https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 12 Oct 2026 09:08:49 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hv93-r4j3-q65f <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary The issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.</p> <p>## Affected Behavior - `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing. - Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:&lt;peerId&gt;`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.</p> <p>## Attack Preconditions - Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token. - Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values. - Target session keys can be derived or guessed.</p> <p>Without those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.</p> <p>## Impact - Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions. - Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused. - Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.</p> <p>## Affected Versions - `openclaw` `&gt;= 2.0.0-beta3` and `&lt; 2026.2.12`</p> <p>## Patched Versions - `openclaw` `&gt;= 2026.2.12`</p> <p>## Fix OpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing: - `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`. - Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing. - Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys. - Sec…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary The issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.</p> <p>## Affected Behavior - `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing. - Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:&lt;peerId&gt;`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.</p> <p>## Attack Preconditions - Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token. - Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values. - Target session keys can be derived or guessed.</p> <p>Without those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.</p> <p>## Impact - Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions. - Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused. - Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.</p> <p>## Affected Versions - `openclaw` `&gt;= 2.0.0-beta3` and `&lt; 2026.2.12`</p> <p>## Patched Versions - `openclaw` `&gt;= 2026.2.12`</p> <p>## Fix OpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing: - `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`. - Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing. - Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys. - Sec…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hv93-r4j3-q65f