RUSTSEC-2026-0515 (CVE-2026-123606)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 14:21 – Source websiteWhen a referral listed name servers outside the delegated zone and gave no glue addresses, the recursor looked up A and AAAA records for every listed name server, recursing into each one. Only the chain-depth limits applied. There was no cap on how many name servers it chased per referral or on the total upstream work per client query.
Someone who controls a zone can return referrals that list many glueless name servers in a victim's domain, and nest them, so that each client query makes the recursor send a large number of queries to the victim's servers (the NXNSAttack pattern). The same can exhaust the recursor's own resources.
This affects the recursive resolver, which is in hickory-resolver behind the opt-in recursor feature from 0.26.0-beta.1. Earlier releases shipped it as the separate hickory-recursor crate.
From 0.26.2 the recursor follows at most 5 glueless name servers per delegation and sends at most 200 upstream queries per client request.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"denial-of-service"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-resolver",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-resolver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.26.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.2"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123606",
"GHSA-6h5c-jjg5-wj59"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "When a referral listed name servers outside the delegated zone and gave no glue addresses, the recursor looked up A and AAAA records for every listed name server, recursing into each one. Only the chain-depth limits applied. There was no cap on how many name servers it chased per referral or on the total upstream work per client query.\n\nSomeone who controls a zone can return referrals that list many glueless name servers in a victim\u0027s domain, and nest them, so that each client query makes the recursor send a large number of queries to the victim\u0027s servers (the NXNSAttack pattern). The same can exhaust the recursor\u0027s own resources.\n\nThis affects the recursive resolver, which is in hickory-resolver behind the opt-in `recursor` feature from 0.26.0-beta.1. Earlier releases shipped it as the separate hickory-recursor crate.\n\nFrom 0.26.2 the recursor follows at most 5 glueless name servers per delegation and sends at most 200 upstream queries per client request.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0515",
"modified": "2026-11-12T14:21:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-resolver"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0515.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/74062f3a3ef6904b64717dd025945702b2cf4133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/47cd005b8f3d190134bbb943d2328ef8a83ade8c"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Recursor followed every glueless name server in a referral, with no per-query budget"
}
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|---|
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