RUSTSEC-2026-0515 (CVE-2026-123606)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 14:21 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Recursor followed every glueless name server in a referral, with no per-query budget
Details

When a referral listed name servers outside the delegated zone and gave no glue addresses, the recursor looked up A and AAAA records for every listed name server, recursing into each one. Only the chain-depth limits applied. There was no cap on how many name servers it chased per referral or on the total upstream work per client query.

Someone who controls a zone can return referrals that list many glueless name servers in a victim's domain, and nest them, so that each client query makes the recursor send a large number of queries to the victim's servers (the NXNSAttack pattern). The same can exhaust the recursor's own resources.

This affects the recursive resolver, which is in hickory-resolver behind the opt-in recursor feature from 0.26.0-beta.1. Earlier releases shipped it as the separate hickory-recursor crate.

From 0.26.2 the recursor follows at most 5 glueless name servers per delegation and sends at most 200 upstream queries per client request.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "hickory-resolver",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-resolver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.26.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-123606",
    "GHSA-6h5c-jjg5-wj59"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "When a referral listed name servers outside the delegated zone and gave no glue addresses, the recursor looked up A and AAAA records for every listed name server, recursing into each one. Only the chain-depth limits applied. There was no cap on how many name servers it chased per referral or on the total upstream work per client query.\n\nSomeone who controls a zone can return referrals that list many glueless name servers in a victim\u0027s domain, and nest them, so that each client query makes the recursor send a large number of queries to the victim\u0027s servers (the NXNSAttack pattern). The same can exhaust the recursor\u0027s own resources.\n\nThis affects the recursive resolver, which is in hickory-resolver behind the opt-in `recursor` feature from 0.26.0-beta.1. Earlier releases shipped it as the separate hickory-recursor crate.\n\nFrom 0.26.2 the recursor follows at most 5 glueless name servers per delegation and sends at most 200 upstream queries per client request.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0515",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T14:21:59Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-resolver"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0515.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/74062f3a3ef6904b64717dd025945702b2cf4133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/47cd005b8f3d190134bbb943d2328ef8a83ade8c"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Recursor followed every glueless name server in a referral, with no per-query budget"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…