TS-2026-015

Vulnerability from tailscale - Published: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Description: Memory exhaustion in Tailscale SSH session handling could lead to denial of service.

What happened?

Tailscale SSH provides a secure shell server integrated into tailscaled. An issue in the embedded SSH server's session handling allowed authenticated peers to cause unbounded memory growth in the tailscaled process. This occurred through continuous window-change messages and environment variable appends within a session. These allocations persisted even after the peer disconnected.

Tailscale now bounds the memory used for session handling and releases it when the peer disconnects.

This vulnerability is fixed in Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.

What was the impact?

An attacker could exhaust available memory on the host, leading to an out-of-memory (OOM) kill of the tailscaled process. Because tailscaled is central to all node networking state, such a crash disrupts every Tailscale connection on the node.

Who was affected?

This issue affects nodes running the Tailscale SSH server. An authenticated SSH session permitted by policy is required to trigger the condition.

What do I need to do?

If you use Tailscale SSH, upgrade to Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.

Show details on source website

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  "published": "Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT",
  "summary": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eDescription\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e: Memory exhaustion in Tailscale SSH session handling could lead to denial of service.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat happened?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"https://tailscale.com/docs/features/tailscale-ssh\"\u003eTailscale SSH\u003c/a\u003e provides a secure shell server integrated into \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e. An issue in the embedded SSH server\u0027s session handling allowed authenticated peers to cause unbounded memory growth in the \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e process. This occurred through continuous window-change messages and environment variable appends within a session. These allocations persisted even after the peer disconnected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale now bounds the memory used for session handling and releases it when the peer disconnects.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability is fixed in Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat was the impact?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker could exhaust available memory on the host, leading to an out-of-memory (OOM) kill of the \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e process. Because \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e is central to all node networking state, such a crash disrupts every Tailscale connection on the node.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWho was affected?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects nodes running the Tailscale SSH server. An authenticated SSH session permitted by policy is required to trigger the condition.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat do I need to do?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf you use Tailscale SSH, upgrade to Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.\u003c/p\u003e",
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    "base": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/index.xml",
    "language": null,
    "type": "text/html",
    "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eDescription\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e: Memory exhaustion in Tailscale SSH session handling could lead to denial of service.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat happened?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"https://tailscale.com/docs/features/tailscale-ssh\"\u003eTailscale SSH\u003c/a\u003e provides a secure shell server integrated into \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e. An issue in the embedded SSH server\u0027s session handling allowed authenticated peers to cause unbounded memory growth in the \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e process. This occurred through continuous window-change messages and environment variable appends within a session. These allocations persisted even after the peer disconnected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale now bounds the memory used for session handling and releases it when the peer disconnects.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability is fixed in Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat was the impact?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker could exhaust available memory on the host, leading to an out-of-memory (OOM) kill of the \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e process. Because \u003ccode\u003etailscaled\u003c/code\u003e is central to all node networking state, such a crash disrupts every Tailscale connection on the node.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWho was affected?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects nodes running the Tailscale SSH server. An authenticated SSH session permitted by policy is required to trigger the condition.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat do I need to do?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf you use Tailscale SSH, upgrade to Tailscale version 1.104.4 or newer.\u003c/p\u003e"
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    "value": "TS-2026-015"
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Sightings

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Nomenclature

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