CWE-1321
AllowedImproperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.
938 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5947-M4FG-XHQG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-03 18:08 – Updated: 2020-08-31 18:46Versions of lodash.mergewith before 4.6.1 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function 'mergeWith' may allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object via __proto__ causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Recommendation
Update to version 4.6.1 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "lodash.mergewith"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:46:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Versions of `lodash.mergewith` before 4.6.1 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function \u0027mergeWith\u0027 may allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of `Object` via `__proto__` causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.\n\n\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 4.6.1 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-5947-m4fg-xhqg",
"modified": "2020-08-31T18:46:11Z",
"published": "2020-09-03T18:08:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1069"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in lodash.mergewith"
}
GHSA-5957-5C94-3V7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 19:10 – Updated: 2026-07-31 19:10Summary
Jodit.configure(options) — and the internal ConfigMerge / ConfigProto helpers — merged user-supplied options into the editor configuration without filtering prototype-mutating keys. A payload nested under an existing plain-object option such as controls could reach and mutate Object.prototype (prototype pollution).
Affected
- Package:
jodit(npm) - Versions:
< 4.12.18 - Public API:
Jodit.configure(options)
Proof of Concept
import { Jodit } from 'jodit';
delete Object.prototype.polluted;
Jodit.configure(JSON.parse('{"controls":{"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}}'));
console.log(({}).polluted); // "yes" (before the fix)
delete Object.prototype.polluted;
Impact
Applications that pass user-controlled or partially user-controlled configuration into Jodit.configure() could be vulnerable to prototype pollution: unexpected property injection, logic bypass, denial of service, or secondary security issues.
Patch
Fixed in 4.12.18 by rejecting __proto__, constructor, and prototype at every merge level in ConfigMerge and ConfigProto.
Credit
Responsibly reported by Junming Wu.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "jodit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.12.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T19:10:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T21:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Jodit.configure(options)` \u2014 and the internal `ConfigMerge` / `ConfigProto` helpers \u2014 merged user-supplied options into the editor configuration without filtering prototype-mutating keys. A payload nested under an existing plain-object option such as `controls` could reach and mutate `Object.prototype` (prototype pollution).\n\n### Affected\n- Package: `jodit` (npm)\n- Versions: `\u003c 4.12.18`\n- Public API: `Jodit.configure(options)`\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```js\nimport { Jodit } from \u0027jodit\u0027;\ndelete Object.prototype.polluted;\nJodit.configure(JSON.parse(\u0027{\"controls\":{\"__proto__\":{\"polluted\":\"yes\"}}}\u0027));\nconsole.log(({}).polluted); // \"yes\" (before the fix)\ndelete Object.prototype.polluted;\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications that pass user-controlled or partially user-controlled configuration into `Jodit.configure()` could be vulnerable to prototype pollution: unexpected property injection, logic bypass, denial of service, or secondary security issues.\n\n### Patch\nFixed in 4.12.18 by rejecting `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` at every merge level in `ConfigMerge` and `ConfigProto`.\n\n### Credit\nResponsibly reported by Junming Wu.",
"id": "GHSA-5957-5c94-3v7w",
"modified": "2026-07-31T19:10:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T19:10:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/security/advisories/GHSA-5957-5c94-3v7w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/commit/d298397bc993793b17145806c15f7dae53f90104"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xdan/jodit/releases/tag/4.12.18"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jodit has prototype pollution via Jodit.configure() / ConfigMerge"
}
GHSA-5F8H-2XPH-WWXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 18:31In Eclipse Theia versions 0.7.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the PreferenceUtils.merge function in @theia/core recursively merges preference values without rejecting prototype-related keys (__proto__, constructor, prototype). Because this function is invoked by PreferenceServiceImpl.doResolve for every preference resolution across scopes (default, user, workspace, folder), a crafted preference value in a workspace settings file (.theia/settings.json or .vscode/settings.json) can pollute Object.prototype when the user opens the workspace, potentially altering application logic across the Theia process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14574"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T11:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Eclipse Theia versions 0.7.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the `PreferenceUtils.merge` function in `@theia/core` recursively merges preference values without rejecting prototype-related keys (`__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`). Because this function is invoked by `PreferenceServiceImpl.doResolve` for every preference resolution across scopes (default, user, workspace, folder), a crafted preference value in a workspace settings file (`.theia/settings.json` or `.vscode/settings.json`) can pollute `Object.prototype` when the user opens the workspace, potentially altering application logic across the Theia process.",
"id": "GHSA-5f8h-2xph-wwxv",
"modified": "2026-08-07T18:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T12:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-theia/theia/security/advisories/GHSA-f3w9-qfw3-xr32"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/157"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/567"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5F97-H2C2-826Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:03A Prototype Pollution issue in API Dev Tools json-schema-ref-parser v.11.0.0 and v.11.1.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the bundle(), parse(), resolve(), dereference() functions.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-29651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-20T21:03:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-20T18:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Prototype Pollution issue in API Dev Tools json-schema-ref-parser v.11.0.0 and v.11.1.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the `bundle()`, `parse()`, `resolve()`, `dereference()` functions.",
"id": "GHSA-5f97-h2c2-826q",
"modified": "2024-05-20T21:03:12Z",
"published": "2024-05-20T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/APIDevTools/json-schema-ref-parser/commit/8cad7f72c15b198f4d0b5b1c8a3a979b2e4baa82"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/tariqhawis/5db76b38112bba756615b688c32409ad"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/APIDevTools/json-schema-ref-parser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "json-schema-ref-parser Prototype Pollution issue"
}
GHSA-5FGG-JCPF-8JJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 17:40 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:29Summary
Versions of i18next-http-middleware prior to 3.9.3 pass user-controlled lng and ns parameters to two internal paths that use them in ways that enable prototype pollution and, depending on the configured backend, path traversal or SSRF.
The vulnerable entry points are unauthenticated HTTP handlers that are part of the middleware's public API:
getResourcesHandler— readslng/nsfrom query parameters or route params and passes them unvalidated to:utils.setPath(resources, [lng, ns], ...)— thesetPathhelper did not guard against__proto__,constructor, orprototypekeys, writing intoObject.prototypewhen those values were supplied.i18next.services.backendConnector.load(languages, namespaces, ...)— depending on the configured backend, unvalidated path segments enabled filesystem path traversal (e.g. withi18next-fs-backend) or SSRF (e.g. withi18next-http-backend).- A
namespaces.forEach(ns => i18next.options.ns.push(ns))loop additionally performed permanent, unbounded growth of the shared singleton namespace list. missingKeyHandler— iterated the incoming request body withfor...in, which traverses inherited prototype-chain properties. A POST body like{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}was forwarded intosaveMissing.
Impact
- Prototype pollution — a single unauthenticated request of the form
GET /locales/resources.json?lng=__proto__&ns=isAdminwrites intoObject.prototype, affecting every plain object created subsequently in the Node.js process. This can break authorization checks (if (user.isAdmin)), cause denial of service via type confusion, or be chained into RCE depending on what downstream code reads from polluted objects. - Path traversal / SSRF — with filesystem or HTTP backends that interpolate
lng/nsinto paths or URLs, attacker-controlled values likens=../../etc/passwdorlng=internal-servicecould reach resources outside the intended scope. - Denial of service — the unbounded
i18next.options.nsgrowth, plus repeated backend load calls, enabled memory and CPU exhaustion from unique namespace payloads.
Affected versions
< 3.9.3.
Patch
Fixed in 3.9.3. The patch:
- Blocks
__proto__,constructor, andprototypekeys inutils.setPath. - Replaces the
for...inbody iteration inmissingKeyHandlerwithObject.keys()plus an explicit dangerous-keys guard. - Introduces a
utils.isSafeIdentifierhelper (denylist approach — still permits any legitimate i18next language code shape) that filterslng/nsvalues for path-traversal, path separators, control characters, prototype keys, and over-long inputs before they reach the backend connector and before they are pushed intoi18next.options.ns.
Workarounds
No workaround short of upgrading. Front-proxying the middleware with a WAF rule that rejects requests containing __proto__, constructor, prototype, .., or control characters in lng/ns query parameters or body keys is a partial mitigation.
Credits
Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next ecosystem.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "i18next-http-middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41690"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:40:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T16:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nVersions of `i18next-http-middleware` prior to 3.9.3 pass user-controlled `lng` and `ns` parameters to two internal paths that use them in ways that enable prototype pollution and, depending on the configured backend, path traversal or SSRF.\n\nThe vulnerable entry points are unauthenticated HTTP handlers that are part of the middleware\u0027s public API:\n\n- `getResourcesHandler` \u2014 reads `lng`/`ns` from query parameters or route params and passes them unvalidated to:\n - `utils.setPath(resources, [lng, ns], ...)` \u2014 the `setPath` helper did not guard against `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` keys, writing into `Object.prototype` when those values were supplied.\n - `i18next.services.backendConnector.load(languages, namespaces, ...)` \u2014 depending on the configured backend, unvalidated path segments enabled filesystem path traversal (e.g. with `i18next-fs-backend`) or SSRF (e.g. with `i18next-http-backend`).\n - A `namespaces.forEach(ns =\u003e i18next.options.ns.push(ns))` loop additionally performed permanent, unbounded growth of the shared singleton namespace list.\n- `missingKeyHandler` \u2014 iterated the incoming request body with `for...in`, which traverses inherited prototype-chain properties. A POST body like `{\"__proto__\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}` was forwarded into `saveMissing`.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Prototype pollution** \u2014 a single unauthenticated request of the form `GET /locales/resources.json?lng=__proto__\u0026ns=isAdmin` writes into `Object.prototype`, affecting every plain object created subsequently in the Node.js process. This can break authorization checks (`if (user.isAdmin)`), cause denial of service via type confusion, or be chained into RCE depending on what downstream code reads from polluted objects.\n- **Path traversal / SSRF** \u2014 with filesystem or HTTP backends that interpolate `lng`/`ns` into paths or URLs, attacker-controlled values like `ns=../../etc/passwd` or `lng=internal-service` could reach resources outside the intended scope.\n- **Denial of service** \u2014 the unbounded `i18next.options.ns` growth, plus repeated backend load calls, enabled memory and CPU exhaustion from unique namespace payloads.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`\u003c 3.9.3`.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **3.9.3**. The patch:\n\n1. Blocks `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` keys in `utils.setPath`.\n2. Replaces the `for...in` body iteration in `missingKeyHandler` with `Object.keys()` plus an explicit dangerous-keys guard.\n3. Introduces a `utils.isSafeIdentifier` helper (denylist approach \u2014 still permits any legitimate i18next language code shape) that filters `lng`/`ns` values for path-traversal, path separators, control characters, prototype keys, and over-long inputs before they reach the backend connector and before they are pushed into `i18next.options.ns`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround short of upgrading. Front-proxying the middleware with a WAF rule that rejects requests containing `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`, `..`, or control characters in `lng`/`ns` query parameters or body keys is a partial mitigation.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered via an internal security audit of the i18next ecosystem.",
"id": "GHSA-5fgg-jcpf-8jjw",
"modified": "2026-05-13T13:29:51Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T17:40:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-middleware/security/advisories/GHSA-5fgg-jcpf-8jjw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41690"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-middleware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.i18next.com/how-to/faq#how-should-the-language-codes-be-formatted"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "i18next-http-middleware: Prototype pollution and path traversal via user-controlled language and namespace parameters"
}
GHSA-5FJ2-4FRQ-GPXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 03:31A prototype pollution vulnerability in Software Mansion React Native Worklets before 0.12.2 allows an attacker-controlled object containing a proto property to modify the prototype of an object created during serialization in clonePlainJSObject in packages/react-native-worklets/src/memory/serializable.native.ts. When affected data is subsequently processed by React Native Worklets, the malformed serialized object can cause the React Native application to crash. This can result in a remotely triggered denial of service in applications that pass attacker-controlled data through the affected serialization path. In applications where the attacker-controlled data is persisted, the denial of service may persist across application restarts or repeated attempts to access the affected content.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97724"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T03:16:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A prototype pollution vulnerability in Software Mansion React Native Worklets before 0.12.2 allows an attacker-controlled object containing a __proto__ property to modify the prototype of an object created during serialization in clonePlainJSObject in packages/react-native-worklets/src/memory/serializable.native.ts. When affected data is subsequently processed by React Native Worklets, the malformed serialized object can cause the React Native application to crash. This can result in a remotely triggered denial of service in applications that pass attacker-controlled data through the affected serialization path. In applications where the attacker-controlled data is persisted, the denial of service may persist across application restarts or repeated attempts to access the affected content.",
"id": "GHSA-5fj2-4frq-gpxm",
"modified": "2026-09-25T03:31:01Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T03:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/software-mansion/react-native-reanimated/issues/10436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/software-mansion/react-native-reanimated/pull/10451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/software-mansion/react-native-reanimated/pull/10462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.swmansion.com/react-native-reanimated"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/software-mansion/react-native-reanimated/releases/tag/worklets-0.12.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:U/V:D/RE:L/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5GMW-XHRV-C9V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:50 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:50tinypool passes worker options to new Worker() by reading them off a plain object whose prototype is Object.prototype. Options the application did not set are resolved through the prototype chain and then passed explicitly to worker_threads.Worker.
Node core ignores Worker options inherited from Object.prototype. By reading them and passing them explicitly, tinypool re-materialises them as own properties and defeats that protection.
Two keys reach code execution:
execArgv— pollutingObject.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', '/path/to/attacker.js']causes every pool worker to load the attacker's script.env— pollutingObject.prototype.env = { NODE_OPTIONS: '--require /path/to/attacker.js' }achieves the same via environment injection.
Root cause
dist/index.js lines 508-511:
env: this.options.env,
argv: this.options.argv,
execArgv: this.options.execArgv,
resourceLimits: this.options.resourceLimits,
this.options is built at line 470 via object spread:
this.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 };
Impact
Arbitrary code execution inside every worker the pool spawns, with the privileges of the host process. Because tinypool is the worker pool behind Vitest (~42M downloads/week), the natural blast radius is developer machines and CI runners — an attacker who lands a prototype-pollution primitive anywhere in the dependency tree gets code execution in the build/test pipeline, which is a supply-chain foothold (access to CI secrets, signing keys, artifact publishing).
Proof of concept
Minimal reproduction (3 files):
worker.mjs — the application's own legitimate worker:
export default function double(n) { return n * 2 }
payload.js — attacker-controlled code (never referenced by the app):
const fs = require('fs')
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt', 'code execution achieved, pid=' + process.pid)
console.log('*** RCE ***')
app.js — normal tinypool usage:
const path = require('path')
// Simulates an upstream PP source (lodash/qs/minimist/set-value/deepmerge)
Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', path.join(__dirname, 'payload.js')]
const { Tinypool } = require('tinypool')
const pool = new Tinypool({
filename: path.join(__dirname, 'worker.mjs'),
minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 1
})
pool.run(21).then(r => {
console.log('pool returned:', r) // 42 — app works normally
pool.destroy()
})
Run:
npm i tinypool@2.1.0
node app.js
cat /tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt # attacker's code ran
Both execArgv and env vectors confirmed on Node 20.
Suggested fix
Resolve worker options with own-property semantics:
this.options = Object.assign(Object.create(null),
kDefaultOptions, options, { filename, maxQueue: 0 });
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tinypool"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:50:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "`tinypool` passes worker options to `new Worker()` by reading them off a plain object whose prototype is `Object.prototype`. Options the application did not set are resolved through the prototype chain and then passed explicitly to `worker_threads.Worker`.\n\nNode core ignores `Worker` options inherited from `Object.prototype`. By reading them and passing them explicitly, tinypool re-materialises them as own properties and defeats that protection.\n\n\nTwo keys reach code execution:\n\n1. **`execArgv`** \u2014 polluting `Object.prototype.execArgv = [\u0027--require\u0027, \u0027/path/to/attacker.js\u0027]` causes every pool worker to load the attacker\u0027s script.\n2. **`env`** \u2014 polluting `Object.prototype.env = { NODE_OPTIONS: \u0027--require /path/to/attacker.js\u0027 }` achieves the same via environment injection.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`dist/index.js` lines 508-511:\n\n```js\nenv: this.options.env,\nargv: this.options.argv,\nexecArgv: this.options.execArgv,\nresourceLimits: this.options.resourceLimits,\n```\n\n`this.options` is built at line 470 via object spread:\n\n```js\nthis.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 };\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution inside every worker the pool spawns, with the privileges of the host process. Because tinypool is the worker pool behind Vitest (~42M downloads/week), the natural blast radius is developer machines and CI runners \u2014 an attacker who lands a prototype-pollution primitive anywhere in the dependency tree gets code execution in the build/test pipeline, which is a supply-chain foothold (access to CI secrets, signing keys, artifact publishing).\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nMinimal reproduction (3 files):\n\n**worker.mjs** \u2014 the application\u0027s own legitimate worker:\n```js\nexport default function double(n) { return n * 2 }\n```\n\n**payload.js** \u2014 attacker-controlled code (never referenced by the app):\n```js\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027)\nfs.writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt\u0027, \u0027code execution achieved, pid=\u0027 + process.pid)\nconsole.log(\u0027*** RCE ***\u0027)\n```\n\n**app.js** \u2014 normal tinypool usage:\n```js\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027)\n\n// Simulates an upstream PP source (lodash/qs/minimist/set-value/deepmerge)\nObject.prototype.execArgv = [\u0027--require\u0027, path.join(__dirname, \u0027payload.js\u0027)]\n\nconst { Tinypool } = require(\u0027tinypool\u0027)\nconst pool = new Tinypool({\n filename: path.join(__dirname, \u0027worker.mjs\u0027),\n minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 1\n})\npool.run(21).then(r =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027pool returned:\u0027, r) // 42 \u2014 app works normally\n pool.destroy()\n})\n```\n\nRun:\n```\nnpm i tinypool@2.1.0\nnode app.js\ncat /tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt # attacker\u0027s code ran\n```\n\nBoth `execArgv` and `env` vectors confirmed on Node 20.\n\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nResolve worker options with own-property semantics:\n\n```js\nthis.options = Object.assign(Object.create(null),\n kDefaultOptions, options, { filename, maxQueue: 0 });\n```",
"id": "GHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3",
"modified": "2026-10-05T22:50:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T22:50:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinylibs/tinypool/security/advisories/GHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinylibs/tinypool/pull/134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinylibs/tinypool/commit/24df4e730e7d0857a6d226c9b58f8924227404fd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tinylibs/tinypool"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinylibs/tinypool/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Tinypool: Prototype Pollution gadget in worker options leads to Remote Code Execution"
}
GHSA-5J86-7R7M-P8H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 00:57 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:44Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can crash the Parse Server process by calling a Cloud Function endpoint with a prototype property name as the function name. The server recurses infinitely, causing a call stack size error that terminates the process.
Other prototype property names bypass Cloud Function dispatch validation and return HTTP 200 responses, even though no such Cloud Functions are defined. The same applies to dot-notation traversal.
All Parse Server deployments that expose the Cloud Function endpoint are affected.
Patches
The internal handler registries for Cloud Functions, Jobs, Triggers, and Validators have been changed to prevent prototype chain properties from being resolved.
Workarounds
Place a reverse proxy or WAF in front of Parse Server and block requests to Object.prototype property names.
References
- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6
- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.2
- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.13
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.1-alpha.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T00:57:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can crash the Parse Server process by calling a Cloud Function endpoint with a prototype property name as the function name. The server recurses infinitely, causing a call stack size error that terminates the process.\n\nOther prototype property names bypass Cloud Function dispatch validation and return HTTP 200 responses, even though no such Cloud Functions are defined. The same applies to dot-notation traversal.\n\nAll Parse Server deployments that expose the Cloud Function endpoint are affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe internal handler registries for Cloud Functions, Jobs, Triggers, and Validators have been changed to prevent prototype chain properties from being resolved.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nPlace a reverse proxy or WAF in front of Parse Server and block requests to `Object.prototype` property names.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.2\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.13",
"id": "GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:44:51Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T00:57:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30939"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Parse Server has Denial of Service (DoS) and Cloud Function Dispatch Bypass via Prototype Chain Resolution"
}
GHSA-5P42-M6F3-HPMJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-17 00:30 – Updated: 2023-08-24 22:28A Prototype Pollution issue in Cronvel Tree-kit v.0.7.4 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the extend function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tree-kit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-17T19:06:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-16T22:15:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A Prototype Pollution issue in Cronvel Tree-kit v.0.7.4 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the extend function.",
"id": "GHSA-5p42-m6f3-hpmj",
"modified": "2023-08-24T22:28:41Z",
"published": "2023-08-17T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cronvel/tree-kit/commit/61bf10cf0dbddaeea3f198cfe7cb469f360d82bc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cronvel/tree-kit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.code-intelligence.com/blog/treekit-prototype-pollution-cve-2023-38894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tree-kit.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "tree-kit Prototype Pollution vulnerability"
}
GHSA-5PG7-V24C-9RP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-18 01:53 – Updated: 2021-04-19 22:11Prototype pollution vulnerability in 'controlled-merge' versions 1.0.0 through 1.2.0 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "controlled-merge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-28268"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-19T22:11:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-11-15T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Prototype pollution vulnerability in \u0027controlled-merge\u0027 versions 1.0.0 through 1.2.0 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-5pg7-v24c-9rp9",
"modified": "2021-04-19T22:11:46Z",
"published": "2021-05-18T01:53:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28268"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hlfshell/controlled-merge/commit/5a4b2e9ffe5a0be7f8843d4ab038599d3ae5f9d4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/controlled-merge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.whitesourcesoftware.com/vulnerability-database/CVE-2020-28268"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype pollution in controlled-merge"
}
Mitigation
By freezing the object prototype first (for example, Object.freeze(Object.prototype)), modification of the prototype becomes impossible.
Mitigation
By blocking modifications of attributes that resolve to object prototype, such as proto or prototype, this weakness can be mitigated.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
When handling untrusted objects, validating using a schema can be used.
Mitigation
By using an object without prototypes (via Object.create(null) ), adding object prototype attributes by accessing the prototype via the special attributes becomes impossible, mitigating this weakness.
Mitigation
Map can be used instead of objects in most cases. If Map methods are used instead of object attributes, it is not possible to access the object prototype or modify it.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-180: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels
An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.