxResponseSize, and the bytes held at once across every response and codec server request to compression.maxDecodedInFlight, 512 MiB by default; a response that would exceed either limit is refused with ResourceExhausted. A configuration whose maxResponseSize exceeds compression.maxDecodedInFlight must raise compression.maxDecodedInFlight to match, or the proxy does not start.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Upgrade to temporal-proxy 1.2.1 or later. Fixed releases limit the bytes decoded for one response to its upstream\u0027s maxResponseSize, and the bytes held at once across every response and codec server request to compression.maxDecodedInFlight, 512 MiB by default; a response that would exceed either limit is refused with ResourceExhausted. A configuration whose maxResponseSize exceeds compression.maxDecodedInFlight must raise compression.maxDecodedInFlight to match, or the proxy does not start."
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "INTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "temporal-proxy can be terminated by memory exhaustion when decompressing stored payloads",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eNo setting disables the decoder in 1.2.0. A deployment that has not enabled compression can run 1.1.2 on the 1.1 release line, which does not decompress payloads; one that enabled compression on 1.2.0 cannot, because 1.1 passes the stored compressed payloads to clients undecoded. Deleting the Workflow Executions that hold the payloads stops the repeated failures; terminating or resetting them does not remove the history.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "No setting disables the decoder in 1.2.0. A deployment that has not enabled compression can run 1.1.2 on the 1.1 release line, which does not decompress payloads; one that enabled compression on 1.2.0 cannot, because 1.1 passes the stored compressed payloads to clients undecoded. Deleting the Workflow Executions that hold the payloads stops the repeated failures; terminating or resetting them does not remove the history."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
    "assignerShortName": "Temporal",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-130091",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:24:35.307Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-16T20:59:59.874Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T21:19:07.877Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-130091",
      "date": "2026-11-22",
      "epss": "0.00472",
      "percentile": "0.41624"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "packageName": "github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
                "product": "temporal-proxy",
                "programFiles": [
                  "pkg/codec/compressor.go",
                  "internal/proxy/compression.go",
                  "internal/proxy/codec.go"
                ],
                "programRoutines": [
                  {
                    "name": "Compressor.Decode"
                  },
                  {
                    "name": "NewCodecs"
                  }
                ],
                "repo": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
                "vendor": "Temporal Technologies, Inc.",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "1.2.1",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "1.2.0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "security@temporal.io"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server\u0027s /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-130091",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-18T22:17:18.940",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV40": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "baseScore": 7.1,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "security@temporal.io",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ],
          "ssvcV203": [
            {
              "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "ssvcData": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-130091",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "technicalImpact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:19:00.476228Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-11-18T21:17:49.347",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/internal/proxy/codec.go#L157-L166"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/pkg/codec/compressor.go#L206-L262"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/5c5060cc77c8e94a01de1414cc32e55751580381"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/ea70ede864cdf6aa9591432d0464a6d6f3413260"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/295"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/301"
          },
          {
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.2.1"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "security@temporal.io",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-409"
              }
            ],
            "source": "security@temporal.io",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": {
        "adp": [
          {
            "metrics": [
              {
                "other": {
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2026-130091",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "no"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:19:00.476228Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T21:19:03.628Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
              "product": "temporal-proxy",
              "programFiles": [
                "pkg/codec/compressor.go",
                "internal/proxy/compression.go",
                "internal/proxy/codec.go"
              ],
              "programRoutines": [
                {
                  "name": "Compressor.Decode"
                },
                {
                  "name": "NewCodecs"
                }
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy",
              "vendor": "Temporal Technologies, Inc.",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "1.2.1",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "1.2.0",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "configurations": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eEvery temporal-proxy 1.2.0 deployment is affected; no compression, encryption, or codec server setting is required. The attacker needs write permission in one namespace whose history is read through the proxy.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "Every temporal-proxy 1.2.0 deployment is affected; no compression, encryption, or codec server setting is required. The attacker needs write permission in one namespace whose history is read through the proxy."
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Subsequent System Availability metric is None because the upstream Temporal service keeps running and serving clients that do not use the proxy; loss of the proxy\u0027s own service is scored as Vulnerable System Availability.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "The Subsequent System Availability metric is None because the upstream Temporal service keeps running and serving clients that do not use the proxy; loss of the proxy\u0027s own service is scored as Vulnerable System Availability."
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eA caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server\u0027s /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server\u0027s /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later."
            }
          ],
          "impacts": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "Termination of the proxy process through memory exhaustion, interrupting service for every namespace and upstream it serves. Restarting the proxy does not restore service while the stored payloads remain. No confidentiality or integrity impact was identified."
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV4_0": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "baseScore": 7.1,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "format": "CVSS",
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "GENERAL"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-409",
                  "description": "CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:24:35.307Z",
            "orgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
            "shortName": "Temporal"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "name": "Inbound codec chain in temporal-proxy 1.2.0, which always includes the decompressor",
              "tags": [
                "product"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/internal/proxy/codec.go#L157-L166"
            },
            {
              "name": "Compressor.Decode in temporal-proxy 1.2.0, which bounds each payload but not the response",
              "tags": [
                "product"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/pkg/codec/compressor.go#L206-L262"
            },
            {
              "name": "Fix pull request",
              "tags": [
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/295"
            },
            {
              "name": "Fix commit",
              "tags": [
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/ea70ede864cdf6aa9591432d0464a6d6f3413260"
            },
            {
              "name": "Backport pull request for the 1.2 release line",
              "tags": [
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/301"
            },
            {
              "name": "Backport commit on releases/v1.2.x",
              "tags": [
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/5c5060cc77c8e94a01de1414cc32e55751580381"
            },
            {
              "name": "temporal-proxy 1.2.1",
              "tags": [
                "release-notes"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "solutions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to temporal-proxy 1.2.1 or later. Fixed releases limit the bytes decoded for one response to its upstream\u0027s maxResponseSize, and the bytes held at once across every response and codec server request to compression.maxDecodedInFlight, 512 MiB by default; a response that would exceed either limit is refused with ResourceExhausted. A configuration whose maxResponseSize exceeds compression.maxDecodedInFlight must raise compression.maxDecodedInFlight to match, or the proxy does not start.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "Upgrade to temporal-proxy 1.2.1 or later. Fixed releases limit the bytes decoded for one response to its upstream\u0027s maxResponseSize, and the bytes held at once across every response and codec server request to compression.maxDecodedInFlight, 512 MiB by default; a response that would exceed either limit is refused with ResourceExhausted. A configuration whose maxResponseSize exceeds compression.maxDecodedInFlight must raise compression.maxDecodedInFlight to match, or the proxy does not start."
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "discovery": "INTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "temporal-proxy can be terminated by memory exhaustion when decompressing stored payloads",
          "workarounds": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eNo setting disables the decoder in 1.2.0. A deployment that has not enabled compression can run 1.1.2 on the 1.1 release line, which does not decompress payloads; one that enabled compression on 1.2.0 cannot, because 1.1 passes the stored compressed payloads to clients undecoded. Deleting the Workflow Executions that hold the payloads stops the repeated failures; terminating or resetting them does not remove the history.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "No setting disables the decoder in 1.2.0. A deployment that has not enabled compression can run 1.1.2 on the 1.1 release line, which does not decompress payloads; one that enabled compression on 1.2.0 cannot, because 1.1 passes the stored compressed payloads to clients undecoded. Deleting the Workflow Executions that hold the payloads stops the repeated failures; terminating or resetting them does not remove the history."
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
        "assignerShortName": "Temporal",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-130091",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:24:35.307Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-11-16T20:59:59.874Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T21:19:07.877Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…