Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-88

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.

732 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-6X3G-4R88-C5QH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:17 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:17

Details

A vulnerability in the configuration and management database of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of command arguments that are passed to the configuration and management database of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by creating custom functions that contain malicious code and are executed as the vmanage user of the configuration management system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69937.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0345"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-07-18T23:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the configuration and management database of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of command arguments that are passed to the configuration and management database of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by creating custom functions that contain malicious code and are executed as the vmanage user of the configuration management system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69937.",
  "id": "GHSA-6x3g-4r88-c5qh",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:17:52Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:17:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0345"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180718-sdwan-cx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104859"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6X9P-J759-G35G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-08 09:30 – Updated: 2024-10-08 09:30

Details

A vulnerability has been identified in Siemens SINEC Security Monitor (All versions < V4.9.0). The affected application does not properly validate user input to the ssmctl-client command. This could allow an authenticated, lowly privileged remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the underlying OS.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

9.4 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47553"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-08T09:15:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in Siemens SINEC Security Monitor (All versions \u003c V4.9.0). The affected application does not properly validate user input to the ```ssmctl-client``` command.\nThis could allow an authenticated, lowly privileged remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the underlying OS.",
  "id": "GHSA-6x9p-j759-g35g",
  "modified": "2024-10-08T09:30:54Z",
  "published": "2024-10-08T09:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-430425.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-74P7-6H78-GW8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 22:45 – Updated: 2026-06-22 22:45

Summary

skillctl: argument injection, path traversal in --dest, FIFO/device DoS, hardlink exfiltration, and commit-trailer forgery

Details

Impact

Following the path-safety patches in GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 (v0.1.2), a comprehensive multi-angle audit surfaced five further vulnerabilities, now patched in v0.1.3:

source_sha argument injection in git ls-tree (CRITICAL). InstalledSkill.source_sha deserialized from .skills.toml (committed, PR-mergeable) flowed unvalidated into git ls-tree -r -z <refspec> -- <path>. Because the refspec sits before --, an attacker who slipped a malicious .skills.toml into a PR could set source_sha = "--name-only" / --abbrev=0 / --output=… and corrupt the diff classifier (which drives pull / push destructive decisions), or forge a divergence state to trick push --on-divergence overwrite into clobbering the wrong content.
FIFO / device / socket denial-of-service in copy_dir_all (CRITICAL). The file-type branch only checked is_dir() / is_symlink(); a FIFO inside a skill folder fell through to fs::copy, which blocks indefinitely waiting for a writer. A character device like /dev/zero would read until OOM. Reachable on skillctl add against any adversarial library.
add --dest arbitrary-directory wipe in agent mode (HIGH). --dest accepted absolute paths and .. traversal without validation, so a single invocation skillctl add --dest /Users/victim/.ssh --on-conflict overwrite --skill <maliciously-named> would remove_dir_all arbitrary directories — no .skills.toml round-trip required. Reachable in any non-interactive / agent-driven workflow where flag values may be attacker-supplied.
Commit-message trailer forgery via skill names (HIGH). Skill names were spliced verbatim into git commit -m "update skill: <name>" and into the commit.message field of --json output. A skill named foo\nCo-Authored-By: evil@x produced a forged commit trailer that downstream tooling (Linear, GitHub commit-bot, release-notes scrapers) treats as real authorship metadata.
Hardlink exfiltration via the round-trip (HIGH). fs::symlink_metadata reports a regular file for hardlinks (shared inode), and fs::copy reads the target content. An untrusted agent writing <project>/my-skill/data as a hardlink to ~/.ssh/id_rsa would have shipped the SSH key content to the (possibly public) library on the next skillctl push or detect.

Patches

Fixed in v0.1.3:

InstalledSkill::validate rejects any source_sha that isn't 40–64 hex characters.
fs_util::copy_dir_all only allows regular files and directories; FIFO / socket / device / other special files are rejected with AppError::Config.
commands::add::resolve_destination rejects .. unconditionally and rejects absolute paths in non-interactive / --json mode.
New src/sanitize.rs module: validate_identifier (strict, no control bytes / newlines / ESC, used for skill name + individual tags) and validate_message_safe (lenient, allows \n + \t, rejects \r + DEL + C0/C1 controls, used for description and --message). Wired at the skill::discover and read_tags boundaries so poisoned skills are dropped silently and poisoned descriptions/tags are stripped from otherwise-valid skills.
fs_util::copy_dir_all checks metadata.nlink() > 1 on regular files (Unix) and refuses hardlinked content.

All checks are lexical or single-syscall (symlink_metadata, metadata). No canonicalize, no TOCTOU windows. 23 new unit + integration tests cover each rejection class; cargo test: 95 pass; clippy clean; cargo audit clean.

Workarounds

Upgrade to v0.1.3. Pre-patch mitigations are awkward but possible: - Audit every .skills.toml source_sha field before running skillctl pull / push / detect. - Audit library content for FIFO / device files and hardlinks before running skillctl add. - Never invoke skillctl add with attacker-controllable --dest values in agent / CI contexts. - Never use --message with attacker-controlled content.

Credit

The findings were surfaced by a maintainer-led multi-angle audit (6 parallel sub-agents, one per threat-model dimension) following the firebaguette audit that motivated v0.1.2. The methodology (cross-agent convergence to identify the most exploitable items) is documented in the project's internal decisions log; the strongest signal was the four-of-six independent convergence on the source_sha vector.

Resources

Fix commit: 28dfce3
Release: https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3
Prior advisory (path-safety + symlinks): GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "skillctl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-59",
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nFollowing the path-safety patches in [GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47) (v0.1.2), a comprehensive multi-angle audit surfaced five further vulnerabilities, now patched in v0.1.3:\n\n1. **`source_sha` argument injection in `git ls-tree` (CRITICAL).** `InstalledSkill.source_sha` deserialized from `.skills.toml` (committed, PR-mergeable) flowed unvalidated into `git ls-tree -r -z \u003crefspec\u003e -- \u003cpath\u003e`. Because the refspec sits before `--`, an attacker who slipped a malicious `.skills.toml` into a PR could set `source_sha = \"--name-only\"` / `--abbrev=0` / `--output=\u2026` and corrupt the diff classifier (which drives `pull` / `push` destructive decisions), or forge a divergence state to trick `push --on-divergence overwrite` into clobbering the wrong content.\n2. **FIFO / device / socket denial-of-service in `copy_dir_all` (CRITICAL).** The file-type branch only checked `is_dir()` / `is_symlink()`; a FIFO inside a skill folder fell through to `fs::copy`, which blocks indefinitely waiting for a writer. A character device like `/dev/zero` would read until OOM. Reachable on `skillctl add` against any adversarial library.\n3. **`add --dest` arbitrary-directory wipe in agent mode (HIGH).** `--dest` accepted absolute paths and `..` traversal without validation, so a single invocation `skillctl add --dest /Users/victim/.ssh --on-conflict overwrite --skill \u003cmaliciously-named\u003e` would `remove_dir_all` arbitrary directories \u2014 no `.skills.toml` round-trip required. Reachable in any non-interactive / agent-driven workflow where flag values may be attacker-supplied.\n4. **Commit-message trailer forgery via skill names (HIGH).** Skill names were spliced verbatim into `git commit -m \"update skill: \u003cname\u003e\"` and into the `commit.message` field of `--json` output. A skill named `foo\\nCo-Authored-By: evil@x` produced a forged commit trailer that downstream tooling (Linear, GitHub commit-bot, release-notes scrapers) treats as real authorship metadata.\n5. **Hardlink exfiltration via the round-trip (HIGH).** `fs::symlink_metadata` reports a regular file for hardlinks (shared inode), and `fs::copy` reads the target content. An untrusted agent writing `\u003cproject\u003e/my-skill/data` as a hardlink to `~/.ssh/id_rsa` would have shipped the SSH key content to the (possibly public) library on the next `skillctl push` or `detect`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in [v0.1.3](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3):\n\n- `InstalledSkill::validate` rejects any `source_sha` that isn\u0027t 40\u201364 hex characters.\n- `fs_util::copy_dir_all` only allows regular files and directories; FIFO / socket / device / other special files are rejected with `AppError::Config`.\n- `commands::add::resolve_destination` rejects `..` unconditionally and rejects absolute paths in non-interactive / `--json` mode.\n- New `src/sanitize.rs` module: `validate_identifier` (strict, no control bytes / newlines / ESC, used for skill `name` + individual `tags`) and `validate_message_safe` (lenient, allows `\\n` + `\\t`, rejects `\\r` + DEL + C0/C1 controls, used for `description` and `--message`). Wired at the `skill::discover` and `read_tags` boundaries so poisoned skills are dropped silently and poisoned descriptions/tags are stripped from otherwise-valid skills.\n- `fs_util::copy_dir_all` checks `metadata.nlink() \u003e 1` on regular files (Unix) and refuses hardlinked content.\n\nAll checks are lexical or single-syscall (`symlink_metadata`, `metadata`). No `canonicalize`, no TOCTOU windows. 23 new unit + integration tests cover each rejection class; `cargo test`: 95 pass; clippy clean; `cargo audit` clean.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to v0.1.3. Pre-patch mitigations are awkward but possible:\n- Audit every `.skills.toml` `source_sha` field before running `skillctl pull` / `push` / `detect`.\n- Audit library content for FIFO / device files and hardlinks before running `skillctl add`.\n- Never invoke `skillctl add` with attacker-controllable `--dest` values in agent / CI contexts.\n- Never use `--message` with attacker-controlled content.\n\n## Credit\n\nThe findings were surfaced by a maintainer-led multi-angle audit (6 parallel sub-agents, one per threat-model dimension) following the firebaguette audit that motivated v0.1.2. The methodology (cross-agent convergence to identify the most exploitable items) is documented in the project\u0027s internal decisions log; the strongest signal was the four-of-six independent convergence on the `source_sha` vector.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix commit: [28dfce3](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/commit/28dfce3)\n- Release: https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3\n- Prior advisory (path-safety + symlinks): [GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47)",
  "id": "GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8p",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/commit/28dfce3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "skillctl: argument injection, path traversal in --dest, FIFO/device DoS, hardlink exfiltration, and commit-trailer forgery"
}

GHSA-754M-GG4C-75J7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-14 18:32

Details

A vulnerability in the Mitel 6800 Series, 6900 Series, and 6900w Series SIP Phones, including the 6970 Conference Unit, through R6.4.0.HF1 (R6.4.0.136) could allow an unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the phone to conduct an argument injection attack, due to insufficient parameter sanitization. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the system.

Severity

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-41711"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-13T17:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Mitel 6800 Series, 6900 Series, and 6900w Series SIP Phones, including the 6970 Conference Unit, through R6.4.0.HF1 (R6.4.0.136) could allow an unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the phone to conduct an argument injection attack, due to insufficient parameter sanitization. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the system.",
  "id": "GHSA-754m-gg4c-75j7",
  "modified": "2024-08-14T18:32:37Z",
  "published": "2024-08-13T18:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-24-0020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7627-MP87-JF6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-04 21:58

Summary

Command injection in cocoapods-downloader

Details

The package cocoapods-downloader before 1.6.0, from 1.6.2 and before 1.6.3 are vulnerable to Command Injection via git argument injection. When calling the Pod::Downloader.preprocess_options function and using git, both the git and branch parameters are passed to the git ls-remote subcommand in a way that additional flags can be set. The additional flags can be used to perform a command injection.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "cocoapods-downloader"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "cocoapods-downloader"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.6.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24440"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-04T21:58:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The package cocoapods-downloader before 1.6.0, from 1.6.2 and before 1.6.3 are vulnerable to Command Injection via git argument injection. When calling the Pod::Downloader.preprocess_options function and using git, both the git and branch parameters are passed to the git ls-remote subcommand in a way that additional flags can be set. The additional flags can be used to perform a command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-7627-mp87-jf6q",
  "modified": "2022-04-04T21:58:52Z",
  "published": "2022-04-02T00:00:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24440"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CocoaPods/cocoapods-downloader/pull/124"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CocoaPods/cocoapods-downloader/pull/128"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CocoaPods/cocoapods-downloader/commit/52a0d54464932a90ded5a59c71a016e8dec0ca84"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CocoaPods/cocoapods-downloader/commit/b70bc39c75645aa6d4a01a3ca6de40477c84f4b5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CocoaPods/cocoapods-downloader"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/cocoapods-downloader/CVE-2022-24440.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-RUBY-COCOAPODSDOWNLOADER-2414278"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Command injection in cocoapods-downloader"
}

GHSA-7975-FJPP-FMH7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2022-06-17 00:01

Details

Wind River VxWorks 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9.3, 6.9.4, and Vx7 has Incorrect Access Control in IPv4 assignment by the ?ipdhcpc DHCP client component.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-12264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-08-05T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Wind River VxWorks 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9.3, 6.9.4, and Vx7 has Incorrect Access Control in IPv4 assignment by the ?ipdhcpc DHCP client component.",
  "id": "GHSA-7975-fjpp-fmh7",
  "modified": "2022-06-17T00:01:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:52:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-189842.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K41190253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03960en_us"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support2.windriver.com/index.php?page=cve\u0026on=view\u0026id=CVE-2019-12264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.windriver.com/security/announcements/tcp-ip-network-stack-ipnet-urgent11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7F72-6WG4-PRPR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 09:30 – Updated: 2026-03-09 09:30

Details

A low‑privileged local attacker who gains access to the UBR service account (e.g., via SSH) can escalate privileges to obtain full system access. This is due to the service account being permitted to execute certain binaries (e.g., tcpdump and ip) with sudo.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41761"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-09T09:16:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A low\u2011privileged local attacker who gains access to the UBR service account (e.g., via SSH) can escalate privileges to obtain full system access. This is due to the service account being permitted to execute certain binaries (e.g., tcpdump and ip) with sudo.",
  "id": "GHSA-7f72-6wg4-prpr",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T09:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41761"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mbs-solutions.de/mbs-2025-0001"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7J5W-7R7X-9V27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:02

Summary

CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Overview

The git_show tool in DeepSeek-TUI executes git show with the model-supplied rev parameter passed unvalidated into the argv. git show honours the --output=<path> option, so a rev value beginning with --output= is interpreted as a flag rather than a revision. The tool is registered with ApprovalRequirement::Auto and declares ToolCapability::ReadOnly, so the write happens without a user prompt and contradicts the capability the catalog advertises to the model and the user.

This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 (CVE-2026-45374): an auto-approved tool produces an effect outside the boundary the user consented to.

Impact

A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI.

Useful targets reachable as the invoking user:

~/.ssh/authorized_keys
~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile
~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor)
~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files

The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit hash, author/date header, indented commit message, and (when patch=true) diff hunks. The commit subject, body, author identity, and diff text are entirely attacker-controlled because the attacker owns the repository HEAD. The leading commit <hash> line prevents clean overwrite of formats that reject unknown tokens, but is silently ignorable in files parsed as comments-or-text (crontab, dotfiles consumed by tolerant readers) and is irrelevant for the destructive/DoS sub-case (clobbering ~/.ssh/authorized_keys locks the user out; clobbering a project file corrupts source).

Technical Details

Root Cause

crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:

// L196-198
fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement {
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}

// L204-228 (excerpt)
async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> {
    let rev = required_str(&input, "rev")?;
    ...
    let mut args = vec![
        "show".to_string(),
        "--no-color".to_string(),
        "--no-ext-diff".to_string(),
    ];
    if patch { args.push(format!("--unified={unified}")); }
    else     { args.push("--no-patch".to_string()); }
    if stat  { args.push("--stat".to_string()); }
    args.push(rev.to_string());        // unvalidated, no `--end-of-options` sentinel
    ...
}

The JSON schema for rev is {"type": "string"} (L161-164) with no pattern, no enum, and no length cap. required_str performs no semantic validation. The argv has no --end-of-options separator between the trailing options and rev, so git's option parser keeps consuming flags from rev.

The same pattern in git_blame (L322-388) is tracked in a separate advisory.

Why `--output` Works

git show shares its option parser with git log / git diff, which expose --output=<file>. The implementation opens the path with O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC and writes the formatted output there. No permission check beyond the filesystem's own running as the user is sufficient to clobber anything the user owns.

Proof of Concept

The vulnerable argv assembled by the tool when invoked with {"rev": "--output=/home/victim/.bashrc"} is equivalent to:

git show --no-color --no-ext-diff --no-patch --stat --output=/home/victim/.bashrc

Reproduced against system git as a non-root user:

$ id
uid=1001(lowtest) gid=1001(lowtest) groups=1001(lowtest)

$ cd /tmp/lp && git init -q
$ echo a > a.txt && git add a.txt
$ git -c user.email=a@b -c user.name=a commit -q -m "lol"

$ git show --no-color --no-patch "--output=/home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered" HEAD
$ ls -la /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered
-rw-rw-r-- 1 lowtest lowtest 128 May 19 07:05 /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered

End-to-end exploitation path:

Attacker publishes a repository whose AGENTS.md instructs the model to call git_show with rev set to a crafted --output= string targeting a file in the victim's home directory. The same auto-load pathway documented in CVE-2026-45311 applies.
Victim opens the repository in DeepSeek-TUI and issues any prompt that exercises the agent loop.
The model issues the tool call. Because approval_requirement() returns Auto, no approval UI is shown.
git show --output=<path> overwrites the target file with attacker-controlled commit metadata and diff text.

Remediation

Two changes in crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:

Insert an end-of-options sentinel before rev so git stops parsing flags:

rust args.push("--end-of-options".to_string()); args.push(rev.to_string());

Reject rev values that begin with - (or restrict to a revision-shape regex ^[A-Za-z0-9._/^~@:{}-]+$ after the leading character check):

rust if rev.starts_with('-') { return Err(ToolError::invalid_input("rev must not start with '-'")); }

A regression test mirroring run_tests_requires_user_approval (test_runner.rs:197) should assert that rev = "--output=/tmp/x" is rejected.

Severity

9.3 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codewhale-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "codewhale"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75913"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T16:18:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n# Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval\n\n## Overview\n\nThe `git_show` tool in DeepSeek-TUI executes `git show` with the model-supplied `rev` parameter passed unvalidated into the argv. `git show` honours the `--output=\u003cpath\u003e` option, so a `rev` value beginning with `--output=` is interpreted as a flag rather than a revision. The tool is registered with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto` and declares `ToolCapability::ReadOnly`, so the write happens without a user prompt and contradicts the capability the catalog advertises to the model and the user.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 (CVE-2026-45374): an auto-approved tool produces an effect outside the boundary the user consented to.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded `AGENTS.md` is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI.\n\nUseful targets reachable as the invoking user:\n\n- `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`\n- `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.profile`\n- `~/.gitconfig` (chainable into RCE via `core.editor`)\n- `~/.config/**`, `~/.aws/credentials`, project source files\n\nThe written content is the `git show` rendering of HEAD commit hash, author/date header, indented commit message, and (when `patch=true`) diff hunks. The commit subject, body, author identity, and diff text are entirely attacker-controlled because the attacker owns the repository HEAD. The leading `commit \u003chash\u003e` line prevents clean overwrite of formats that reject unknown tokens, but is silently ignorable in files parsed as comments-or-text (crontab, dotfiles consumed by tolerant readers) and is irrelevant for the destructive/DoS sub-case (clobbering `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` locks the user out; clobbering a project file corrupts source).\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs`:\n\n```rust\n// L196-198\nfn approval_requirement(\u0026self) -\u003e ApprovalRequirement {\n    ApprovalRequirement::Auto\n}\n\n// L204-228 (excerpt)\nasync fn execute(\u0026self, input: Value, context: \u0026ToolContext) -\u003e Result\u003cToolResult, ToolError\u003e {\n    let rev = required_str(\u0026input, \"rev\")?;\n    ...\n    let mut args = vec![\n        \"show\".to_string(),\n        \"--no-color\".to_string(),\n        \"--no-ext-diff\".to_string(),\n    ];\n    if patch { args.push(format!(\"--unified={unified}\")); }\n    else     { args.push(\"--no-patch\".to_string()); }\n    if stat  { args.push(\"--stat\".to_string()); }\n    args.push(rev.to_string());        // unvalidated, no `--end-of-options` sentinel\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nThe JSON schema for `rev` is `{\"type\": \"string\"}` (L161-164) with no `pattern`, no enum, and no length cap. `required_str` performs no semantic validation. The argv has no `--end-of-options` separator between the trailing options and `rev`, so git\u0027s option parser keeps consuming flags from `rev`.\n\nThe same pattern in `git_blame` (L322-388) is tracked in a separate advisory.\n\n### Why `--output` Works\n\n`git show` shares its option parser with `git log` / `git diff`, which expose `--output=\u003cfile\u003e`. The implementation opens the path with `O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC` and writes the formatted output there. No permission check beyond the filesystem\u0027s own running as the user is sufficient to clobber anything the user owns.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe vulnerable argv assembled by the tool when invoked with\n`{\"rev\": \"--output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"}` is equivalent to:\n\n```\ngit show --no-color --no-ext-diff --no-patch --stat --output=/home/victim/.bashrc\n```\n\nReproduced against system `git` as a non-root user:\n\n```\n$ id\nuid=1001(lowtest) gid=1001(lowtest) groups=1001(lowtest)\n\n$ cd /tmp/lp \u0026\u0026 git init -q\n$ echo a \u003e a.txt \u0026\u0026 git add a.txt\n$ git -c user.email=a@b -c user.name=a commit -q -m \"lol\"\n\n$ git show --no-color --no-patch \"--output=/home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\" HEAD\n$ ls -la /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\n-rw-rw-r-- 1 lowtest lowtest 128 May 19 07:05 /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\n```\n\nEnd-to-end exploitation path:\n\n- Attacker publishes a repository whose `AGENTS.md` instructs the model to call `git_show` with `rev` set to a crafted `--output=` string targeting a file in the victim\u0027s home directory. The same auto-load pathway documented in CVE-2026-45311 applies.\n- Victim opens the repository in DeepSeek-TUI and issues any prompt that exercises the agent loop.\n- The model issues the tool call. Because `approval_requirement()` returns `Auto`, no approval UI is shown.\n- `git show --output=\u003cpath\u003e` overwrites the target file with attacker-controlled commit metadata and diff text.\n\n## Remediation\n\nTwo changes in `crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs`:\n\nInsert an end-of-options sentinel before `rev` so git stops parsing flags:\n\n   ```rust\n   args.push(\"--end-of-options\".to_string());\n   args.push(rev.to_string());\n   ```\n\nReject `rev` values that begin with `-` (or restrict to a revision-shape\n   regex `^[A-Za-z0-9._/^~@:{}-]+$` after the leading character check):\n\n   ```rust\n   if rev.starts_with(\u0027-\u0027) {\n       return Err(ToolError::invalid_input(\"rev must not start with \u0027-\u0027\"));\n   }\n   ```\n\nA regression test mirroring `run_tests_requires_user_approval` (`test_runner.rs:197`) should assert that `rev = \"--output=/tmp/x\"` is rejected.",
  "id": "GHSA-7j5w-7r7x-9v27",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-7j5w-7r7x-9v27"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75913"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-argument-injection-via-git-show"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval"
}

GHSA-7J77-W563-22RJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:39 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:39

Details

kernel/omap/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_omx.c in the kernel component in Amazon Kindle Fire HD(3rd) Fire OS 4.5.5.3 allows attackers to inject a crafted argument via the argument of an ioctl on device file /dev/rpmsg-omx1 with the command 3221772291, and cause a kernel crash.

Severity

4.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-11020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-10-16T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "kernel/omap/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_omx.c in the kernel component in Amazon Kindle Fire HD(3rd) Fire OS 4.5.5.3 allows attackers to inject a crafted argument via the argument of an ioctl on device file /dev/rpmsg-omx1 with the command 3221772291, and cause a kernel crash.",
  "id": "GHSA-7j77-w563-22rj",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:39:48Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:39:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/datadancer/HIAFuzz/blob/master/CVE-2018-11020.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/datadancer/HIAFuzz/blob/master/CVE-Advisory.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7JX3-JQCP-HHGC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-08 20:54

Withdrawn 2026-09-08

Summary

Duplicate Advisory: GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite

Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "gitpython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.1.57"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T20:54:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T14:17:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.",
  "id": "GHSA-7jx3-jqcp-hhgc",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T20:54:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T15:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
  "withdrawn": "2026-09-08T20:54:21Z"
}

Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Parameterization

Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.

Mitigation MIT-5

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Mitigation

Implementation

Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Mitigation

Implementation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

Mitigation

Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

Mitigation

Implementation

When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Mitigation

Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection

An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.

CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection

An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.

CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads

This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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CWE-88

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Credit

Resources

Maintainer resolution

Argument Injection in git_show Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Overview

Impact

Technical Details

Root Cause

Why --output Works

Proof of Concept

Remediation

Duplicate Advisory

Original Description

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation MIT-5

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection

CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection

CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Why `--output` Works