BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-GHSA-H… (GHSA-HV93-R4J3-Q65F)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-10-10 08:58 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing
Details

Summary

The issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied sessionKey values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.

Affected Behavior

  • POST /hooks/agent accepted payload sessionKey and used it directly for session routing.
  • Common session-key shapes (for example agent:main:dm:<peerId>) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.

Attack Preconditions

  • Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.
  • Hook ingress allows request-selected sessionKey values.
  • Target session keys can be derived or guessed.

Without those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.

Impact

  • Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.
  • Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.
  • Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.

Affected Versions

  • openclaw >= 2.0.0-beta3 and < 2026.2.12

Patched Versions

  • openclaw >= 2026.2.12

Fix

OpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing: - POST /hooks/agent rejects payload sessionKey unless hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true. - Added hooks.defaultSessionKey for fixed ingress routing. - Added hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes to constrain explicit routing keys. - Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.

Recommended Configuration

{
  "hooks": {
    "enabled": true,
    "token": "${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}",
    "defaultSessionKey": "hook:ingress",
    "allowRequestSessionKey": false,
    "allowedSessionKeyPrefixes": ["hook:"]
  }
}

Credit

Thanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.9",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.9"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n- `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing.\n- Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:\u003cpeerId\u003e`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.\n- Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values.\n- Target session keys can be derived or guessed.\n\nWithout those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.\n\n## Impact\n- Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.\n- Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.\n- Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2.0.0-beta3` and `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n\n## Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing:\n- `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`.\n- Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing.\n- Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys.\n- Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.\n\n## Recommended Configuration\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"enabled\": true,\n    \"token\": \"${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}\",\n    \"defaultSessionKey\": \"hook:ingress\",\n    \"allowRequestSessionKey\": false,\n    \"allowedSessionKeyPrefixes\": [\"hook:\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\nThanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f",
  "modified": "2026-10-10T08:58:04Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f"
  ]
}



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