RUSTSEC-2026-0517 (CVE-2026-123584)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 14:21 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Spoofed malformed UDP datagrams abort DNS lookups
Details

While waiting for a reply on a UDP connection, the client parsed every datagram that arrived from the name server's address and port before checking its message ID. If parsing failed, the attempt ended with an error instead of dropping the datagram and waiting for the real reply. The receive loop also gave up after three datagrams.

An off-path attacker who can guess the client's source port, but not the transaction ID, can send one malformed datagram with a spoofed source address and make the pending lookup fail.

The fix reads the message ID from the first two bytes before parsing, ignores short datagrams and datagrams with the wrong ID, keeps listening until the outer timeout, and only then parses the response. It is in 0.26.2.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "hickory-net",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-net"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.26.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-123584",
    "GHSA-v44v-c8m4-gc43"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "While waiting for a reply on a UDP connection, the client parsed every datagram that arrived from the name server\u0027s address and port before checking its message ID. If parsing failed, the attempt ended with an error instead of dropping the datagram and waiting for the real reply. The receive loop also gave up after three datagrams.\n\nAn off-path attacker who can guess the client\u0027s source port, but not the transaction ID, can send one malformed datagram with a spoofed source address and make the pending lookup fail.\n\nThe fix reads the message ID from the first two bytes before parsing, ignores short datagrams and datagrams with the wrong ID, keeps listening until the outer timeout, and only then parses the response. It is in 0.26.2.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0517",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T14:21:59Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-net"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0517.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/07ff35c1b33c1df27e398cee463e424cef951a82"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Spoofed malformed UDP datagrams abort DNS lookups"
}



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