RUSTSEC-2026-0507 (CVE-2026-123605)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-03 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 13:59 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
RRSIG signer name was not checked against the zone of the signed records
Details

DNSSEC validation checked an RRset against the DNSKEYs of whatever zone was named in the RRSIG's Signer's Name field. RFC 4035 section 5.3.1 requires that name to be the zone that contains the RRset, but this was not checked.

Anyone who controls a DNSSEC-signed zone, and can answer or modify DNS responses, can therefore sign records for names in an unrelated zone with their own keys and have the validator accept them as secure.

This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle (resolver, recursor and client) when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.

The fix ignores an RRSIG whose signer name is not the RRset's owner name or one of its ancestors. It is in 0.26.2.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "privilege-escalation"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "hickory-net",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/hickory-net"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-123605",
    "GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "DNSSEC validation checked an RRset against the DNSKEYs of whatever zone was named in the RRSIG\u0027s Signer\u0027s Name field. RFC 4035 section 5.3.1 requires that name to be the zone that contains the RRset, but this was not checked.\n\nAnyone who controls a DNSSEC-signed zone, and can answer or modify DNS responses, can therefore sign records for names in an unrelated zone with their own keys and have the validator accept them as secure.\n\nThis affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` (resolver, recursor and client) when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`.\n\nThe fix ignores an RRSIG whose signer name is not the RRset\u0027s owner name or one of its ancestors. It is in 0.26.2.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0507",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T13:59:45Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/hickory-net"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0507.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/019535e011131c52d19cb6a2c7a2d31270271135"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "RRSIG signer name was not checked against the zone of the signed records"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…