RUSTSEC-2026-0511 (CVE-2026-123594)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 14:21 – Source websiteUp to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.
From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-proto",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-proto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.0-beta.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123594",
"GHSA-86vr-jm6c-7cpg"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto\u0027s NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record\u0027s next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.\n\nFrom 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0511",
"modified": "2026-11-12T14:21:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-proto"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0511.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/bfbe7ede4021965526f065be9b415945ce575e29"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)"
}
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