UBUNTU-CVE-2026-116794 (CVE-2026-116794)
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-28 18:17 – Updated: 2026-11-05 04:42 – Source websiterussh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "librust-russh-dev",
"binary_version": "0.57.1-2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
"name": "rust-russh",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/rust-russh@0.57.1-2?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.57.1-2"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server\u0027s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-116794",
"modified": "2026-11-05T04:42:49Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T18:17:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-116794"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-116794"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/62db6e7defd6d244159da962ccccb029e785ce0f"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.0"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-116794"
]
}
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