GHSA-W42C-H7HR-F67P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 20:36 – Updated: 2026-11-19 20:36Summary
Gortex is an MCP server exposing write_file, edit_file, and move_inline tools. resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from confinement, and the write handlers — unlike read_file / get_symbol_source — never call guardSymlinkWithinRepo. A single MCP write_file call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, outside every indexed repo root (AtomicWriteFile's MkdirAll auto-creates missing parents). Writing ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project's own SECURITY.md invariant "File-path resolution is confined to indexed repository roots"
Affected
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go (+ tools_move_inline.go), HEAD 28fa017 (v0.53.0).
CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name/Path) → CWE-94 (code execution).
Vulnerable code
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62 resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at :793 (AtomicWriteFile, write_file) and :676 (edit_file) run with no guardSymlinkWithinRepo. The asymmetry is the bug: read_file (:940) and get_symbol_source do call guardSymlinkWithinRepo; the write path does not.
PoC (executed)
The PoC (internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go, package mcp) builds the server via the repo's own newSingleRepoServer(t) harness and invokes the real srv.handleWriteFile through the genuine mcplib.CallToolRequest shape:
=== RUN TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot
indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo
handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50
PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes "OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root"
RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -> "echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file"
VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 ("It does not write to source files")
--- PASS (go test ok)
The test asserts the handler did not return IsError and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)
Impact
write_file / edit_file are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can — startup/hook/cron files → arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property SECURITY.md promises) is broken on the write path.
Severity
High — CVSS v3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ≈ 8.x. UI:R reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file → execute on next trigger), so I:H + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower — but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.
Remediation
Apply guardSymlinkWithinRepo (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on write_file / edit_file / move_inline, identically to read_file / get_symbol_source. Confinement must cover the write path.
Dedup / freshness (re-verified live)
gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories → [] (none). gh search prs/issues for resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo / symlink / traversal / confinement → 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo are gortex-own code (not vendored). Fresh at HEAD 28fa017.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/zzet/gortex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.55.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:36:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGortex is an MCP server exposing `write_file`, `edit_file`, and `move_inline` tools. `resolveFilePath` **exempts absolute paths** from confinement, and the write handlers \u2014 unlike `read_file` / `get_symbol_source` \u2014 **never call `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`**. A single MCP `write_file` call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, **outside every indexed repo root** (`AtomicWriteFile`\u0027s `MkdirAll` auto-creates missing parents). Writing `~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`, `.git/hooks/pre-commit`, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project\u0027s own `SECURITY.md` invariant *\"File-path resolution is **confined to indexed repository roots**\"*\n\n### Affected\n`internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go` (+ `tools_move_inline.go`), HEAD `28fa017` (v0.53.0).\n**CWE-22** (Path Traversal) / **CWE-73** (External Control of File Name/Path) \u2192 **CWE-94** (code execution).\n\n### Vulnerable code\n`internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62` `resolveFilePath` exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at `:793` (`AtomicWriteFile`, `write_file`) and `:676` (`edit_file`) run with **no** `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`. The asymmetry is the bug: `read_file` (`:940`) and `get_symbol_source` **do** call `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`; the write path does not.\n\n### PoC (executed)\nThe PoC (`internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go`, package `mcp`) builds the server via the repo\u0027s **own** `newSingleRepoServer(t)` harness and invokes the real `srv.handleWriteFile` through the genuine `mcplib.CallToolRequest` shape:\n```\n=== RUN TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot\n indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo\n handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50\n PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes \"OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root\"\n RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -\u003e \"echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file\"\n VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 (\"It does not write to source files\")\n--- PASS (go test ok)\n```\nThe test asserts the handler did **not** return `IsError` and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)\n\n### Impact\n`write_file` / `edit_file` are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can \u2014 startup/hook/cron files \u2192 arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property `SECURITY.md` promises) is broken on the write path.\n\n### Severity\n**High \u2014 CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` \u2248 8.x.** `UI:R` reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file \u2192 execute on next trigger), so `I:H` + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower \u2014 but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.\n\n### Remediation\nApply `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline`, identically to `read_file` / `get_symbol_source`. Confinement must cover the write path.\n\n### Dedup / freshness (re-verified live)\n`gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories` \u2192 `[]` (none). `gh search prs/issues` for `resolveFilePath` / `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` / symlink / traversal / confinement \u2192 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). `resolveFilePath` / `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` are gortex-own code (not vendored). **Fresh** at HEAD `28fa017`.",
"id": "GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p",
"modified": "2026-11-19T20:36:31Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T20:36:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zzet/gortex/security/advisories/GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zzet/gortex/commit/5ba2f066dd6dcd726c4e61b74851862dc596d994"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zzet/gortex"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zzet/gortex/releases/tag/v0.55.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gortex: Arbitrary file write / repo-confinement escape in `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline` MCP tools \u2192 code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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