RUSTSEC-2026-0508 (CVE-2026-123587)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 13:59 – Source websiteThe last NSEC record in a zone points back to the zone apex. To recognise it, DNSSEC validation treated an NSEC record as covering every name after its owner when its next domain name equalled the owner name of an SOA record in the response. That SOA record did not have to pass validation.
An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can replay a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG, add a forged SOA record whose name equals that NSEC record's next domain name, and so make the validator accept that any name sorting after the NSEC owner does not exist.
This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.
The fix recognises a wraparound NSEC record from the chain itself (its next domain name sorts at or before its owner and is the zone of the queried name) and only uses validated SOA records. It is in 0.26.2.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-net",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-net"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.2"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123587",
"GHSA-qw83-5pm2-ggp5"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "The last NSEC record in a zone points back to the zone apex. To recognise it, DNSSEC validation treated an NSEC record as covering every name after its owner when its next domain name equalled the owner name of an SOA record in the response. That SOA record did not have to pass validation.\n\nAn attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can replay a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG, add a forged SOA record whose name equals that NSEC record\u0027s next domain name, and so make the validator accept that any name sorting after the NSEC owner does not exist.\n\nThis affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`.\n\nThe fix recognises a wraparound NSEC record from the chain itself (its next domain name sorts at or before its owner and is the zone of the queried name) and only uses validated SOA records. It is in 0.26.2.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0508",
"modified": "2026-11-12T13:59:45Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-net"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0508.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/e5ca40a7ef149ba5a79bc6f4916f114d153ce9ab"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "NSEC wraparound detection trusted an unvalidated SOA record"
}
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