UBUNTU-CVE-2026-71886 (CVE-2026-71886)
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-05 00:00 – Updated: 2026-10-05 00:00 – Source websiteIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/xenial"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.49+dfsg-3ubuntu1",
"1.51-4ubuntu1",
"1.51-4ubuntu1+esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/bionic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.57-1",
"1.58-1",
"1.59-1",
"1.59-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/focal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.61-1",
"1.61-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbctls-java",
"binary_version": "1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.68-2",
"1.68-4",
"1.68-5",
"1.68-5ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcjmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbctls-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcutil-java",
"binary_version": "1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.72-2",
"1.77-1",
"1.77-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "libbcjmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcmail-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpg-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcpkix-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcprov-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbctls-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libbcutil-java",
"binary_version": "1.80-3"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "bouncycastle",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/bouncycastle@1.80-3?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.80-3"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component\u0027s binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker\u0027s assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key\u0027s signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key\u0027s identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-71886",
"modified": "2026-10-05T00:00:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-71886"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71886"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-71886"
]
}
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