CVE-2026-128088 (GCVE-0-2026-128088)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 19:07 – Updated: 2026-11-13 19:07
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock
Summary
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.
Severity
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisori… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a8… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1 | x_refsource_MISC |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "russh",
"vendor": "Eugeny",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.65.0, \u003c 0.65.1"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.2,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-367",
"description": "CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-863",
"description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T19:07:42.568Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a80a7355fcd2fb25e7e00d79aec8184c",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a80a7355fcd2fb25e7e00d79aec8184c"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-128088",
"datePublished": "2026-11-13T19:07:42.568Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-12T21:24:51.131Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T19:07:42.568Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-128088",
"date": "2026-11-16",
"epss": "0.00113",
"percentile": "0.01448"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "russh",
"vendor": "Eugeny",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.65.0, \u003c 0.65.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-128088",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T19:19:31.743",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.2,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-13T19:19:31.630",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a80a7355fcd2fb25e7e00d79aec8184c"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-367"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-863"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Low",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-13T20:55:21+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-128088",
"id": "CVE-2026-128088",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-13T19:07:42.568000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "russh: russh: SSH agent lock bypass via unverified state during confirmation",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-128088.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…