BREW-TRAVIS-CVE-2026-125108 (GHSA-P8X9-V4HV-2W4G)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-11-11 10:06 – Updated: 2026-11-11 10:06 – Source websiteSummary
The guard added for CVE-2026-26961 (GHSA-vgpv-f759-9wx3), which rejects multipart requests with more than one boundary parameter, only inspects the part of the Content-Type header after the boundary it extracts. A Content-Type whose first boundary parameter is empty or begins with a quote, semicolon, or comma is skipped by the extraction pattern, so a second boundary parameter is accepted silently and Rack parses the body with a boundary that a conforming parser would not derive from the header.
Details
Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse_boundary extracts the boundary with a regular expression that uses a lazy prefix and a value class excluding ", ;, and ,. For a header such as multipart/form-data; boundary=";boundary=AaB03x" or multipart/form-data; boundary=; boundary=AaB03x, the pattern skips the first boundary= and anchors on the second, and the subsequent check for another boundary= in the remaining text finds nothing. Rack then uses AaB03x.
RFC 9110 parses the first header as a single parameter whose value is ;boundary=AaB03x, which is not a legal boundary under RFC 2046, so the only conformant outcome is rejection. Inspecting intermediaries that implement the standard grammar, such as ModSecurity, see a different boundary or no multipart body at all.
The fix counts boundary= occurrences across the entire header value and rejects the request when there is more than one.
Impact
As with CVE-2026-26961, an attacker can craft a multipart request that a web application firewall or other inspecting proxy in front of a Rack application interprets differently from Rack, so form fields and file uploads reach the application without inspection. Rack itself grants no capability beyond that of a well-formed request with the same body. All supported versions, including 2.2, are affected.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack.
- Reject requests whose
Content-Typecontains more than oneboundaryparameter at the reverse proxy.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "rack",
"resource_purl": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "travis",
"purl": "pkg:brew/travis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.14.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"key": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
"name": "rack",
"resource": "rack",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.0.11"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe guard added for CVE-2026-26961 (GHSA-vgpv-f759-9wx3), which rejects multipart requests with more than one `boundary` parameter, only inspects the part of the `Content-Type` header after the boundary it extracts. A `Content-Type` whose first `boundary` parameter is empty or begins with a quote, semicolon, or comma is skipped by the extraction pattern, so a second `boundary` parameter is accepted silently and Rack parses the body with a boundary that a conforming parser would not derive from the header.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse_boundary` extracts the boundary with a regular expression that uses a lazy prefix and a value class excluding `\"`, `;`, and `,`. For a header such as `multipart/form-data; boundary=\";boundary=AaB03x\"` or `multipart/form-data; boundary=; boundary=AaB03x`, the pattern skips the first `boundary=` and anchors on the second, and the subsequent check for another `boundary=` in the remaining text finds nothing. Rack then uses `AaB03x`.\n\nRFC 9110 parses the first header as a single parameter whose value is `;boundary=AaB03x`, which is not a legal boundary under RFC 2046, so the only conformant outcome is rejection. Inspecting intermediaries that implement the standard grammar, such as ModSecurity, see a different boundary or no multipart body at all.\n\nThe fix counts `boundary=` occurrences across the entire header value and rejects the request when there is more than one.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs with CVE-2026-26961, an attacker can craft a multipart request that a web application firewall or other inspecting proxy in front of a Rack application interprets differently from Rack, so form fields and file uploads reach the application without inspection. Rack itself grants no capability beyond that of a well-formed request with the same body. All supported versions, including 2.2, are affected.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack.\n* Reject requests whose `Content-Type` contains more than one `boundary` parameter at the reverse proxy.",
"id": "BREW-travis-CVE-2026-125108",
"modified": "2026-11-11T10:06:00Z",
"published": "2026-11-11T10:06:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/19a1a19cb4da97d61c8d5effeb2e927c44370ae9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/a29512324265790a5536b830490075d0d79323be"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/d5e928b803da30b8e40171dbd4be39bed7daa6fa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v2.2.25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v3.1.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v3.2.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rack: Multipart boundary ambiguity guard in Rack::Multipart::Parser can be bypassed with a quoted boundary value, allowing WAF bypass",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g",
"CVE-2026-125108"
]
}
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|---|
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