CVE-2026-123867 (GCVE-0-2026-123867)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 18:23 – Updated: 2026-11-12 14:34
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Node.js is vulnerable to a per-host mTLS authorization bypass via a CA-only SNI context failing open to the default CA
Summary
A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with `server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })` but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In `src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc`, `CertCbDone` installs the SNI context's CA only when `setSniContext` succeeds, but `setSniContext` returns `false` for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with `requestCert` and `rejectUnauthorized` enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.
Severity
4.2 (Medium)
CWE
- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/november… | vendor-advisory |
| https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html |
Impacted products
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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