GHSA-C3CJ-3P6P-J822
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 00:07 – Updated: 2026-11-20 00:07Summary
jane-php resolves external $ref targets at code-generation time via file_get_contents($ref) (jane-php/json-schema-runtime/Reference.php::doResolve) with no scheme/path restriction. An attacker-controlled OpenAPI document can therefore cause: $ref: 'http://attacker/x' -> SSRF (HTTP GET at gen time; response inlined = RFI); $ref: '/abs/file' -> LFI; $ref: '../secret.yaml' -> path-traversal LFI (CWE-22, arbitrary local JSON/YAML read). Verified 7.11.2/PHP8.1 (listener records the fetch; remote + ../ local content inlined into the generated code). file:// rejected. CWE-918/CWE-98/CWE-611/CWE-22.
Details
// Reference.php::doResolve()
$contents = file_get_contents($fragment); // $fragment = attacker-controlled $ref URI
Impact
Generating PHP with jane from an attacker-influenced OpenAPI document issues HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URLs (SSRF — internal services, cloud metadata) and reads arbitrary local files (LFI via ../), at build/CI time, inlining results into the output.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py, gen.php): runs jane on a remote-$ref spec (local listener records the SSRF, output checked for the inlined response) and a ../-traversal local-$ref spec (output checked for the leaked file).
Suggested fix
Disable remote $ref fetching by default (or allow-list); confine local $ref to the spec directory (reject absolute paths and ..). Don't file_get_contents($ref) on attacker-controlled URIs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "jane-php/open-api-3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-611",
"CWE-918",
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:07:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\njane-php resolves external `$ref` targets at code-generation time via `file_get_contents($ref)` (jane-php/json-schema-runtime/Reference.php::doResolve) with no scheme/path restriction. An attacker-controlled OpenAPI document can therefore cause: `$ref: \u0027http://attacker/x\u0027` -\u003e SSRF (HTTP GET at gen time; response inlined = RFI); `$ref: \u0027/abs/file\u0027` -\u003e LFI; `$ref: \u0027../secret.yaml\u0027` -\u003e path-traversal LFI (CWE-22, arbitrary local JSON/YAML read). Verified 7.11.2/PHP8.1 (listener records the fetch; remote + `../` local content inlined into the generated code). `file://` rejected. CWE-918/CWE-98/CWE-611/CWE-22.\n\n### Details\n```php\n// Reference.php::doResolve()\n$contents = file_get_contents($fragment); // $fragment = attacker-controlled $ref URI\n```\n\n### Impact\nGenerating PHP with jane from an attacker-influenced OpenAPI document issues HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URLs (SSRF \u2014 internal services, cloud metadata) and reads arbitrary local files (LFI via `../`), at build/CI time, inlining results into the output.\n\n### PoC\n`reproduce.sh` (+ `make_spec.py`, `gen.php`): runs jane on a remote-$ref spec (local listener records the SSRF, output checked for the inlined response) and a `../`-traversal local-$ref spec (output checked for the leaked file).\n\n### Suggested fix\nDisable remote `$ref` fetching by default (or allow-list); confine local `$ref` to the spec directory (reject absolute paths and `..`). Don\u0027t `file_get_contents($ref)` on attacker-controlled URIs.\n\n[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497381/maintainer-report.txt)\n[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497382/reproduce.sh)\n[gen.php](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497384/gen.php)\n[make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497385/make_spec.py)",
"id": "GHSA-c3cj-3p6p-j822",
"modified": "2026-11-20T00:07:32Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T00:07:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/security/advisories/GHSA-c3cj-3p6p-j822"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/pull/961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/commit/75f2bbf79ca2f2eeb13080a2cebded1263396b49"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/releases/tag/v7.12.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jane: $ref resolution performs SSRF + LFI (path traversal) at code-generation time (jane-php)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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