BREW-UFFIZZI-CVE-2026-126349 (GHSA-539F-XCGW-2GJG)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-11-13 11:42 – Updated: 2026-11-13 11:42 – Source websiteImpact
Addressable::IDNA.to_unicode decodes Punycode labels (labels beginning with xn--) that contain characters which change how text is displayed without being visible themselves. These include bidirectional controls such as U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE and U+2066–U+2069, zero-width characters, and other invisible format characters. Addressable::URI#display_uri uses to_unicode, so it can display a host whose characters appear reordered or which looks identical to a different host. For example, the host of http://xn--abcmoc-dm0c.com/ is displayed as abc, U+202E, moc.com, and the override makes everything after abc render right to left.
Parsing, host, normalized_host and any connection made from the URI are not affected. Only the displayed form is. Applications that show display_uri to users (link previews, chat and email clients, admin interfaces) can be used to make a malicious domain look like a trusted one.
- In the pure-Ruby IDNA implementation, all such characters are decoded, including those that IDNA's nameprep profile prohibits.
- In the native IDNA implementation, used when libidn and the
idn-rubygem are installed, libidn rejects most of them, but not characters added to Unicode after version 3.2, such as U+061C and U+2066–U+2069.
Affected Versions
The pure-Ruby IDNA implementation is affected in Addressable >= 2.0.0. The native IDNA implementation is affected in Addressable >= 2.5.2, when to_unicode began accepting characters unassigned in Unicode 3.2. It is fixed in 2.9.1 for both implementations, where such labels are returned unchanged.
Workarounds
- Install libidn and the
idn-rubygem, so that Addressable uses the native IDNA implementation. This reduces the affected characters to those added since Unicode 3.2. - Check displayed hosts for bidirectional and invisible characters (e.g.,
/[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/) and fall back tonormalized_hostwhen one is present.
Credits
Reported by @andrewstellman.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "addressable",
"resource_purl": "pkg:gem/addressable@2.8.7",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2.9.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "uffizzi",
"purl": "pkg:brew/uffizzi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"key": "pkg:gem/addressable@2.8.7",
"name": "addressable",
"resource": "addressable",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2.8.7"
}
]
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`Addressable::IDNA.to_unicode` decodes Punycode labels (labels beginning with `xn--`) that contain characters which change how text is displayed without being visible themselves. These include bidirectional controls such as U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE and U+2066\u2013U+2069, zero-width characters, and other invisible format characters. `Addressable::URI#display_uri` uses `to_unicode`, so it can display a host whose characters appear reordered or which looks identical to a different host. For example, the host of `http://xn--abcmoc-dm0c.com/` is displayed as `abc`, U+202E, `moc.com`, and the override makes everything after `abc` render right to left.\n\nParsing, `host`, `normalized_host` and any connection made from the URI are not affected. Only the displayed form is. Applications that show `display_uri` to users (link previews, chat and email clients, admin interfaces) can be used to make a malicious domain look like a trusted one.\n\n- In the pure-Ruby IDNA implementation, all such characters are decoded, including those that IDNA\u0027s nameprep profile prohibits.\n- In the native IDNA implementation, used when libidn and the `idn-ruby` gem are installed, libidn rejects most of them, but not characters added to Unicode after version 3.2, such as U+061C and U+2066\u2013U+2069.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nThe pure-Ruby IDNA implementation is affected in Addressable \u003e= 2.0.0. The native IDNA implementation is affected in Addressable \u003e= 2.5.2, when `to_unicode` began accepting characters unassigned in Unicode 3.2. It is fixed in 2.9.1 for both implementations, where such labels are returned unchanged.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Install libidn and the `idn-ruby` gem, so that Addressable uses the native IDNA implementation. This reduces the affected characters to those added since Unicode 3.2.\n- Check displayed hosts for bidirectional and invisible characters (e.g., `/[\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/`) and fall back to `normalized_host` when one is present.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by @andrewstellman.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* [Open an issue](https://github.com/sporkmonger/addressable/issues)",
"id": "BREW-uffizzi-CVE-2026-126349",
"modified": "2026-11-13T11:42:58Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T11:42:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sporkmonger/addressable/security/advisories/GHSA-539f-xcgw-2gjg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sporkmonger/addressable/commit/60455d32bb59fda2585a0e1865a9fcb21e8e55b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/addressable/GHSA-539f-xcgw-2gjg.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sporkmonger/addressable"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sporkmonger/addressable/releases/tag/addressable-2.9.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Addressable display_uri can show misleading hosts containing bidi and invisible characters",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-539f-xcgw-2gjg",
"CVE-2026-126349"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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